Foundations of Reason and Imperative Morality
The DistantCollegian has replied to my previous arguments regarding Value Judgements and provided a more thorough explanation of his distinction between Continental and English reason on his own blog
Continental vs. English Reason
Now, the Continentals have a tradition of belief that pure reason can find a priori truth, rather than merely interpreting experience, as in the English belief. Thus Des Cartes famously proved his own existence deductively. Now, moral claims are a priori. Thus, those arguing that pure reason, and the innate abilities of the human mind or soul, can discover moral truth, are siding with the Continentals. - DistantCollegian
The distinction you seem to be drawing seems to be that between a belief that all knowledge is open to reason (that is, a logical, rational system can be constructed to contain all that one knows) and the counter belief that not all things can be so rationally understood. In other words, one system holds that all things are rationally understandable and the other system despairs of finding a reasonable system for explaining all things, arguing rather than only the immediately experiential (natural, scientific) things are open to reason and the rest must be understood in some way.
If this is correct, I'm afraid I still do not understand your distinction between "Continental" and "English" reason. According to my understanding, most philosophers historically held the first view outlined above, that a rational system could explain all knowledge. However, in the 19th century, Soren Kierkegaard despaired of finding a way of rational understanding all knowledge and unlike his predescessors, gave up. To fill the gap, he posited a "leap of faith" in God, that is, a purely irrational belief in the existence of God to provide meaning for life. In doing so, he founded the modern existential movement and laid the foundation for much of modern philosophy, which, as a result of the "leap of faith" and despairing of a rational system for everything, has been decidedly relativistic. But Kierkegaard was a Dane (not English, but on the Continent), so I'm not sure what you derive your regional distinction from. As I understand it, the distinction is would more aptly be traditionalists (or rationalists) vs. existentialists (or modernists).
Applications of Reason
Now, by this understanding, isn't human reason is as impotent as in Heather McDonald's understanding? We cannot innately discover a priori good, for it does not necessarily exist. It does not logically precede consciousness. It can be known, then, only through Revelation. - DistantCollegian
I'm not sure how you draw the conclusion that Sartre and McDonald view human reason in the same light. Heather seems to claim that values can be rationally justified. Sartre, argues simultaneously that such values are impossible without God, "an intelligable heaven", and that "God does not exist".
Sartre's Argument
If an a priori good requires an infinite and perfect conscious thinking it, then it is a product of thought- thus, infinite and perfect thought is prior to even the a priori; the thought precedes its object. In that case, we can no longer call the "infinite and perfect consciousness" perfect. There is no standard to measure it against, if it is itself subjective. - DistantCollegian
It seems to me that the primary miscommunication here is in the meaning of the term "a priori". You seem to be defining it as "a principle existing prior to thought". First, as you yourself point out, such a definition seems to render any "a priori" principle absurd, unless it is somehow inherently true apart from a thinking being (even beyond God). As this would imply that God is not the master of all that is, but rather, bound by an even higher "a priori" system, it does not seem to be an acceptable understanding. Nor does this does not seem to fit with the Dictionary.com attempts to define the term. Although the definitions there do not seem very helpful either, it seems that what "a priori" really means is something akin to Plato's forms, a general, pre-existing principle that defines the foundational qualities of a particular thing (such as a chair). Furthermore, since it seems rather absurd that these principles simply float out there in the ether, it seems that they must exist in an infinite mind, the mind of God. However, such a definition seems to turn what you argued was self-contradictory into something that is self-affirming, or tautological.
My Argument
That said, my intent in citing Sartre was not to initiate a confusing discussion of the definition of "a priori". I cited Sartre as I believed (perhaps wrongly), that he presented in a clear way a summary of the argument towards the conclusion I was attempting to make: that universally applicable moral values (that is, values which carry with them an imperative to all men, in other words, a value which I can demand that others follow in the same way that they can demand that I follow it and be justified in making such demands) are not supportable from the philosophic framework of materialistic naturalism (and by application, require a higher power, such as God, in order for them to exist).
The missing piece, which you and Sartre both take to be self-evident, is "a priori good requires an infinite and perfect consciousness in order to think it." Now, you say "it seems pretty clear to me, especially based on the above arguments, that reason + nature cannot establish any ultimate moral system that implies any oughtness to man's actions, especially because there is no foundation (for that oughtness.)" But it is problematic to base this claim on "the above arguments," for the above arguments are against the power of reason as understood by the English, whereas Sartre is arguing against the Continentals. - DistantCollegian
First, allow me to reformulate the minor premise away from Sartre's language, which is, perhaps, confusing. Let us rather say that, "The existance of imperative good requires the existence of an morally authoratative, personal, being (God)." The best support for this premise that comes to mind, is exhaustive elimination of the alternatives: impersonal matter or impersonal being.
