DVD Encryption
Things are not as bad as I though. Yesterday I attended a seminar at the UW about the state of the war between the "cease and desist" people and the rest of us. We are winning the war!
As far as copying music, the industry has pretty much given up the futile efforts at copy protection. After EMI decided to start selling unprotected soundtracks, the rest will follow in short order.
The low definition DVDs use a brain-dead protection scheme, CSS (Content Scrambling System), that has been broken long time ago--witness DeCSS. CSS contained in its design the possibility of revoking broken cryptographic keys, but the industry never used it, so all past and present DVDs are easily copyable.
The new breed, HD-DVD and BlueRay, both use a new system, AACS (Advanced Access Control System). This is actually pretty strong system, with strong encryption and the ability to revoke broken keys at will. So it was a bit of a surprise to find out how quickly it has been broken by dedicated hackers. The cryptographic key was extracted from WinDVD in a very clever way. This key is now available on the Internet, on T-shirts, coffee mugs, etc. All the "cease and desist" notices mady it only more popular. With this key, you can decrypt (and copy) all HD-DVDs and BlueRay DVDs that have been published so far.
However, this key is now being revoked. This doesn't change the ability to decrypt existing DVDs, but all new DVDs will now contain the revocation of the broken key, so they won't be copyable. At least that was the idea. The revocation of the key takes 90 days, and for the last three months there have been no new releases of high-def media. The new wave will be released next Tuesday.
Now guess what. A DVD from a new batch was somehow leaked prematurely. To everybody's surprise, a software player called AnyDVD from SlySoft can play the new disks. Either they have broken more keys, or they found a way to circumvent the system.
Why is it so important to break the DVD encryption system? After all, people who have the means to play high def DVDs have already invested thousands in their hardware, so they can afford to buy DVDs. Except that there is one more annoying copy-protection mechanism, HDCP, the one between your computer or player and your monitor. If your expensive hi-def monitor doesn't have HDCP input, you're out of luck. Your legally bought player will not play your legally purchased HD-DVDs on your legally acquired plasma display! Caveat Emptor!
Fortunately, HDCP system has been long broken, and anyway it's not required if you use a player like AnyDVD. So even if you plan on purchasing all your HD-DVDs or BlueRays, you still might need an illegal player. They are just asking you to circumvent their system.
Anyway, this is not the biggest headache of the DVD industry. In fact, from the business point of view, they would be better off dropping copy protection (including the annoying region codes, and blocked user operations). The biggest problem is the format war between HD-DVD and BlueRay.
The prediction is that both systems will die and a new system will be adopted that has no DRM.
As far as copying music, the industry has pretty much given up the futile efforts at copy protection. After EMI decided to start selling unprotected soundtracks, the rest will follow in short order.
The low definition DVDs use a brain-dead protection scheme, CSS (Content Scrambling System), that has been broken long time ago--witness DeCSS. CSS contained in its design the possibility of revoking broken cryptographic keys, but the industry never used it, so all past and present DVDs are easily copyable.
The new breed, HD-DVD and BlueRay, both use a new system, AACS (Advanced Access Control System). This is actually pretty strong system, with strong encryption and the ability to revoke broken keys at will. So it was a bit of a surprise to find out how quickly it has been broken by dedicated hackers. The cryptographic key was extracted from WinDVD in a very clever way. This key is now available on the Internet, on T-shirts, coffee mugs, etc. All the "cease and desist" notices mady it only more popular. With this key, you can decrypt (and copy) all HD-DVDs and BlueRay DVDs that have been published so far.
However, this key is now being revoked. This doesn't change the ability to decrypt existing DVDs, but all new DVDs will now contain the revocation of the broken key, so they won't be copyable. At least that was the idea. The revocation of the key takes 90 days, and for the last three months there have been no new releases of high-def media. The new wave will be released next Tuesday.
Now guess what. A DVD from a new batch was somehow leaked prematurely. To everybody's surprise, a software player called AnyDVD from SlySoft can play the new disks. Either they have broken more keys, or they found a way to circumvent the system.
Why is it so important to break the DVD encryption system? After all, people who have the means to play high def DVDs have already invested thousands in their hardware, so they can afford to buy DVDs. Except that there is one more annoying copy-protection mechanism, HDCP, the one between your computer or player and your monitor. If your expensive hi-def monitor doesn't have HDCP input, you're out of luck. Your legally bought player will not play your legally purchased HD-DVDs on your legally acquired plasma display! Caveat Emptor!
Fortunately, HDCP system has been long broken, and anyway it's not required if you use a player like AnyDVD. So even if you plan on purchasing all your HD-DVDs or BlueRays, you still might need an illegal player. They are just asking you to circumvent their system.
Anyway, this is not the biggest headache of the DVD industry. In fact, from the business point of view, they would be better off dropping copy protection (including the annoying region codes, and blocked user operations). The biggest problem is the format war between HD-DVD and BlueRay.
The prediction is that both systems will die and a new system will be adopted that has no DRM.