Pardon me while I get political for a bit.
I'd meant to post this for several months now. And I heard the last relevant bit of news several days ago, but I'm only just now getting off my ass and posting. Because. Gah.
Italics are excerpts from The Dark Side: The inside story of how the war on terror turned into a war on American ideals by Jane Mayer. Bold italics from A Question of Torture: CIA interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror by Alfred W. McCoy. And most of this post, really, will be excerpts, wholesale; because this thing stuck in my craw ever since I read the book four or five months ago, in a way that makes me want to stick it into everyone else's craw too.
On that day, December 19, 2001, Pakistani security forces, blocking the chaotic escape of those fleeing Afghanistan over what were called "rat trails" through the mountains, captured what was considered the first big prize in the war on terror. He was an alleged Al Qaeda commander by the name of Ali Abdul Aziz al-Fakhiri, better known by his nom de guerre, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. The Pakistanis quickly turned al-Libi over the Americans...
At the FBI's field office in New York, Jack Cloonan thought they had a possible gold mine.... With the criminal justice model in mind, he advised his FBI colleagues in Afghanistan to question al-Libi respectfully "and handle this like it was being done right here, in my office in New York." He recalled, "I remember talking on a secure line to them. I told them, 'Do yourself a favor, read the guy his rights. It may be old-fashioned, but this will come out if we don't. If may take ten years, but it will hurt you, and the Bureau's reputation, if you don't. Have it stand as a shining example of what we feel is right.'"
Al-Libi was a small man who liked to smile a lot, in a way that seemed genuinely friendly, not malicious.... Once he got started, he just talked and talked. In fact, he talked so much that they had to keep pocketfuls of pens warmed by their body heat, because in the frosty Spartan cell they were using as an office, the ink kept freezing before he was done. They could barely keep up.
"He was expecting us to pull out his fingernails or something," a source familiar with the interrogation, who was not authorized to describe it on the record, recalled. "But when he found out that we were really there to listen, and that he was stuck, with no way out, he just opened up."
Amongst various intelligence al-Libi provided, it emerged that he hadn't actually liked Bin Laden, who had tried to force him to train only Al Qaeda fighters, not all Muslims, which was his preference. Most important, they claimed, al-Libi gave the agents specific, actionable intelligence--information that could save American lives. Defenders of coercion in the Bush Administration would go on to argue that the extreme urgency of getting such operational information justified their approach. But without coercion, al-Libi told the FBI team of an approved plot by Al Qaeda that was in the final stage before execution, to blow up the U.S. embassy in Aden, Yemen. A source close to the interrogation maintained that this was corroborated, averting what would likely have been a deadly attack.
Almost important as what al-Libi said was what he didn't say. Although Fincher reportedly pressed al-Libi hard on any ties between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the Al Qaeda commander told the investigators he knew of none.
In exchange for his cooperation, there was something al-Libi wanted.... He had a Syrian wife. He wanted for her, and her family, to be able to come to the United States. He was willing to be prosecuted himself if a deal could be struck.
The FBI wasn't the only agency who wanted to get their hands on al-Libi and the information he had. The CIA station chief in Kabul had problems with the way the FBI team was approaching things. He complained to Cofer Black at Langley, and that got Director Tenet going to the White House. And the FBI lost that fight, and found CIA agents barging into their office in the middle of their discussion.
Back in Kabul, Cloonan recalled, "CIA officers come in, start shackling al-Libi up. Right before they duct tape his mouth, he tells our guys, 'I know this isn't your fault.'"
That was the bit that stuck with me. "I know this isn't your fault."
Al-Libi was sent to Egypt under the extraordinary rendition program.
Cloonan retired from the FBI in disgust, after a twenty-seven year career.
In March of 2003, the U.S.A. invaded Iraq. One of the justifications used by the U.S. government was Saddam Hussein's support of the Al Qaeda terrorists.
