Recovering Iraq
Recovering Iraq from ISIS presents a number of interesting military and political problems.
First problem: most of the towns along the Tigris (and highway 1)are “contested,” but how well contested? On paper, Iraq’s national army has air power and vastly greater numbers, but getting those greater numbers to the fight, past the uncontested crossroads at Fallujah, requires helicopters in large numbers, a specific kind of air power which the Iraqi army lacks. We can debate the political problems which could be overcome to acquire vertical-lift air power and apply it to this fight, but the immediate fact is getting troops around or through Fallujah is not an easy problem.
Second problem: even if an attack on Fallujah, or past Fallujah, were successful and planted large numbers of infantry and some armor behind the enemy’s supply lines back to Syria, ISIS has new supply lines from Mosul. Mosul is somewhat contested by the Peshmerga, but is still useful as a basing and supply area to ISIS troops operating in the northern theatre. Problem for ISIS: this still leaves Iraq’s national forces in control of the center of the country, with the big airport at Baghdad and the big army bases; in theory, internal lines of control could allow the INF to outlast ISIS, even if they fail to outfight the considerably smaller number of battle-hardened troops. The difference between battle-hardened and battle-exhausted is usually around 75-100 days, depending on food, water, and morale.
So, third problem: getting Iraqi national forces to fight. This is a political problem more than a military one, but it becomes a military problem when, as in most of the battles in Anbar, and some in the northern theatre, Iraqi troops in isolation, inadequately supplied and fed, chose to abandon their positions and their service and go home. Iraq has the political problem that it was not a nation-state before the US invasion, and has not developed more of a singular national identity yet. It was once a functioning state, and has caught a certain amount of democracy fever, but one of the problems with democracy is it requires nationalism to give a coherent direction to the sentiments of the mob. Iraq’s tripartite republic is singularly incapable of instilling a sense of nationalism in less than ten years. (Thanks for that, Sykes and Picot.)
Fourth problem: assuming that the Iraqi military can be convinced to fight, political pressures will tug internally on any goal set before the staff. If they try to concentrate on retaking the northern theatre, from Tikrit out toward Mosul, for example, al-Maliki is going to face hell from his own Shiite backers because he does not strike first to retake Fallujah and the roads from Baghdad to Karbala and Najaf. If, on the other hand, Maliki determines that the problem of Anbar and Karbala is the priority, he can easily be accused by the Sunni Arabs and Kurds of abandoning their areas in favor of crushing mostly-Sunni Anbar and retaking the Shi’a holy cities. The Pesh, if they should move on their own, or with US assistance from across the border in Turkey (assuming Turkey could be convinced to go along) could easily be accused of fostering Kurdish separatism rather than assisting in retaking their country of Iraq. Centrifugal political forces, in other words, may render any offensive untenable short-term.
I think all of these problems can be overcome, but I am less than confident that the Maliki government and the Iraqi general staff are up to the task of overcoming all of them at once. The best strategy may simply be to hold the double-river valley and the land around the capital, keep the Pesh in the field and supplied, and besiege Fallujah (again) until the 75-100 days expire and the ISIS troops aren’t so effective any more. Superior numbers, position, and money usually win, given enough time and the willingness to let it happen.
First problem: most of the towns along the Tigris (and highway 1)are “contested,” but how well contested? On paper, Iraq’s national army has air power and vastly greater numbers, but getting those greater numbers to the fight, past the uncontested crossroads at Fallujah, requires helicopters in large numbers, a specific kind of air power which the Iraqi army lacks. We can debate the political problems which could be overcome to acquire vertical-lift air power and apply it to this fight, but the immediate fact is getting troops around or through Fallujah is not an easy problem.
Second problem: even if an attack on Fallujah, or past Fallujah, were successful and planted large numbers of infantry and some armor behind the enemy’s supply lines back to Syria, ISIS has new supply lines from Mosul. Mosul is somewhat contested by the Peshmerga, but is still useful as a basing and supply area to ISIS troops operating in the northern theatre. Problem for ISIS: this still leaves Iraq’s national forces in control of the center of the country, with the big airport at Baghdad and the big army bases; in theory, internal lines of control could allow the INF to outlast ISIS, even if they fail to outfight the considerably smaller number of battle-hardened troops. The difference between battle-hardened and battle-exhausted is usually around 75-100 days, depending on food, water, and morale.
So, third problem: getting Iraqi national forces to fight. This is a political problem more than a military one, but it becomes a military problem when, as in most of the battles in Anbar, and some in the northern theatre, Iraqi troops in isolation, inadequately supplied and fed, chose to abandon their positions and their service and go home. Iraq has the political problem that it was not a nation-state before the US invasion, and has not developed more of a singular national identity yet. It was once a functioning state, and has caught a certain amount of democracy fever, but one of the problems with democracy is it requires nationalism to give a coherent direction to the sentiments of the mob. Iraq’s tripartite republic is singularly incapable of instilling a sense of nationalism in less than ten years. (Thanks for that, Sykes and Picot.)
Fourth problem: assuming that the Iraqi military can be convinced to fight, political pressures will tug internally on any goal set before the staff. If they try to concentrate on retaking the northern theatre, from Tikrit out toward Mosul, for example, al-Maliki is going to face hell from his own Shiite backers because he does not strike first to retake Fallujah and the roads from Baghdad to Karbala and Najaf. If, on the other hand, Maliki determines that the problem of Anbar and Karbala is the priority, he can easily be accused by the Sunni Arabs and Kurds of abandoning their areas in favor of crushing mostly-Sunni Anbar and retaking the Shi’a holy cities. The Pesh, if they should move on their own, or with US assistance from across the border in Turkey (assuming Turkey could be convinced to go along) could easily be accused of fostering Kurdish separatism rather than assisting in retaking their country of Iraq. Centrifugal political forces, in other words, may render any offensive untenable short-term.
I think all of these problems can be overcome, but I am less than confident that the Maliki government and the Iraqi general staff are up to the task of overcoming all of them at once. The best strategy may simply be to hold the double-river valley and the land around the capital, keep the Pesh in the field and supplied, and besiege Fallujah (again) until the 75-100 days expire and the ISIS troops aren’t so effective any more. Superior numbers, position, and money usually win, given enough time and the willingness to let it happen.