Basketball OK; Algeria
Wow, the end of the Oklahoma vs. Oklahoma State game was intense! Two (or was it three?) lead changes with under 10 seconds of game time to go! I wonder who would have won had the referee called travel instead of foul at the very end of the game. Basketball is such a great way to pick up from where the Olympics left off. I'm so ready for March Madness!
Now onto your regularly scheduled reading notes...
A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era
Matthew Connelly, Oxford University Press, 2002.
Connelly shows how European standards of “progress” and “modernization” not only served to colonize Algeria, but also to decolonize it. The same ideas of self-determinacy and nation formation, adopted by Algerians through being educated under Western standards, led to the downfall of France’s protectorate over Algeria. Similarly, technology that was introduced to help maintain consistent control over the territory was used in turn for the rebel movement, when radio broadcasts became a powerful tool to incite popular reaction.
“Since the FLN could not physically control territory, the basis for their claim to sovereignty was abstract: it rested in peoples’ estimations of their legitimacy as the rightful rulers-not just people in Algeria, but in France, the United States, and anywhere else influence could be brought to bear on the course of events. In a very real sense, one of the most important battles in the Algerian War was waged in the realm of ideas. Its ultimate outcome is still uncertain.” (p. 38)
Connelly:
“Chapter 1 alluded to other international events that impinged on Algeria in the context of the global demographic, economic, cultural, and technological trends undermining imperialism as a whole.” (p. 41)
Chapter 2:
“This chapter will set the stage and introduce some of the other protagonists, which requires turning the spotlight on Algeria’s ‘wings,’ as Morocco and Tunisia were sometimes called.” (p. 41)
“North Africans sought support simultaneously from the West, as shown in the aftermath of a clash between Moroccans and French colonial troops in April 1947. The sultan traveled to Tangier and, in a defiant speech before a large crowd of Moroccans, reaffirmed his country’s attachment to Islam and hailed the Arab League without rendering the customary tribute to the protectorate.” (p. 44)
Need to see things in the context of “white” vs. others (even USSR), or West vs. “Asiatics and African and colonial natives” (p. 48) with threat of Communism during Cold War and interconnectedness of colonization as part of that race.
Context: race to colonize with mentality to “get to it” first before the Soviets (?)
“Thus, French officials had a protective, even proprietary attitude toward their colonial charges which conceded nothing to American pretensions to be an emancipatory power.” (p. 51)
“The new American policy on North Africa was part of a more general shift in American strategy to back the European empires and South Africa. Almost everywhere they confronted the same dilemma: resistance to change threatened to drive Third World nationalists toward the Soviets and to waste resources that might have strengthened European reconstruction. On the other hand, policymakers feared that either chaos or communism would result from ‘premature’ independence and juged that the European economies depended on the colonies.” (p. 51)
“Moreover, in the process, the Americans became ever more dependent on their ally to protect U.S. interests in Asia, Africa, and Europe-and ever more deeply involved in French domestic politics.” (p. 58)
~ There was an American-French tension in terms of competing re: issues of North African countries’ independence. For example, in Morocco, in which America posed as a liberation threat to a French empire that was stretched very thin. (c.f. p. 59)
Conflict:
“If the politicians of the Fourth Republic would not lead, follow, or get out of the way, Washingotn would allow and even encourage their overthrow.” (p. 63)
I like how Connolly brought in other global happenings at that time-Vietnam, Tunisia, Morocco-and analyzed the interrelatedness of all these events in how they effected the outcome of the Algerian war and struggle for independence. It showed me a bigger picture of just a narrow view of Algerian history. It made the root causes and aftermaths so much more logical in light of everything tied to it (North Africa as well as the “West”).
Conspiracy theories-blaming each other
Internationalizing the Algerian problem:
“Internal reforms were important not only to advance integration but also to maintain the support of allies and answer the arguments of the emerging nonaligned movement. At the same time, exposing and-if need be-striking at the FLN’s external backers would delegitimize their claims to speak for the Muslim population in Algeria and abroad.” (p. 72)
~ France needed to seek support from abroad, which made concessions harder-outsiders aren’t welcomed to decide “cutting off” a piece of France (i.e., Algeria) when the problem was viewed as an internal one.
Is the “war,” then, a civil war?