In 2004, after al-Libi was returned to the custody of the United States, he told the CIA that Egyptian security officials had threatened him with "a long list of methods that could be used against him which were extreme." He said the Egyptians pressed him in particular to admit to knowing about ties between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This pressure occurred in the crucial months prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when the Bush Administration was trying to substantiate the case for war. Al-Libi told the CIA that he "knew nothing" about the subject so he "had difficulty even coming up with a story." Dissatisfied with his nonresponsiveness, he said, the Egyptians locked him in a tiny cage for more than eighty hours. Al-Libi still didn't know what to say when they let him out. At this point, al-Libi said, the Egyptians knocked him over and punched him for fifteen minutes. Then, when again they asked him about links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, according to the report, he admitted to the CIA that he had made a story up. He accused three Al Qaeda figures he knew--using their real names--of going to Iraq to learn about nuclear weapons.
Al-Libi told the CIA that the Egyptians pressed him about Saddam Hussein supplying Al Qaeda with anthrax and other biological weapons.... Again he was beaten, this time, he said, "in a way that left no marks." He subsequently fabricated additional details, which were piped into the Vice President's office, among other places, and used by the Bush Administration to buttress its allegations that Iraq was on the verge of supplying Al Qaeda with potentially terrifying weapons of mass destruction.
According to two FBI officials, al-Libi later explained his subsequent lies matter-of-factly. "They were killing me," he said. "I had to tell them something."
Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi died a few days ago in a jail cell in Libya.
It was reported as a suicide.
There are doubts. And not, the cynic in me thinks, merely because suicide is forbidden by Islam.
If this is an old story to you, I apologize for tying up your friends list with it. But if this is the first you've heard of this--please, if you have a moment and a few neurons to spare, think about this. Or go here, or here, and follow some links.
I wanted to post this partially for the political reasons, sure. One of those 'look at how this country has done business for the past eight years, now tell me why were aren't prosecuting these people' posts. Because I'm a dirty fucking hippie like that. But also, partially, for a purely personal, abstract reason--like I said, this stuck in my craw.
"I know this isn't your fault."
Italics are excerpts from The Dark Side: The inside story of how the war on terror turned into a war on American ideals by Jane Mayer. Bold italics from A Question of Torture: CIA interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror by Alfred W. McCoy. And most of this post, really, will be excerpts, wholesale; because this thing stuck in my craw ever since I read the book four or five months ago, in a way that makes me want to stick it into everyone else's craw too.
On that day, December 19, 2001, Pakistani security forces, blocking the chaotic escape of those fleeing Afghanistan over what were called "rat trails" through the mountains, captured what was considered the first big prize in the war on terror. He was an alleged Al Qaeda commander by the name of Ali Abdul Aziz al-Fakhiri, better known by his nom de guerre, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. The Pakistanis quickly turned al-Libi over the Americans...
At the FBI's field office in New York, Jack Cloonan thought they had a possible gold mine.... With the criminal justice model in mind, he advised his FBI colleagues in Afghanistan to question al-Libi respectfully "and handle this like it was being done right here, in my office in New York." He recalled, "I remember talking on a secure line to them. I told them, 'Do yourself a favor, read the guy his rights. It may be old-fashioned, but this will come out if we don't. If may take ten years, but it will hurt you, and the Bureau's reputation, if you don't. Have it stand as a shining example of what we feel is right.'"
Al-Libi was a small man who liked to smile a lot, in a way that seemed genuinely friendly, not malicious.... Once he got started, he just talked and talked. In fact, he talked so much that they had to keep pocketfuls of pens warmed by their body heat, because in the frosty Spartan cell they were using as an office, the ink kept freezing before he was done. They could barely keep up.
"He was expecting us to pull out his fingernails or something," a source familiar with the interrogation, who was not authorized to describe it on the record, recalled. "But when he found out that we were really there to listen, and that he was stuck, with no way out, he just opened up."
