The imparative Gambit
The Imperative Gambit
The need and consequences of Direct Action Ops in Pakistan
James Mason
9/22/2008
ENG 102 Mary Olea
D006 Sum 08
Something must be done but too much shouldn’t be done. That sentence is a succinct assessment of the challenges the next president will face regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is not one person in the United States that would disagree with directly combating the terrorist that are responsible for the attacks of September 11th, 2001. With that in mind it is safe to say that the next president will have to reign in emotions( his own as well as those of the public) in order to deal with one of the most complex situations in our history. Not only is Pakistan an ally in an area where we have few friends, they are also a nuclear armed nation with an unstable government and a lawless region on the northwest border. The Inter Service Intelligence Service (ISI) plays a dominant role in the country and it is riddled with Islamist sympathizers making it a frustrating ally at best. There is no silver bulled to solve all our problems in the region but there are some basic issues that should be addressed. Please bear in mind these steps are easier said than done.
Cleaning the ISI of Islamist sympathizers is the most difficult and one of the most important steps that needs to be taken. It is difficult because it is out of our hands but, a service without integrity is useless especially in the field of intelligence. One reason this is critical is the structure of the ISI. Unlike the CIA the ISI is an intelligence service for all branches of the military, so if they are corrupt field operations can be placed in jeopardy. An exapmple of this problem can be seen with the ease with which Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani moves through the tribal areas of Pakistan . According to Mullah Nasrullah (another leader) Haqqani “Feels invincible. The ISI protects him.”(Hosenball 2008) During the same interview Nasrullah’s convoy was repeatedly waved through Pakistani army check points after they radioed ahead to a mysterious “Col. Niazi.” (Hosenball 2008)
Supporting the new Pakistani government is something the U.S. should do, will do, and has done. What needs to be looked at is not our material support alone but our image and that of the Pakistani government. The Pakistanis are doing more fighting in the tribal areas than the U.S. is giving them credit for but they are fighting with one hand tied behind their back. In a land where religious affiliation and cultural norms are of paramount consideration, it would be best to find a way to have the Pakistani army win hearts and minds for us. There is evidence they are capable of doing just that. Some tribal elders are turning against the Taliban with the belief that the militants are to blame for unrest in the region. (BBC 2008) If this sentiment can be harnessed and untilized without making it apear to be supported by the U.S. then progress can be made.
What should not be done in the region is relying on brute force to solve complex issues. Unilateral direct action operations should not be carried out without explicit undeniable intelligence. The current administration has been too reliant on direct action and in this instance it could do more harm than good, even if the missions are successful. Excluding the killing or capture of Al Qaeda’s top two, strikes with Pakistan should be extremely limited. Even if there is minimal collateral damage the outcry would negate any advantage gained from the killing of actual militants. In fact, it allows the insurgents to gain sympathy.
Another solution that is just as bad as diredt action is throwing money at the Pakistani military with no preconditions. Having the Pakistani army kill other Pakistanis with the latest U.S. Equipment will only undermine our efforts at winning hearts and mind. It is true that we need to supply them but, both governments should make an effort to use the will of the people as fire power against the militants. With the latest bombing in Pakistan the U.S. and the Pkistani government have a great chance to embrace public outrage. Hopefully this will not be squandered
The need and consequences of Direct Action Ops in Pakistan
James Mason
9/22/2008
ENG 102 Mary Olea
D006 Sum 08
Something must be done but too much shouldn’t be done. That sentence is a succinct assessment of the challenges the next president will face regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is not one person in the United States that would disagree with directly combating the terrorist that are responsible for the attacks of September 11th, 2001. With that in mind it is safe to say that the next president will have to reign in emotions( his own as well as those of the public) in order to deal with one of the most complex situations in our history. Not only is Pakistan an ally in an area where we have few friends, they are also a nuclear armed nation with an unstable government and a lawless region on the northwest border. The Inter Service Intelligence Service (ISI) plays a dominant role in the country and it is riddled with Islamist sympathizers making it a frustrating ally at best. There is no silver bulled to solve all our problems in the region but there are some basic issues that should be addressed. Please bear in mind these steps are easier said than done.
Cleaning the ISI of Islamist sympathizers is the most difficult and one of the most important steps that needs to be taken. It is difficult because it is out of our hands but, a service without integrity is useless especially in the field of intelligence. One reason this is critical is the structure of the ISI. Unlike the CIA the ISI is an intelligence service for all branches of the military, so if they are corrupt field operations can be placed in jeopardy. An exapmple of this problem can be seen with the ease with which Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani moves through the tribal areas of Pakistan . According to Mullah Nasrullah (another leader) Haqqani “Feels invincible. The ISI protects him.”(Hosenball 2008) During the same interview Nasrullah’s convoy was repeatedly waved through Pakistani army check points after they radioed ahead to a mysterious “Col. Niazi.” (Hosenball 2008)
Supporting the new Pakistani government is something the U.S. should do, will do, and has done. What needs to be looked at is not our material support alone but our image and that of the Pakistani government. The Pakistanis are doing more fighting in the tribal areas than the U.S. is giving them credit for but they are fighting with one hand tied behind their back. In a land where religious affiliation and cultural norms are of paramount consideration, it would be best to find a way to have the Pakistani army win hearts and minds for us. There is evidence they are capable of doing just that. Some tribal elders are turning against the Taliban with the belief that the militants are to blame for unrest in the region. (BBC 2008) If this sentiment can be harnessed and untilized without making it apear to be supported by the U.S. then progress can be made.
What should not be done in the region is relying on brute force to solve complex issues. Unilateral direct action operations should not be carried out without explicit undeniable intelligence. The current administration has been too reliant on direct action and in this instance it could do more harm than good, even if the missions are successful. Excluding the killing or capture of Al Qaeda’s top two, strikes with Pakistan should be extremely limited. Even if there is minimal collateral damage the outcry would negate any advantage gained from the killing of actual militants. In fact, it allows the insurgents to gain sympathy.
Another solution that is just as bad as diredt action is throwing money at the Pakistani military with no preconditions. Having the Pakistani army kill other Pakistanis with the latest U.S. Equipment will only undermine our efforts at winning hearts and mind. It is true that we need to supply them but, both governments should make an effort to use the will of the people as fire power against the militants. With the latest bombing in Pakistan the U.S. and the Pkistani government have a great chance to embrace public outrage. Hopefully this will not be squandered