Well, crap.

[zunger]

It looks like the US may have actually managed to do something which will change the situation in Afghanistan in the long term, not just the short term: discovered large mineral deposits.It's going to take a while to process the potential implications of this. Afghanistan has been an isolated place, ruled by tribal warlords and resisting any

Comments

[zunger]

I agree with you and think that I was unclear earlier. For (b), I think that there is likely to be a competition, and that many of those in a decision-making position are likely to view this as a key strategic advantage; but I'm not at all certain that competing in this way will end up being to our net advantage in the long term.

I guess that a lot of the question is whether or not we believe that this will be a zero- (or even negative-)sum game. The pure resource competition almost certainly is, but that's only a small part of the overall wealth/power equation; advances in resource utilization can make entire resources suddenly much less important, and can create giant positive-sum wins for all players. I'm guessing that there will be a number of those in the future, and (as you say) there are a number of places where outright competition would be negative-sum in its own right.

I have a more subtle worry which I guess you might call "ideological." I don't think that China has any interest in spreading its own brand of politics around the world, but I do wonder what a world dominated by the Chinese would look like in terms of the political zeitgeist. The last few decades of the twentieth century saw a very broad acceptance of certain American norms, e.g. about freedom of speech; that several countries are working so hard to quench those internally is, in its way, a demonstration of how strong a hold the idea seems to have on people. In a century of Chinese ascendancy, though, what would the corresponding ideas be, and how would those play out in the daily lives of people? I can't help having a nasty feeling about that -- in part because I'm very comfortable with American norms, but also in part because China's domestic political history doesn't exactly fill me with warm fuzzies.

[benrosenbaum]

I share to some extent your ideological worry. I have two counterbalancing responses, though. One is that we don't entirely know what an ascendant and secure China would look like -- what internal struggles and processes its rise would bring. If we cast back to the period when the US was still militarily weak and relatively impoverished compared to Europe, but the farsighted could already see its rise as predestined, we're talking about the Civil War era or just post Civil War -- when America was busily at work on concluding the genocidal takeover of the remains of the frontier, and either still in the grip of the peculiar institution, or restoring it in large part de facto via Jim Crow and the KKK; not to mention robber barons and sweatshops. I expect the humane values of an ascendant China will be different from ours, certainly. The emphasis on free speech might be lost, for instance. But there might be counterbalancing virtues. (This is sort of the Ibn Khaldunian model, in which barbarians by their very roughness always conquer the decadent, allowing them to flower into the humane peak of civilization, which inevitably leads to decadence and fall...)

The other thing is that it is not necessarily the case that the alternatives to American hegemony are Chinese hegemony or Cold-War struggle. It is possible to have a multipolar world with a general agreement on spheres of influence, in which trade and cooperation far outweigh occasional border skirmishes. The Great Powers of Europe achieved this for much of the time between Napoleon and WWI (to the increasingly great cost of the people they colonized, it bears mentioning); so did Islam, China and the various South Indian and Southeast Asian polities in the Indian Ocean region in the period ca. 800-1500.

[zunger]

Your first response got me thinking about the things which stayed the same and the things which changed for various countries. Many of the things which most characterized the US in the post-Civil War era could still be seen today; for example, a deep notion of national exceptionalism, a propensity for waves of religious fervor of a particular sort, and powerful shared ideas about individual liberty. And as you said, several other things changed -- robber-baron capitalism is no longer quite so popular, and as a country we seem considerably less bloodthirsty than we were back then.

My suspicion is that countries have a "national psyche," a set of common framing structures and narratives, which tends to stay fixed over very long periods of time, changed only by shocks on the scale of mass migrations; and on top of this, there is an ebb and flow of energy, with countries in their first flush of youth making a name for themselves by any means possible, and later -- if and when they're rich and established -- reining in things like Dickensian capitalism or military expansionism in favor of safety nets and the comforts of success.

I think it's this latter oscillation which Ibn Khaldun saw, but the constants are still there; even in his time, Rome was not Baghdad, and one could not confuse the courts and countrysides of Tamerlane and of Clovis, separated though they were by a similar span from their conquering histories. I don't doubt that an ascendant China would have its own virtues, but I fear that many of its underlying traits - its powerful respect for authority over the individual, its calm acceptance of extraordinary gaps of power - would stay the same.

I do agree about the multipolarity of the future world; the bipolar world of the Cold War was an accident of history, not likely to happen very often. But the US and China will surely be two of the biggest fish in this pond...

(Side note: We should totally have had a panel about something related to this at WisCon. It would have been really interesting.)