Tethered Eagle
Tethered Eagle
Air Power and the Future of Iraq
9/15/2008
James Ellison Mason
There has been very little public discussion of the need to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force but that endeavor is crucial to our extrication from the conflict. The desire to have the Iraqi Army stand on its own is shared by both the U.S. and Iraqi governments, but until they can provide their own close air support and combat air patrols the U.S. will have a presence in the country. While this may not involve offensive operations by ground forces, the air element and more importantly, all of the support personnel will still be in theater and open to attack. To understand how this situation came about it is important to look at our war fighting skills, how they are/were employed and what needed to be done to support the gains of our air force.
Air Supremacy is defined as; “That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference”. (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ) To achieve this, the U.S. Military has developed a doctrine of overwhelming firepower targeted at C3 nodes (Communications command and control) as well as an enhanced SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) capability. These tactics combined with the destruction of a nation’s infrastructure render an enemies ability to conduct air operations into nonexistence. This can be observed by the attrition of the Iraqi Air Force. During the 1980s the IAF was able to conduct mission both offensive and defensive against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Even after eight years of war the Iraqis had a formidable air force. At the start of the first Gulf War in 1990 the IAF numbered:
Bombers: 16
Fighter/Attack: 390
Fighters: 245
Transport: 47
(Global Security.org )
As of 2008 the IAF has no fighter or attack aircraft and only three C-130 transport. The bulk of the force is made up of trainers and light observation/reconnaissance aircraft. Although this attrition saved lives during the wars the efficiency with which it was carried out now puts the U.S. in the position of being Iraq’s air force for the foreseeable future. Building an effective army from the ground up takes a less time than doing the same with an air force. Bearing this in mind, it is safe to say that the U.S. will be involved in Iraq for a long time. With Iraq’s corruption and violence the creation of an air force will be an uphill battle, one which the U.S. will have no choice but to participate in.
Recently the Iraqi’s have put in requests for over $10 Billion. While this is a positive step, money alone is only part of the problem. According to Defense Industry Daily:
“In the end, all of the relevant decisions will be political, rather than military, choices. At present, the odds are that Iraq will fly F-16 C/D aircraft in the Block 25-50 range, beginning around 2010. Alongside a reduced but still present USAF, which will remain in Iraq beyond 2011.” (Defense Industry Daily 7 Sep 2008.)
The problem is political. We have reached a point militarily where we can do anything we want to do as fast as we want to do it. In World War II it took the U.S. four years to get to Berlin. In that time The Marshal plan was formulated and therefore our victory was supported by a plan for peace. We made it to Baghdad in three weeks and had no plan let alone a blueprint for an air force. In military science it is important to be a forward thinker or risk trying to fight todays war as you fought the last one. Today, it is the politicians who have to keep up. This qugmire was cause by a lack of thinking at the political level. Wars today involve the calm after the battle as well as the battles themselves. Unfortunately air power costs money and money comes from governments.
Air Power and the Future of Iraq
9/15/2008
James Ellison Mason
There has been very little public discussion of the need to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force but that endeavor is crucial to our extrication from the conflict. The desire to have the Iraqi Army stand on its own is shared by both the U.S. and Iraqi governments, but until they can provide their own close air support and combat air patrols the U.S. will have a presence in the country. While this may not involve offensive operations by ground forces, the air element and more importantly, all of the support personnel will still be in theater and open to attack. To understand how this situation came about it is important to look at our war fighting skills, how they are/were employed and what needed to be done to support the gains of our air force.
Air Supremacy is defined as; “That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference”. (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ) To achieve this, the U.S. Military has developed a doctrine of overwhelming firepower targeted at C3 nodes (Communications command and control) as well as an enhanced SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) capability. These tactics combined with the destruction of a nation’s infrastructure render an enemies ability to conduct air operations into nonexistence. This can be observed by the attrition of the Iraqi Air Force. During the 1980s the IAF was able to conduct mission both offensive and defensive against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Even after eight years of war the Iraqis had a formidable air force. At the start of the first Gulf War in 1990 the IAF numbered:
Bombers: 16
Fighter/Attack: 390
Fighters: 245
Transport: 47
(Global Security.org )
As of 2008 the IAF has no fighter or attack aircraft and only three C-130 transport. The bulk of the force is made up of trainers and light observation/reconnaissance aircraft. Although this attrition saved lives during the wars the efficiency with which it was carried out now puts the U.S. in the position of being Iraq’s air force for the foreseeable future. Building an effective army from the ground up takes a less time than doing the same with an air force. Bearing this in mind, it is safe to say that the U.S. will be involved in Iraq for a long time. With Iraq’s corruption and violence the creation of an air force will be an uphill battle, one which the U.S. will have no choice but to participate in.
Recently the Iraqi’s have put in requests for over $10 Billion. While this is a positive step, money alone is only part of the problem. According to Defense Industry Daily:
“In the end, all of the relevant decisions will be political, rather than military, choices. At present, the odds are that Iraq will fly F-16 C/D aircraft in the Block 25-50 range, beginning around 2010. Alongside a reduced but still present USAF, which will remain in Iraq beyond 2011.” (Defense Industry Daily 7 Sep 2008.)
The problem is political. We have reached a point militarily where we can do anything we want to do as fast as we want to do it. In World War II it took the U.S. four years to get to Berlin. In that time The Marshal plan was formulated and therefore our victory was supported by a plan for peace. We made it to Baghdad in three weeks and had no plan let alone a blueprint for an air force. In military science it is important to be a forward thinker or risk trying to fight todays war as you fought the last one. Today, it is the politicians who have to keep up. This qugmire was cause by a lack of thinking at the political level. Wars today involve the calm after the battle as well as the battles themselves. Unfortunately air power costs money and money comes from governments.