A brief but important update
A brief but important update.
1. On the background of continued shelling and clashes near Donetsk, the "mysterious" regrouping of forces continued, which triggered a minor panic in the junta and a temper tantrum in Europe: Russia went out of hand completely and sent its military into Donetsk and Makeyevka. In Donetsk they made a quite logical announcement on this subject that all of this is their own, effectively local, and so the hunt for "Voentorg" continued with the same level of success as before. This scheme is traditional for a hybrid war and it continues to work. In order to dispel the panic, the redeployment had a strictly military nature and had no goals in the spirit of "disarm Bezler's forces" or "press on Mozgovoy". In fact (there are certain internal arguments there), at this moment the defense of Donetsk and Makeyevka got significantly stronger. Also the situation with the ammunition, which in October became very lamentable, improved significantly. A number of directions on which there is a threat of tanks were significantly reinforced. Overall, what we are seeing is at least a complex of defensive measures.
2. Not much is clear on Bezler and the situation in Gorlovka, because an onslaught of hysterical announcements in the Internet has little bearing on some well-defined facts. Bezler himself is still missing (it was expected that he would reveal himself with regards to being awarded the star of the hero of the DPR). Gorlovka's communities broadcast controversial information ranging from "everything is OK" to "horror-horror, there is a war between Bezler and Oplot here". Honestly, I don't have precise information on what has happened and is happening in Gorlovka. From what I heard, the local units were supposed to join a mechanized brigade that is being formed.
3. On the topic of appointing Pushilin to Minsk negotiations: this is actually not that significant - the key mechanism of these negotiations will be the agreements between Russia and the EU and not the stuff that Pushilin will discuss with the representative of the junta. Obama's appeals to Europe to stand together in the face of the Russian threat will obviously trigger new attempts to pull at least some European states away from the rigid American position and to nudge Europe towards a compromise. The victorious results of a survey-referendum in Catalonia (which will now obviously separate - sooner or later) + a failure of the Democratic Party in the USA are viewed as quite timely with respect to weakening the opponent positions and the possibility of reaching a compromise. In this respect, new attempts of settling the issue quietly can be expected in the nearest time. I believe that there are few chances for that, in the light of the position that was chosen by the USA.
4. Guerrilla and informational activity around Kharkov is indeed growing. Apparently, the processes of increasing tensions are ongoing, albeit not as fast as desired. However, a couple of competent people with whom I discussed this question told me that no tangible effect from this work can be expected until the next Spring. Too much was lost this Spring. Also the enemy is on the watch: very serious countermeasures are deployed in Kharkov. Some of these measures involve foreign counter-insurgency specialists. A wide network of SBU informants is deployed in Kharkov itself, who are on the lookout for signs of sedition. As before, the main problems of Kharkov underground are: the lack of organizers and leaders, a small amount of weapons, and a serious opposition by the enemy's punitive organs.
5. On the topic of messing around in the airport: as of today, the old terminal was controlled by the NAF, as before. The tower region and the area of the new terminal were successfully hit by the NAF artillery. There is an utter positional clinch here, which cannot be resolved without capturing Avdeyevka or the village of Peski. Regarding the perspectives of an offensive against these settlements: Peski can be captured after a proper preliminary bombardment and throwing significant number armored vehicles into combat. Avdeyevka, on the other hand, will be much more difficult, because significant forces are stationed in Avdeyevka itself. Also, significant junta reserves are concentrated in the depth of formation (at least 1 heavy battalion-tactical group and significant artillery forces), which will inevitably play a role if the NAF with the support of the "Voentorg" will try to establish control over Avdeyevka. So, no rapid success is expected here. In this respect, the offensive in the area of Schastye, Bakhmutka, and Slavyanoserbsk is more promising, although the current rate of progress is extremely slow. In the nearest time the NAF will likely force the junta to vacate another 1 or 2 checkpoints. However, the perspectives of completely encircling Schastye appear very murky. The offensive is clearly conducted with insufficient forces.
PS. Trophy "Bulat" tanks from the Lugansk People's Republic units are shown on the head photo.
http://voicesevas.ru/news/yugo-vostok/6910-voyna-na-yugo-vostoke-onlayn-10112014-hronika-sobytiy.html (in Russian) - the online-broadcast on the "Voice of Sevastopol" for 11/10
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1891191.html (in Russian)