“Thus, while the French had not chosen the ground, they concluded that they could not avoid doing battle with the FLN in the international arena. The two sides therefore joined in waging the Algerian War as a kind of world war, a war for world opinion. America’s clout at the United Nations and with the FLN’s suppliers made it the most fiercely contested terrain.” (p. 82)
At the core of this book is the message that the Algerian War is an international affair. This quote sums it up well. There was no option for the French but to move the war into an international level. And by doing so, it was no longer an internal problem. Other international opinions got involved; Cold War ideologies were taken into consideration.
Turn:
“Ironically, now it was the French who were pursuing a peripheral strategy, trumpeting the strategic importance of North Africa and arguing that in fighting the Algerian nationalists they were defending NATO’s southern flank.” (p. 84)
Throw in the side the factor of Israel. A la Peres: more French killed in North Africa, closer Israel-France tie :p (The "Franco-Israeli alliance vs. Nasser's aid to FLN)
~ This creates a situation where “all Arabs” are against “all non-Arabs,” i.e., the infamous clash of civilization theory, which, flawed or not, was how the players viewed the Algerian situation at that time. This shows some of the causes of the problems that civilizational theories contain.
“In fact, many games were being played out in the Near East and North Africa, even if the available evidence affords only a tentative and incomplete picture. One thing seems clear, and it is one of the supreme ironies of this war: France was preparing to strike at Nasser and ‘pan-Islamism’ at the very moment the FLN rejected Egyptian influence and the very idea of jihad.” (p. 109)
“Thus, the seizing of a foreign-flagged ship in international waters and the interception of the Moroccan plane in international airspace, not to mention the real danger of the war spreading across North Africa, made it obvious that Algeria was no longer an internal affair, if it ever had been.” (p. 115)
Incorporation of world opinions (pp. 133 ff.)
“The FLN’s principal propaganda organ was devoting over half of its coverage to the international context of the war by the middle of 1958. This is all the more striking considering that in that same period the intensity of the military struggle attained an all-time high.” (p. 135)
Led to international media adjustment as well.
“Having observed how the arguments aimed at winning over world opinion sharpened domestic debates within France and undermined the whole rationale for retaining Algeria, we will now see how in Algeria, as in Suez, the force of world opinion was mediated by American policymakers intent on riding the ‘trend of history’-and dragging the French with them.” (p. 141)
Now onto your regularly scheduled reading notes...
A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era
Matthew Connelly, Oxford University Press, 2002.
Connelly shows how European standards of “progress” and “modernization” not only served to colonize Algeria, but also to decolonize it. The same ideas of self-determinacy and nation formation, adopted by Algerians through being educated under Western standards, led to the downfall of France’s protectorate over Algeria. Similarly, technology that was introduced to help maintain consistent control over the territory was used in turn for the rebel movement, when radio broadcasts became a powerful tool to incite popular reaction.
“Since the FLN could not physically control territory, the basis for their claim to sovereignty was abstract: it rested in peoples’ estimations of their legitimacy as the rightful rulers-not just people in Algeria, but in France, the United States, and anywhere else influence could be brought to bear on the course of events. In a very real sense, one of the most important battles in the Algerian War was waged in the realm of ideas. Its ultimate outcome is still uncertain.” (p. 38)
Connelly:
“Chapter 1 alluded to other international events that impinged on Algeria in the context of the global demographic, economic, cultural, and technological trends undermining imperialism as a whole.” (p. 41)
Chapter 2:
“This chapter will set the stage and introduce some of the other protagonists, which requires turning the spotlight on Algeria’s ‘wings,’ as Morocco and Tunisia were sometimes called.” (p. 41)
“North Africans sought support simultaneously from the West, as shown in the aftermath of a clash between Moroccans and French colonial troops in April 1947. The sultan traveled to Tangier and, in a defiant speech before a large crowd of Moroccans, reaffirmed his country’s attachment to Islam and hailed the Arab League without rendering the customary tribute to the protectorate.” (p. 44)
Need to see things in the context of “white” vs. others (even USSR), or West vs. “Asiatics and African and colonial natives” (p. 48) with threat of Communism during Cold War and interconnectedness of colonization as part of that race.
Context: race to colonize with mentality to “get to it” first before the Soviets (?)
