The consequences of a cauldron
Because they still continue to collect the trophies and catch the last remaining junta soldiers that still wander inside the encircled pocket, the cauldron still exists formally, although effectively the battle for Debalcevo is already over.
As active military action around Debalcevo stopped, the overall number of shelling incidents and firefights immediately decreased. The majority of them fell on the area of Debalcevo.
The West tried to accuse Russia of violating the Minsk agreements due to the rout of the junta at Debalcevo, but everybody got used to this rhetoric by now and the RF simply didn't pay any attention to the threats that had to do with Debalcevo, because it had the appropriate legal foundations that had to do with the indeterminate status of the Debalcevo group. The heart-rending cries from the West on this subject (without any real action directed at punishing Russia for Debalcevo) nicely show that this screw-up will remain Poroshenko's fault: he failed to establish the negotiation parameters of resolving the situation with Debalcevo (perhaps he was indeed misinformed by his General Staff). And so, instead of a negotiated exit, the junta was forcefully expelled from Debalcevo, which led to additional losses of the already battered group of forces. Naturally, the DPR, the LPR, and the RF wouldn't go for a withdrawal of materiel from the cauldron, but the withdrawal of personnel was quite possible in exchange for surrendering all materiel and refraining from mining and destroying the objects on the territory of the pocket. This wasn't done, so the war here actively continued for some extra time. It continued because of Poroshenko.
Now there is a possibility to implement the most obvious points of the Minsk agreements (the cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and the exchange of POWs by the "all for all" principle). Despite the skepticism with respect to the political points of the agreements that were signed in Minsk, at least 3 of the aforementioned points are quite implementable if there is at least minimal interest of the sides in their implementation.
Within the confines of the general line towards freezing the conflict, the terms of pulling back heavy weapons were already negotiated (with a high probability by the end of February the sides will at least pull "Tochka-U", "Smerch", and "Uragan" vehicles sufficiently far from the front line). The pullback will start in the next few days. Just like it was last autumn, Lentsov is supervising the situation on the Russian side. For him this is the 2nd attempt to secure a cease-fire. His participation in the Autumn talks in Gorlovka, Donetsk, and Mariupol wasn't successful. We'll see how it will be this time.
The process of exchanging POWs also has started (there is a good photo report at this link: http://ura.ru/content/primenews/22-02-2015/news/1052201370.html (in Russian)). And the junta couldn't stay away from its traditional dirty tricks: some of the exchanged militiamen had traces of torture. The desired "all for all" variant, in spite of the declarations, is not likely to happen for now, because there are issues with regard to a number of activists; also the junta gives regular people to the DPR and the LPR as a part of the exchange, these people are caught for absolutely insignificant offenses. In the end our side has much more POWs, most of our POWs were captured during the summer of 2014 and the majority of them were exchanged back in autumn. The main problem are the underground activists and the activists of the civilian resistance who suffer in the basements of the Ukrainian Gestapo in the cities of the South-East. Because some of them are suspected by the junta of being linked to the FSB, the junta is giving away such prisoners very reluctantly.
Overall, if there won't be any bloody provocations, then in the nearest 2-3 weeks at least 3 of the aforementioned points of the Minsk agreements will be attempted to be implemented in practice, because the impeding factor of Debalcevo is off the agenda. Meanwhile, keeping in mind the position of the USA and the junta, it is obvious that this truce is likely to be temporary, the question is only in the terms of its violation. The terms of restarting military action in the spring will depend on weather and the condition of the soil to a great extent, because advancing is a dubious task during rasputitsa. Under the conditions of a new front, without the Debalcevo wedge, the sides will regroup in addition to pulling back heavy weapons and reinforcing the battered units. The junta will fortify the front between Gorlovka and Popasnaya, especially at the base of the Svetlodarsk wedge. In the nearest week we may expect redeployment of the additional forces to Artyomovsk for creating an operational reserve, which was wasted in January-February for the actions in the area of Popasnaya, Svetlodarsk, and Debalcevo. The NAF, after the sweep of Debalcevo, will be able to free up significant forces (about 1-1.5 brigades), which will not only reinforce the front south of Svetlodarsk, but also allow to support other directions (e.g., in the area of Popasnaya, or the front to the west of Gorlovka with the target at Mayorsk and Dzerzhinsk). The captured trophies will allow our forces to replenish the materiel stores after the losses that were suffered during the Winter offensive and also to finish arming those units which didn't have enough materiel even before the losses.
With the capture of Debalcevo, the question of restoring the transport infrastructure of the city will arise in the nearest time. After the necessary sweep of the locality from wandering encircled troops, the work on rapid demining and restoration of the road that leads from Lugansk through Debalcevo into Donetsk will start. This will be essentially a strategic highway that will greatly increase the transport connectedness of the people's republic and will simplify maneuvering with their forces. The restoration of the railroad communication with Debalcevo will also take time, but from the point of view of developing transport capabilities of the DPR and the LPR these measures are absolutely essential.
They will certainly rebuild Debalcevo itself as a settlement after the recent fighting, but I wouldn't count on its rapid restoration; the new authorities have very little resources to afford rapid restoration of the town. I suppose that they will now focus on restoring the utility services and establishing the food supply for the population to overcome the primary consequences of the humanitarian catastrophe that occurred.
Below is a long video from Debalcevo.
Click to viewI will summarize the overall military and political results of the battle for Debalcevo tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2057817.html (in Russian)