Amongst various intelligence al-Libi provided, it emerged that he hadn't actually liked Bin Laden, who had tried to force him to train only Al Qaeda fighters, not all Muslims, which was his preference. Most important, they claimed, al-Libi gave the agents specific, actionable intelligence--information that could save American lives. Defenders of coercion in the Bush Administration would go on to argue that the extreme urgency of getting such operational information justified their approach. But without coercion, al-Libi told the FBI team of an approved plot by Al Qaeda that was in the final stage before execution, to blow up the U.S. embassy in Aden, Yemen. A source close to the interrogation maintained that this was corroborated, averting what would likely have been a deadly attack.
Almost important as what al-Libi said was what he didn't say. Although Fincher reportedly pressed al-Libi hard on any ties between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the Al Qaeda commander told the investigators he knew of none.
In exchange for his cooperation, there was something al-Libi wanted.... He had a Syrian wife. He wanted for her, and her family, to be able to come to the United States. He was willing to be prosecuted himself if a deal could be struck.
The FBI wasn't the only agency who wanted to get their hands on al-Libi and the information he had. The CIA station chief in Kabul had problems with the way the FBI team was approaching things. He complained to Cofer Black at Langley, and that got Director Tenet going to the White House. And the FBI lost that fight, and found CIA agents barging into their office in the middle of their discussion.
Back in Kabul, Cloonan recalled, "CIA officers come in, start shackling al-Libi up. Right before they duct tape his mouth, he tells our guys, 'I know this isn't your fault.'"
That was the bit that stuck with me. "I know this isn't your fault."
Al-Libi was sent to Egypt under the extraordinary rendition program.
Cloonan retired from the FBI in disgust, after a twenty-seven year career.
In March of 2003, the U.S.A. invaded Iraq. One of the justifications used by the U.S. government was Saddam Hussein's support of the Al Qaeda terrorists.
In 2004, after al-Libi was returned to the custody of the United States, he told the CIA that Egyptian security officials had threatened him with "a long list of methods that could be used against him which were extreme." He said the Egyptians pressed him in particular to admit to knowing about ties between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This pressure occurred in the crucial months prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when the Bush Administration was trying to substantiate the case for war. Al-Libi told the CIA that he "knew nothing" about the subject so he "had difficulty even coming up with a story." Dissatisfied with his nonresponsiveness, he said, the Egyptians locked him in a tiny cage for more than eighty hours. Al-Libi still didn't know what to say when they let him out. At this point, al-Libi said, the Egyptians knocked him over and punched him for fifteen minutes. Then, when again they asked him about links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, according to the report, he admitted to the CIA that he had made a story up. He accused three Al Qaeda figures he knew--using their real names--of going to Iraq to learn about nuclear weapons.
Al-Libi told the CIA that the Egyptians pressed him about Saddam Hussein supplying Al Qaeda with anthrax and other biological weapons.... Again he was beaten, this time, he said, "in a way that left no marks." He subsequently fabricated additional details, which were piped into the Vice President's office, among other places, and used by the Bush Administration to buttress its allegations that Iraq was on the verge of supplying Al Qaeda with potentially terrifying weapons of mass destruction.
According to two FBI officials, al-Libi later explained his subsequent lies matter-of-factly. "They were killing me," he said. "I had to tell them something."
Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi died a few days ago in a jail cell in Libya.
It was reported as a suicide.
There are doubts. And not, the cynic in me thinks, merely because suicide is forbidden by Islam.
If this is an old story to you, I apologize for tying up your friends list with it. But if this is the first you've heard of this--please, if you have a moment and a few neurons to spare, think about this. Or go here, or here, and follow some links.
I wanted to post this partially for the political reasons, sure. One of those 'look at how this country has done business for the past eight years, now tell me why were aren't prosecuting these people' posts. Because I'm a dirty fucking hippie like that. But also, partially, for a purely personal, abstract reason--like I said, this stuck in my craw.
"I know this isn't your fault."