Зарубежные новости [55] -- турецкое наследство холодной войны
В очередной раз вспомнили о ядерных бомбах, распиханных по натовским авиабазам со времён холодной войны. Не то чтобы о них совсем забыли -- убогий Ф-35 задуман как средство доставки обновлённых бомб Б61-12 в интересах союзников по НАТО. Однако у турков и амов случился грязный развод, заложником которого не могли не оказаться хранящиеся на авиабазе Инжирлик бомбы. То что журнал.. ОК, журналисты, вещают про "контроль штатов", это просто брехня. У штатов никогда не было средств доставки для этих бомб в Турции -- турки так никогда на это не согласились. А у турков были и есть все средства и обученные люди для "ядерной миссии" в формате "разделения ядерной ответственности" по НАТО. Поэтому всё что хранится в Инжирлике -- это оружие Эрдогана, даже если всем удобнее так об этом не говорить. Зачем напрасно пугать народ, особенно ближневосточный, у которого с Эрдоганом как-то не очень складывается сейчас....over the weekend, State and Energy Department officials were quietly reviewing plans for evacuating roughly 50 tactical nuclear weapons that the United States had long stored, under American control, at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, about 250 miles from the Syrian border, according to two American officials.
Those weapons, one senior official said, were now essentially Erdogan’s hostages. To fly them out of Incirlik would be to mark the de facto end of the Turkish-American alliance. To keep them there, though, is to perpetuate a nuclear vulnerability that should have been eliminated years ago.
Также следует вспомнить буквально недавнее видео-выступление Эрдогана, когда он думал вслух что ядерные державы несправедливо запрещают ему ядерное оружие, а он активно с этим несогласен. Ну вот, теперь это несогласие можно активно реализовать. Если амы попытаются вывезти бомбы, и у них это не получится, будут всякие кары и месть, но у Эрдогана полуофициально (почётное второе место на ближнем востоке) появится свой ядерный арсенал, который давно интегрирован в структуру турецкой армии.
Более того, претендующие на тайные знания люди пишут что турецкие бомбы разделены на две группы: одна под контролем амов, другая под контролем турков. Даже если Эрдоган позволит амам вывезти амовскую группу, он не будет Эрдоганом, если позволит амам вывезти турецкую группу. Не поднимется рука у султана отдать такое богатство бывшим друзьям, да и вообще обидно. Как всё это будет разворачиваться, наверно не удастся удержать за дипломатической вуалью -- что-то вылезет, может даже ярко. Любая нездоровая активность в Инжирлике может указывать именно на это.The stockpile at Incirlik AB includes an estimated 10~20 weapons earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16 aircraft. Although former Turkish officials say the F-16s have never had a nuclear role, the Pentagon says they currently do. Nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Turkey’s Akinci AB and Balikesir AB in 1995, and some of the weapons were transferred to Incirlik. In 2001, 40 of 90 weapons at Incirlik AB were “host” weapons for the 4th and 9th Wings. Since then, one of the wings is believed to have lost its nuclear mission, and the inventory reduced accordingly. Turkey has rejected a US request to deploy a fighter wing at Incirlik, making the weapons deployment at the base unique.
Turkey hosts an estimated 60~70 B61 bombs at Incirlik AB, down from the 2001 level of 90 weapons; however, the posture is unique in NATO. Most of the bombs (approximately 50) are for delivery by US aircraft, but the US Air Force does not have a fighter wing based at Incirlik. Requests to deploy a wing there have been turned down by Turkey, so the NATO nuclear posture at Incirlik is more of a half-posture. In a crisis, US aircraft from other bases would have to first deploy to Incirlik to pick up the weapons before they could be used. The remaining 10~20 bombs at Incirlik AB are earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16A/Bs. Until 1995, Akinci AB in central Turkey and Balikesir AB in western Turkey also stored US nuclear weapons for delivery by the 4th Wing and 9th Wing, respectively, but after the US MUNSS at each base was withdrawn, the bombs (about 40 weapons) were moved to Incirlik. Since then, the number of 'Turkish' bombs at Incirlik AB has probably been reduced to 10~20 weapons to correspond to the inventories at other national bases, and one of the two wings lost its nuclear mission. Turkey's F-16s are slated to be replaced by JSFs beginning in 2015, when the first six aircraft are scheduled to be delivered. The Turkish Air Force is scheduled to receive a total of 100 JSFs through 2025 (Defense Department, 2010b). There are conflicting reports about the status of the Turkish nuclear mission. Gen. Ergin Celasin, former commander (until 2001) of the Turkish Air Force, is on record stating that Turkey's role in the NATO nuclear strike mission ended in the 1990s with the withdrawal of weapons from the national Turkish bases. In contrast, according to Pentagon sources, Turkey currently uses its F-16s to execute the nuclear mission. Moreover, until Turkey acquires a sufficient number of nuclear-capable JSFs over the 15 years, its F-16s are scheduled to receive a 'stop-gap' upgrade to make them capable of carrying the new B61-12 bomb that will replace the B61-3/4 beginning in 2017. The confusion about Turkey's status may have to do with the aircraft's degree of nuclear readiness, which has changed over time, ranging from full alert in the 1980s, to withdrawal from national bases in the 1990s, to today's 'pick up the weapons at Incirlik if needed' posture. During these phases, the aircraft status changed from nuclear-capable, certified, and loaded, to nuclear-capable and certified, to nuclear-capable. Today, the Turkish aircraft are nuclear-capable (according to US sources) but neither loaded nor certified. This, combined with the absence of a US wing at Incirlik AB, underscores the special status of the Turkish posture.
