Human rights as a relative concept
Orenlicher and Donnelly attack the concept of relativism (at least, strong relativism) in human rights, but Qi advocates that Chinese people themselves view the concept of civil and political rights as imperialistic and a product of US self interests. Orenlicher notes that the development of human rights has been exclusive to mostly the West. Against the backdrop of “Asian values” and Chinese culture specifically, Donnelly argues that certain values do not necessarily conflict with strong universalism, therefore universal rights should be implemented. While the former may be true, I argue against the latter’s real world application and necessity.
According to Qi, the Chinese are sensitive to their own sovereignty due to past humiliation, have no traditional human rights concept, and view the state as a provider and protector (105). Confucian culture stresses the importance of the community over personal selfishness; therefore individual and state goals do not (or should not) conflict - all actions are for the big picture, the harmony of the entire state. This system would necessarily stifle a liberal democracy, political participation, free thought and free speech - negative civil and political rights. In fact, the mere concept of rights was not part of Chinese intellectual thought until introduced from the West (115).
Orenlicher and Donnelly propose that relativists view human rights as derived from cultural tradition, and thus cultural tradition takes precedence over international human rights norms if they conflict. Donnelly makes a compelling argument against this claim by suggesting that relative values are not the same as rights and cites specific examples from Asian culture, as suggested by James Hsiung and Lawrence Beer. For instance, “Deference to seniority and hierarchy…’stifle[s] the free expression of individual thought…. [But] freedom of expression is viable and protected in Japan’” (120). In other words, while there may be constricting social institutions, they are independent of actual state interference with human rights. Though true for Japan, this is empirically false in China. Chinese people do not enjoy free speech or a free press, and do not have elections beyond local party cadres. According to Qi, this absence of civil and political rights is not a major concern for the Chinese. Qi makes clear that the concept of rights, civil and political specifically, is a product of Western Enlightenment and has had minimal place in Chinese society and in fact, the concept of rights never developed out of their culture at all (113).
China, says Qi, has been quick to dismiss the concept of universal human rights and calls them products of Western exceptionalism and imperialism, and of Christian and Greek thought (111-112). Therefore it is difficult to take Donnelly’s idea of values versus rights and apply it to China. As far as we know, or at least as Qi says, the Chinese view certain civil and political rights as undermining to the “Mandate of Heaven” that is the government (115). Despite how hard the rest of the world might press for these rights to be granted to Chinese citizens, China seems to be relatively stagnant on the negative rights front. Though Donnelly’s suggestion that the Chinese can enjoy traditional values with guaranteed negative rights sounds nice, in practice it is obviously not the case, as they directly conflict with Confucianism. To counter the suggestion that the Chinese prefer this way, Donnelly goes on to argue that a liberal democracy is the best indicator of the will of the people because one could then assume that popular preferences will be carried out (118). This type of democracy is severely limited in China; but Qi suggests that to the Chinese, government stability is more important than the type of regime in power; Donnelly can only assume that the current regime will fall into corruption and fail to keep the happiness of the people in mind (118). Again, the Chinese people’s view is bound to Confucian deference to authority and the notion that the state will take care of the people - views that directly conflict with civil and political rights. Whether the Chinese would elect a different regime if give the option, however, will have to remain unknown for now. Donnelly also notes that deference to authority and the like are not specific to Asia. While this may be true, these values are no less Asian in themselves.
Orenlicher somewhat, but perhaps unknowingly, defends the Chinese position and says that the “whole community” must decide what rights are prima facie, and that “they should be to protect human agency - not to legislate moral, political, or cultural conformity” (143). It is without a doubt popular Chinese opinion that “Western” emphasis on civil and political rights conflicts with traditional Confucius values. Whether or not this is actually the goal of the West is irrelevant to the opinion of the Chinese, who still choose to reject certain rights. But since Confucian values basically entail making sure that every individual has a good life for the collective good, one can be sure that prima facie rights include the right to live, though masked in economic, social, and cultural positive rights to food, education, work, et cetera.
Donnelly makes a compelling argument that universal rights can exist while traditional social institutions might limit personal exercise of these rights. I personally agree that a state should not aim to deter the option to do so. However, the Chinese seem to think differently, according to Qi, and as long as they are living in what they think is the good life, there is no use in pushing them to adopt any changes. While no harm could come from instilling civil and political rights in China, it would have to be with the acceptance of the people and rejection - or reinterpretation - of thousands of years of Confucian ideology. It is my firm belief that as the Chinese become more aware of the benefits of a democratic system that defends civil and political rights, they will push for the change themselves - a method that Donnelly, Orenlicher, and Qi would all deem acceptable.
