THE THEOCENTRIC MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE
Or: Why Jesus Died for the Materialists
The transcendental realist believes we have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. He evaluates and analyzes human knowledge in terms of its conformity with the standard of cognition theoretically achievable by an "infinite" or "absolute" intellect that has a "God's-eye-view" on things. Therefore, the transcendental realist subscribes to a "theocentric model of knowledge".
It's obvious how the 16th and 17th century rationalists subscribed to this model, but it is equally true that so-called "scientific" materialists appeal to this view. If the realm of extended entities is the object of investigation of the sciences, and if these objects can be described independently of subjective, a priori conditions of sensibility, then the transcendental realist evaluates knowledge in terms of this same God's-eye-view on things. For all intents and purposes, the materialist subscribes to a Christ-centered epistemology.
On this model, we can never account for a priori cognition. If we can't have knowledge until we have direct acquaintance with things in themselves, then there is no way to "anticipate" what the real nature of these objects will be. For the transcendental realist, all knowledge is a posteriori.
But the situation is worse than this. Transcendental realism is defenseless against empirical idealism, a philosophical position that claims we can only know our private mental states. Not only can't the theocentric model account for a priori cognition; it can't account for a posteriori knowledge, either. It can't account for knowledge of any kind. For this reason we require a philosophical revolution.
Kant's Copernican Revolution states that our cognition does not conform to objects; instead we can know objects only insofar as they conform to our conditions of cognition. This anthrocentric model of knowledge is the central position of transcendental idealism. It allows us to explain a priori and a posteriori cognition, because it is analytically true that any object that we represent is subject to the conditions under which alone we can represent it. The transcendental distinction prevents the slide into empirical idealism and secures for reason what transcendental realism could not: a secure ground upon which to raise the walls of the Fortress of Wisdom.
The transcendental realist believes we have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. He evaluates and analyzes human knowledge in terms of its conformity with the standard of cognition theoretically achievable by an "infinite" or "absolute" intellect that has a "God's-eye-view" on things. Therefore, the transcendental realist subscribes to a "theocentric model of knowledge".
It's obvious how the 16th and 17th century rationalists subscribed to this model, but it is equally true that so-called "scientific" materialists appeal to this view. If the realm of extended entities is the object of investigation of the sciences, and if these objects can be described independently of subjective, a priori conditions of sensibility, then the transcendental realist evaluates knowledge in terms of this same God's-eye-view on things. For all intents and purposes, the materialist subscribes to a Christ-centered epistemology.
On this model, we can never account for a priori cognition. If we can't have knowledge until we have direct acquaintance with things in themselves, then there is no way to "anticipate" what the real nature of these objects will be. For the transcendental realist, all knowledge is a posteriori.
But the situation is worse than this. Transcendental realism is defenseless against empirical idealism, a philosophical position that claims we can only know our private mental states. Not only can't the theocentric model account for a priori cognition; it can't account for a posteriori knowledge, either. It can't account for knowledge of any kind. For this reason we require a philosophical revolution.
Kant's Copernican Revolution states that our cognition does not conform to objects; instead we can know objects only insofar as they conform to our conditions of cognition. This anthrocentric model of knowledge is the central position of transcendental idealism. It allows us to explain a priori and a posteriori cognition, because it is analytically true that any object that we represent is subject to the conditions under which alone we can represent it. The transcendental distinction prevents the slide into empirical idealism and secures for reason what transcendental realism could not: a secure ground upon which to raise the walls of the Fortress of Wisdom.