Those weapons, one senior official said, were now essentially Erdogan’s hostages. To fly them out of Incirlik would be to mark the de facto end of the Turkish-American alliance. To keep them there, though, is to perpetuate a nuclear vulnerability that should have been eliminated years ago.
Также следует вспомнить буквально недавнее видео-выступление Эрдогана, когда он думал вслух что ядерные державы несправедливо запрещают ему ядерное оружие, а он активно с этим несогласен. Ну вот, теперь это несогласие можно активно реализовать. Если амы попытаются вывезти бомбы, и у них это не получится, будут всякие кары и месть, но у Эрдогана полуофициально (почётное второе место на ближнем востоке) появится свой ядерный арсенал, который давно интегрирован в структуру турецкой армии.
Более того, претендующие на тайные знания люди пишут что турецкие бомбы разделены на две группы: одна под контролем амов, другая под контролем турков. Даже если Эрдоган позволит амам вывезти амовскую группу, он не будет Эрдоганом, если позволит амам вывезти турецкую группу. Не поднимется рука у султана отдать такое богатство бывшим друзьям, да и вообще обидно. Как всё это будет разворачиваться, наверно не удастся удержать за дипломатической вуалью -- что-то вылезет, может даже ярко. Любая нездоровая активность в Инжирлике может указывать именно на это.The stockpile at Incirlik AB includes an estimated 10~20 weapons earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16 aircraft. Although former Turkish officials say the F-16s have never had a nuclear role, the Pentagon says they currently do. Nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Turkey’s Akinci AB and Balikesir AB in 1995, and some of the weapons were transferred to Incirlik. In 2001, 40 of 90 weapons at Incirlik AB were “host” weapons for the 4th and 9th Wings. Since then, one of the wings is believed to have lost its nuclear mission, and the inventory reduced accordingly. Turkey has rejected a US request to deploy a fighter wing at Incirlik, making the weapons deployment at the base unique.
Turkey hosts an estimated 60~70 B61 bombs at Incirlik AB, down from the 2001 level of 90 weapons; however, the posture is unique in NATO. Most of the bombs (approximately 50) are for delivery by US aircraft, but the US Air Force does not have a fighter wing based at Incirlik. Requests to deploy a wing there have been turned down by Turkey, so the NATO nuclear posture at Incirlik is more of a half-posture. In a crisis, US aircraft from other bases would have to first deploy to Incirlik to pick up the weapons before they could be used. The remaining 10~20 bombs at Incirlik AB are earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16A/Bs. Until 1995, Akinci AB in central Turkey and Balikesir AB in western Turkey also stored US nuclear weapons for delivery by the 4th Wing and 9th Wing, respectively, but after the US MUNSS at each base was withdrawn, the bombs (about 40 weapons) were moved to Incirlik. Since then, the number of 'Turkish' bombs at Incirlik AB has probably been reduced to 10~20 weapons to correspond to the inventories at other national bases, and one of the two wings lost its nuclear mission. Turkey's F-16s are slated to be replaced by JSFs beginning in 2015, when the first six aircraft are scheduled to be delivered. The Turkish Air Force is scheduled to receive a total of 100 JSFs through 2025 (Defense Department, 2010b). There are conflicting reports about the status of the Turkish nuclear mission. Gen. Ergin Celasin, former commander (until 2001) of the Turkish Air Force, is on record stating that Turkey's role in the NATO nuclear strike mission ended in the 1990s with the withdrawal of weapons from the national Turkish bases. In contrast, according to Pentagon sources, Turkey currently uses its F-16s to execute the nuclear mission. Moreover, until Turkey acquires a sufficient number of nuclear-capable JSFs over the 15 years, its F-16s are scheduled to receive a 'stop-gap' upgrade to make them capable of carrying the new B61-12 bomb that will replace the B61-3/4 beginning in 2017. The confusion about Turkey's status may have to do with the aircraft's degree of nuclear readiness, which has changed over time, ranging from full alert in the 1980s, to withdrawal from national bases in the 1990s, to today's 'pick up the weapons at Incirlik if needed' posture. During these phases, the aircraft status changed from nuclear-capable, certified, and loaded, to nuclear-capable and certified, to nuclear-capable. Today, the Turkish aircraft are nuclear-capable (according to US sources) but neither loaded nor certified. This, combined with the absence of a US wing at Incirlik AB, underscores the special status of the Turkish posture.