(no subject)
I had an interesting hypnagogic experience last night, illustrating what has been called, in reference to certain neurological disorders, the 'left hemisphere interpreter'.
Due to my injury, I've lost feeling in half of my foot, resulting in that strange tingling feeling when it is touched. As I was falling asleep, I found myself in a dream-like state. The resulting imagery, or narrative, was that my nephew had come into my room while I was trying to rest, and was tugging on my foot, where the feeling is absent, trying to get me up.
It was an interesting and, notwithstanding its discontinuity with my waking circumstances, relatively plausible state of affairs and, in that sense, reasonable explanation of the odd feeling and slight disturbance I was feeling.
That this occurred in sleep, rather than on the occasion of some neurological trauma, yet matches so closely the 'left hemisphere interpreter' phenomenon, reminds me of the connection, which perhaps Ramachandran has suggested, between these hypotheses of cognitive neuropsychiatry and Freud's psychoanalysis.
Aside from this difference in empirical context, I think there is an essential difference in theoretical orientation, through which Freud's thought may be able to provide some useful supplement to our present science. Through its history in the cognitive revolution of the late 20th century, our neuropsychiatric thinking is principally representational in orientation, and this perspective shows up in how the 'left hemisphere interpreter' is understood. We take it to be providing a belief, where the belief is essential propositional, and stands as an explanation for some state of affairs we represent to ourselves. Freud's heritage in 19th century German neuroscience and psychiatry gives his thought, conversely, more of a dynamic impulse; that is, a conception of mind as something that is principally a motive force, or, as he called it, a drive. His famous theory of dreams as wish fulfillments is an expression of this perspective. 'Wish' here is only a cognitive description of the body's motive force. The simplest examples of this can be found in dreams of drinking that result from a state of thirst, or dreams of relieving oneself that result from pressure in the bowels or bladder. The interpretation, imagery, or narrative here is not so much a theory, in representational and propositional terms, as an expression of motive force.
We may want to ask whether this dynamic orientation can be fruitful to understanding the interests of cognitive neuropsychiatry. There is a natural point of contact where the neuropsychiatric hypothesis suppose an essential contribution in emotional input to the interpretations.
Due to my injury, I've lost feeling in half of my foot, resulting in that strange tingling feeling when it is touched. As I was falling asleep, I found myself in a dream-like state. The resulting imagery, or narrative, was that my nephew had come into my room while I was trying to rest, and was tugging on my foot, where the feeling is absent, trying to get me up.
It was an interesting and, notwithstanding its discontinuity with my waking circumstances, relatively plausible state of affairs and, in that sense, reasonable explanation of the odd feeling and slight disturbance I was feeling.
That this occurred in sleep, rather than on the occasion of some neurological trauma, yet matches so closely the 'left hemisphere interpreter' phenomenon, reminds me of the connection, which perhaps Ramachandran has suggested, between these hypotheses of cognitive neuropsychiatry and Freud's psychoanalysis.
Aside from this difference in empirical context, I think there is an essential difference in theoretical orientation, through which Freud's thought may be able to provide some useful supplement to our present science. Through its history in the cognitive revolution of the late 20th century, our neuropsychiatric thinking is principally representational in orientation, and this perspective shows up in how the 'left hemisphere interpreter' is understood. We take it to be providing a belief, where the belief is essential propositional, and stands as an explanation for some state of affairs we represent to ourselves. Freud's heritage in 19th century German neuroscience and psychiatry gives his thought, conversely, more of a dynamic impulse; that is, a conception of mind as something that is principally a motive force, or, as he called it, a drive. His famous theory of dreams as wish fulfillments is an expression of this perspective. 'Wish' here is only a cognitive description of the body's motive force. The simplest examples of this can be found in dreams of drinking that result from a state of thirst, or dreams of relieving oneself that result from pressure in the bowels or bladder. The interpretation, imagery, or narrative here is not so much a theory, in representational and propositional terms, as an expression of motive force.
We may want to ask whether this dynamic orientation can be fruitful to understanding the interests of cognitive neuropsychiatry. There is a natural point of contact where the neuropsychiatric hypothesis suppose an essential contribution in emotional input to the interpretations.