Impersonal Matter
Under the first possiblity (essentially naturalism), we find that nothing exists beyond energy-matter and the physical laws by which they opporate. Within this setting, by some either fortuitous or cruel accident, life came into being, and with it, a "thinking" machine that wants to know what principles it should live by. Some might argue that one should look to the physical laws itself, but that is an absurd proposition. Physcial laws merely describe what can be done. As it is impossible to do otherwise, it would be stupid to ask if one should do it (say, fly to the moon in an old rubber tire by running in circles and waving your arms). Again, the question is not what can man do, but what ought man to do. Others might point to other life, but for every example in nature that encourages our sentiments (such as, nurturing children) nature seems to hold a horrible counter (animals that eat their own children). Others, such as Sartre, look to man himself. However, what authority does one man have to demand of another "do this for I have decided it"? Does not his brother have an equal right to say "rather you do this, for I have decided it"? Clearly, none of these options is satisfactory, and one must conclude that no imperative good can be rational founded upon nature alone.
Impersonal Being
This option seems much like the previous one, which seems to indicate that the problem here is with the lack of personality. Can any moral imperative derive from something that "cares" about things that happen as much as a rock? It does not seem likely. Thus, it seems that we are left with a personal being.
Moral Authority
At this point, you may be willing to accept that a personal being is required, but the minor premise outlined above was more extensive, describing that being as "morally authoritative". To return to the Naturalists attempt to establish morality through man, even though man is a personal being (at least, he seems to be. If Naturalism is true, one may question even that premise) I rejected that attempt on the basis that one man lacks any inherent authority over another man. The question there is, if we are going to base morality on man, which man will be pick as the superior man, our philosopher king, our human god? This to me implies the moral authority mandate of the minor premise.
Agreement
With most of the rest of your remarks, I agree. Particularly this one:
Historical origins may be irrelevant to Heather's central claim, but her argument that we cannot historically trace ideas is false; when we observe modernity's improvements on classicism, we have good reason to believe that the improvements are Christian, not classical in source. - DistantCollegian
I look forward to further remarks and criticism. :-)
Continental vs. English Reason
Now, the Continentals have a tradition of belief that pure reason can find a priori truth, rather than merely interpreting experience, as in the English belief. Thus Des Cartes famously proved his own existence deductively. Now, moral claims are a priori. Thus, those arguing that pure reason, and the innate abilities of the human mind or soul, can discover moral truth, are siding with the Continentals. - DistantCollegian
The distinction you seem to be drawing seems to be that between a belief that all knowledge is open to reason (that is, a logical, rational system can be constructed to contain all that one knows) and the counter belief that not all things can be so rationally understood. In other words, one system holds that all things are rationally understandable and the other system despairs of finding a reasonable system for explaining all things, arguing rather than only the immediately experiential (natural, scientific) things are open to reason and the rest must be understood in some way.
If this is correct, I'm afraid I still do not understand your distinction between "Continental" and "English" reason. According to my understanding, most philosophers historically held the first view outlined above, that a rational system could explain all knowledge. However, in the 19th century, Soren Kierkegaard despaired of finding a way of rational understanding all knowledge and unlike his predescessors, gave up. To fill the gap, he posited a "leap of faith" in God, that is, a purely irrational belief in the existence of God to provide meaning for life. In doing so, he founded the modern existential movement and laid the foundation for much of modern philosophy, which, as a result of the "leap of faith" and despairing of a rational system for everything, has been decidedly relativistic. But Kierkegaard was a Dane (not English, but on the Continent), so I'm not sure what you derive your regional distinction from. As I understand it, the distinction is would more aptly be traditionalists (or rationalists) vs. existentialists (or modernists).
Applications of Reason
Now, by this understanding, isn't human reason is as impotent as in Heather McDonald's understanding? We cannot innately discover a priori good, for it does not necessarily exist. It does not logically precede consciousness. It can be known, then, only through Revelation. - DistantCollegian
I'm not sure how you draw the conclusion that Sartre and McDonald view human reason in the same light. Heather seems to claim that values can be rationally justified. Sartre, argues simultaneously that such values are impossible without God, "an intelligable heaven", and that "God does not exist".
