The Derrida Essay
I'd have to scan it and save it as 38 different files, this is just too time consuming an endeavor. Instead, I'll type out the footnote that puzzled Derrida in its entirety, and then summarize his position as well as Heidegger's as best I can, and we can discuss. Im sorry for the inconvenience. If you have it in your possession then please feel free to add comments.
The Note Derrida is deconstructing belongs to the next to last section of the last chapter of Being and Time, "Temporality and the Within-Time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time") It goes as follows -
The priority which Hegel has given to the 'now' which has been levelled off, makes it plain that in defining the concept of time he is under the sway of the manner in which time is ordinarily understood; and this means that he is likewise under the sway of the traditional conception of it. It can even be shown that his conception of time has been drawn directly from the 'physics' of Aristotle. In the Jena Logic, which was projected at the time of Hegel's habilitation, the analysis of time which we find in his Encyclopedia has already been developed in all its essential parts. Even the roughest examination reveals that the section on time (pp.202) is a paraphrase of Aristotle's essay on time. In the Jena Logic Hegel has already developed his view on time the framework of his philosophy of Nature (p.186), the first part of which is entitled 'System of the Sun; (p.195). Hegel discusses the concept of time in conjunction with defining the concepts of aether and motion. Here too his analysis of space comes later (nachgeordnet). Though the dialectic already emerges, it does not have as yet the rigid schematic form which it will have afterword, but still makes it possible to understand the phenomena in a fairly relaxed manner. On the way from Kant to Hegel's developed system, the impact of the Aristotelian ontology and logic has again been decisive. The fact of this impact has long been well known. But the kind of effect it has had, the path it has taken, even its illuminations, have hitherto been as obscure as the fact itself has been familiar. A concrete philosophical Interpretation comparing Hegel's Jena Logic with the 'physics' and 'metaphysics' of Aristotle will bring new light. For the above considerations, some rough suggestions will suffice. Aristotle sees the essence of time in the nun, Hegel in the 'now' (jetzt). Aristotle takes the nun as oros; Hegel takes the 'now' as 'boundary' (Grenze). Aristotle understands the nun as stigme; Hegel interprets the 'now' as a point. Aristotle describes the nun as tode ti; Hegel calls the 'now' as the 'absolute this; (Das absolute Dieses). Aristotle follows tradition in connecting 'khronos' with sphaira; Hegel stresses the 'circular course' (Kreislauf) of time. To be sure, Hegel escapes the central tendency of the Aristotelian analysis - the tendency to expose a foundational connection (akolouthein) between the nun, the oros, the stigme, and the tode ti. in its result, Bergson's view is in accord with Hegel's thesis that space 'is' time, in spite of the very different reasons why they have given. Bergson merely says the reverse: that time (temps in order to oppose temps, time, with duree, duration) is space. Bergson's view of time too has obviously arisen from an Interpretation of the Aristotelian essay on time. That a treatise of Bergson with the title Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit should have appeared at the same time as his Essai sur les Donnees immediates de la conscience, where the problem of temps and duree is expounded, is not just a superficial literary connection. Having regard to Aristotle's definition of time as the arithmos kineseos, Bergson prefaces his analysis of time with an analysis of number. Time as Space is quantitative succession. By a counter-orientation to this conception of time, duration gets described as qualitative succession. This is not the place for coming to terms critically with Bergson's conception of time or with other Present-day-views of it. So far as anything essential has been achieved in today's analyses which will take us beyond Aristotle to Kant, it pertains more to the way time is grasped and to our 'consciousness of time'. We shall come back to this in the first and third divisions of Part Two.... section missing... In suggesting a direct connection between Hegel's conception of time and Aristotle's analysis, we are not accusing Hegel of any 'dependence' on Aristotle, but are calling attention to the ontological import which this filiation has in principle for the Hegelian logic...
Whoa there's a lot there. So lets soak in this rather long footnote.
The Note Derrida is deconstructing belongs to the next to last section of the last chapter of Being and Time, "Temporality and the Within-Time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time") It goes as follows -
The priority which Hegel has given to the 'now' which has been levelled off, makes it plain that in defining the concept of time he is under the sway of the manner in which time is ordinarily understood; and this means that he is likewise under the sway of the traditional conception of it. It can even be shown that his conception of time has been drawn directly from the 'physics' of Aristotle. In the Jena Logic, which was projected at the time of Hegel's habilitation, the analysis of time which we find in his Encyclopedia has already been developed in all its essential parts. Even the roughest examination reveals that the section on time (pp.202) is a paraphrase of Aristotle's essay on time. In the Jena Logic Hegel has already developed his view on time the framework of his philosophy of Nature (p.186), the first part of which is entitled 'System of the Sun; (p.195). Hegel discusses the concept of time in conjunction with defining the concepts of aether and motion. Here too his analysis of space comes later (nachgeordnet). Though the dialectic already emerges, it does not have as yet the rigid schematic form which it will have afterword, but still makes it possible to understand the phenomena in a fairly relaxed manner. On the way from Kant to Hegel's developed system, the impact of the Aristotelian ontology and logic has again been decisive. The fact of this impact has long been well known. But the kind of effect it has had, the path it has taken, even its illuminations, have hitherto been as obscure as the fact itself has been familiar. A concrete philosophical Interpretation comparing Hegel's Jena Logic with the 'physics' and 'metaphysics' of Aristotle will bring new light. For the above considerations, some rough suggestions will suffice. Aristotle sees the essence of time in the nun, Hegel in the 'now' (jetzt). Aristotle takes the nun as oros; Hegel takes the 'now' as 'boundary' (Grenze). Aristotle understands the nun as stigme; Hegel interprets the 'now' as a point. Aristotle describes the nun as tode ti; Hegel calls the 'now' as the 'absolute this; (Das absolute Dieses). Aristotle follows tradition in connecting 'khronos' with sphaira; Hegel stresses the 'circular course' (Kreislauf) of time. To be sure, Hegel escapes the central tendency of the Aristotelian analysis - the tendency to expose a foundational connection (akolouthein) between the nun, the oros, the stigme, and the tode ti. in its result, Bergson's view is in accord with Hegel's thesis that space 'is' time, in spite of the very different reasons why they have given. Bergson merely says the reverse: that time (temps in order to oppose temps, time, with duree, duration) is space. Bergson's view of time too has obviously arisen from an Interpretation of the Aristotelian essay on time. That a treatise of Bergson with the title Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit should have appeared at the same time as his Essai sur les Donnees immediates de la conscience, where the problem of temps and duree is expounded, is not just a superficial literary connection. Having regard to Aristotle's definition of time as the arithmos kineseos, Bergson prefaces his analysis of time with an analysis of number. Time as Space is quantitative succession. By a counter-orientation to this conception of time, duration gets described as qualitative succession. This is not the place for coming to terms critically with Bergson's conception of time or with other Present-day-views of it. So far as anything essential has been achieved in today's analyses which will take us beyond Aristotle to Kant, it pertains more to the way time is grasped and to our 'consciousness of time'. We shall come back to this in the first and third divisions of Part Two.... section missing... In suggesting a direct connection between Hegel's conception of time and Aristotle's analysis, we are not accusing Hegel of any 'dependence' on Aristotle, but are calling attention to the ontological import which this filiation has in principle for the Hegelian logic...
Whoa there's a lot there. So lets soak in this rather long footnote.