WRITTEN AT 2AM GOODNIGHT.
According to Qi, the Chinese are sensitive to their own sovereignty due to past humiliation, have no traditional human rights concept, and view the state as a provider and protector (105). Confucian culture stresses the importance of the community over personal selfishness; therefore individual and state goals do not (or should not) conflict - all actions are for the big picture, the harmony of the entire state. This system would necessarily stifle a liberal democracy, political participation, free thought and free speech - negative civil and political rights. In fact, the mere concept of rights was not part of Chinese intellectual thought until introduced from the West (115).
Orenlicher and Donnelly propose that relativists view human rights as derived from cultural tradition, and thus cultural tradition takes precedence over international human rights norms if they conflict. Donnelly makes a compelling argument against this claim by suggesting that relative values are not the same as rights and cites specific examples from Asian culture, as suggested by James Hsiung and Lawrence Beer. For instance, “Deference to seniority and hierarchy…’stifle[s] the free expression of individual thought…. [But] freedom of expression is viable and protected in Japan’” (120). In other words, while there may be constricting social institutions, they are independent of actual state interference with human rights. Though true for Japan, this is empirically false in China. Chinese people do not enjoy free speech or a free press, and do not have elections beyond local party cadres. According to Qi, this absence of civil and political rights is not a major concern for the Chinese. Qi makes clear that the concept of rights, civil and political specifically, is a product of Western Enlightenment and has had minimal place in Chinese society and in fact, the concept of rights never developed out of their culture at all (113).
China, says Qi, has been quick to dismiss the concept of universal human rights and calls them products of Western exceptionalism and imperialism, and of Christian and Greek thought (111-112). Therefore it is difficult to take Donnelly’s idea of values versus rights and apply it to China. As far as we know, or at least as Qi says, the Chinese view certain civil and political rights as undermining to the “Mandate of Heaven” that is the government (115). Despite how hard the rest of the world might press for these rights to be granted to Chinese citizens, China seems to be relatively stagnant on the negative rights front. Though Donnelly’s suggestion that the Chinese can enjoy traditional values with guaranteed negative rights sounds nice, in practice it is obviously not the case, as they directly conflict with Confucianism. To counter the suggestion that the Chinese prefer this way, Donnelly goes on to argue that a liberal democracy is the best indicator of the will of the people because one could then assume that popular preferences will be carried out (118). This type of democracy is severely limited in China; but Qi suggests that to the Chinese, government stability is more important than the type of regime in power; Donnelly can only assume that the current regime will fall into corruption and fail to keep the happiness of the people in mind (118). Again, the Chinese people’s view is bound to Confucian deference to authority and the notion that the state will take care of the people - views that directly conflict with civil and political rights. Whether the Chinese would elect a different regime if give the option, however, will have to remain unknown for now. Donnelly also notes that deference to authority and the like are not specific to Asia. While this may be true, these values are no less Asian in themselves.
Orenlicher somewhat, but perhaps unknowingly, defends the Chinese position and says that the “whole community” must decide what rights are prima facie, and that “they should be to protect human agency - not to legislate moral, political, or cultural conformity” (143). It is without a doubt popular Chinese opinion that “Western” emphasis on civil and political rights conflicts with traditional Confucius values. Whether or not this is actually the goal of the West is irrelevant to the opinion of the Chinese, who still choose to reject certain rights. But since Confucian values basically entail making sure that every individual has a good life for the collective good, one can be sure that prima facie rights include the right to live, though masked in economic, social, and cultural positive rights to food, education, work, et cetera.
Donnelly makes a compelling argument that universal rights can exist while traditional social institutions might limit personal exercise of these rights. I personally agree that a state should not aim to deter the option to do so. However, the Chinese seem to think differently, according to Qi, and as long as they are living in what they think is the good life, there is no use in pushing them to adopt any changes. While no harm could come from instilling civil and political rights in China, it would have to be with the acceptance of the people and rejection - or reinterpretation - of thousands of years of Confucian ideology. It is my firm belief that as the Chinese become more aware of the benefits of a democratic system that defends civil and political rights, they will push for the change themselves - a method that Donnelly, Orenlicher, and Qi would all deem acceptable.
WRITTEN AT 2AM GOODNIGHT.