Sartre's Argument
If an a priori good requires an infinite and perfect conscious thinking it, then it is a product of thought- thus, infinite and perfect thought is prior to even the a priori; the thought precedes its object. In that case, we can no longer call the "infinite and perfect consciousness" perfect. There is no standard to measure it against, if it is itself subjective. - DistantCollegian
It seems to me that the primary miscommunication here is in the meaning of the term "a priori". You seem to be defining it as "a principle existing prior to thought". First, as you yourself point out, such a definition seems to render any "a priori" principle absurd, unless it is somehow inherently true apart from a thinking being (even beyond God). As this would imply that God is not the master of all that is, but rather, bound by an even higher "a priori" system, it does not seem to be an acceptable understanding. Nor does this does not seem to fit with the Dictionary.com attempts to define the term. Although the definitions there do not seem very helpful either, it seems that what "a priori" really means is something akin to Plato's forms, a general, pre-existing principle that defines the foundational qualities of a particular thing (such as a chair). Furthermore, since it seems rather absurd that these principles simply float out there in the ether, it seems that they must exist in an infinite mind, the mind of God. However, such a definition seems to turn what you argued was self-contradictory into something that is self-affirming, or tautological.
My Argument
That said, my intent in citing Sartre was not to initiate a confusing discussion of the definition of "a priori". I cited Sartre as I believed (perhaps wrongly), that he presented in a clear way a summary of the argument towards the conclusion I was attempting to make: that universally applicable moral values (that is, values which carry with them an imperative to all men, in other words, a value which I can demand that others follow in the same way that they can demand that I follow it and be justified in making such demands) are not supportable from the philosophic framework of materialistic naturalism (and by application, require a higher power, such as God, in order for them to exist).
The missing piece, which you and Sartre both take to be self-evident, is "a priori good requires an infinite and perfect consciousness in order to think it." Now, you say "it seems pretty clear to me, especially based on the above arguments, that reason + nature cannot establish any ultimate moral system that implies any oughtness to man's actions, especially because there is no foundation (for that oughtness.)" But it is problematic to base this claim on "the above arguments," for the above arguments are against the power of reason as understood by the English, whereas Sartre is arguing against the Continentals. - DistantCollegian
First, allow me to reformulate the minor premise away from Sartre's language, which is, perhaps, confusing. Let us rather say that, "The existance of imperative good requires the existence of an morally authoratative, personal, being (God)." The best support for this premise that comes to mind, is exhaustive elimination of the alternatives: impersonal matter or impersonal being.
Impersonal Matter
Under the first possiblity (essentially naturalism), we find that nothing exists beyond energy-matter and the physical laws by which they opporate. Within this setting, by some either fortuitous or cruel accident, life came into being, and with it, a "thinking" machine that wants to know what principles it should live by. Some might argue that one should look to the physical laws itself, but that is an absurd proposition. Physcial laws merely describe what can be done. As it is impossible to do otherwise, it would be stupid to ask if one should do it (say, fly to the moon in an old rubber tire by running in circles and waving your arms). Again, the question is not what can man do, but what ought man to do. Others might point to other life, but for every example in nature that encourages our sentiments (such as, nurturing children) nature seems to hold a horrible counter (animals that eat their own children). Others, such as Sartre, look to man himself. However, what authority does one man have to demand of another "do this for I have decided it"? Does not his brother have an equal right to say "rather you do this, for I have decided it"? Clearly, none of these options is satisfactory, and one must conclude that no imperative good can be rational founded upon nature alone.
Impersonal Being
This option seems much like the previous one, which seems to indicate that the problem here is with the lack of personality. Can any moral imperative derive from something that "cares" about things that happen as much as a rock? It does not seem likely. Thus, it seems that we are left with a personal being.
Moral Authority
At this point, you may be willing to accept that a personal being is required, but the minor premise outlined above was more extensive, describing that being as "morally authoritative". To return to the Naturalists attempt to establish morality through man, even though man is a personal being (at least, he seems to be. If Naturalism is true, one may question even that premise) I rejected that attempt on the basis that one man lacks any inherent authority over another man. The question there is, if we are going to base morality on man, which man will be pick as the superior man, our philosopher king, our human god? This to me implies the moral authority mandate of the minor premise.
Agreement
With most of the rest of your remarks, I agree. Particularly this one:
Historical origins may be irrelevant to Heather's central claim, but her argument that we cannot historically trace ideas is false; when we observe modernity's improvements on classicism, we have good reason to believe that the improvements are Christian, not classical in source. - DistantCollegian
I look forward to further remarks and criticism. :-)