“Thus, French officials had a protective, even proprietary attitude toward their colonial charges which conceded nothing to American pretensions to be an emancipatory power.” (p. 51)
“The new American policy on North Africa was part of a more general shift in American strategy to back the European empires and South Africa. Almost everywhere they confronted the same dilemma: resistance to change threatened to drive Third World nationalists toward the Soviets and to waste resources that might have strengthened European reconstruction. On the other hand, policymakers feared that either chaos or communism would result from ‘premature’ independence and juged that the European economies depended on the colonies.” (p. 51)
“Moreover, in the process, the Americans became ever more dependent on their ally to protect U.S. interests in Asia, Africa, and Europe-and ever more deeply involved in French domestic politics.” (p. 58)
~ There was an American-French tension in terms of competing re: issues of North African countries’ independence. For example, in Morocco, in which America posed as a liberation threat to a French empire that was stretched very thin. (c.f. p. 59)
Conflict:
“If the politicians of the Fourth Republic would not lead, follow, or get out of the way, Washingotn would allow and even encourage their overthrow.” (p. 63)
I like how Connolly brought in other global happenings at that time-Vietnam, Tunisia, Morocco-and analyzed the interrelatedness of all these events in how they effected the outcome of the Algerian war and struggle for independence. It showed me a bigger picture of just a narrow view of Algerian history. It made the root causes and aftermaths so much more logical in light of everything tied to it (North Africa as well as the “West”).
Conspiracy theories-blaming each other
Internationalizing the Algerian problem:
“Internal reforms were important not only to advance integration but also to maintain the support of allies and answer the arguments of the emerging nonaligned movement. At the same time, exposing and-if need be-striking at the FLN’s external backers would delegitimize their claims to speak for the Muslim population in Algeria and abroad.” (p. 72)
~ France needed to seek support from abroad, which made concessions harder-outsiders aren’t welcomed to decide “cutting off” a piece of France (i.e., Algeria) when the problem was viewed as an internal one.
Is the “war,” then, a civil war?
“Thus, while the French had not chosen the ground, they concluded that they could not avoid doing battle with the FLN in the international arena. The two sides therefore joined in waging the Algerian War as a kind of world war, a war for world opinion. America’s clout at the United Nations and with the FLN’s suppliers made it the most fiercely contested terrain.” (p. 82)
At the core of this book is the message that the Algerian War is an international affair. This quote sums it up well. There was no option for the French but to move the war into an international level. And by doing so, it was no longer an internal problem. Other international opinions got involved; Cold War ideologies were taken into consideration.
Turn:
“Ironically, now it was the French who were pursuing a peripheral strategy, trumpeting the strategic importance of North Africa and arguing that in fighting the Algerian nationalists they were defending NATO’s southern flank.” (p. 84)
Throw in the side the factor of Israel. A la Peres: more French killed in North Africa, closer Israel-France tie :p (The "Franco-Israeli alliance vs. Nasser's aid to FLN)
~ This creates a situation where “all Arabs” are against “all non-Arabs,” i.e., the infamous clash of civilization theory, which, flawed or not, was how the players viewed the Algerian situation at that time. This shows some of the causes of the problems that civilizational theories contain.
“In fact, many games were being played out in the Near East and North Africa, even if the available evidence affords only a tentative and incomplete picture. One thing seems clear, and it is one of the supreme ironies of this war: France was preparing to strike at Nasser and ‘pan-Islamism’ at the very moment the FLN rejected Egyptian influence and the very idea of jihad.” (p. 109)
“Thus, the seizing of a foreign-flagged ship in international waters and the interception of the Moroccan plane in international airspace, not to mention the real danger of the war spreading across North Africa, made it obvious that Algeria was no longer an internal affair, if it ever had been.” (p. 115)
Incorporation of world opinions (pp. 133 ff.)
“The FLN’s principal propaganda organ was devoting over half of its coverage to the international context of the war by the middle of 1958. This is all the more striking considering that in that same period the intensity of the military struggle attained an all-time high.” (p. 135)
Led to international media adjustment as well.
“Having observed how the arguments aimed at winning over world opinion sharpened domestic debates within France and undermined the whole rationale for retaining Algeria, we will now see how in Algeria, as in Suez, the force of world opinion was mediated by American policymakers intent on riding the ‘trend of history’-and dragging the French with them.” (p. 141)