Майкл Макфол
Майкл Макфол (посол США в России) в своей книге Advancing Democracy Abroad описал, каким именно образом Госдеп поддерживает цветные революции:
In the fall of 2003, numerous American envoys tried to convince President Shevardnadze to hold free and fair elections. When he did not, the Bush administration did not immediately denounce the election results, but gradually signaled support for the opposition until they seized power. In the run up to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Bush administration officials also encouraged President Kuchma to hold free and fair elections, and by denying visas to prominent Ukrainian businessmen, signaled to the regime the consequences of a fraudulent vote. These threats did not prevent Kuchma from trying to steal the vote, but they may have helped to constrain the president and his entourage from using force against the demonstrators. Indirectly, American-supported media outlets’ reports on Kuchma’s involvement in the killing of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the vast corruption of Shevardnadze’s Georgian government also helped to undermine the popularity and power of these leaders.
NDI and IRI played active roles in encouraging cooperation among the democratic groups in Serbia and Ukraine, though less so in Georgia. They did so by collecting and then sharing survey data, which underscored the electoral advantage of a single candidate. In both countries, this data pointed to the need to back particular candidates-Voijislav Kostunica in Serbia and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine rather than the more charismatic opposition leaders in both countries at the time (Zoran Djinjic in Serbia and Yulia Timoshenko in Ukraine).
In the fall of 2003, numerous American envoys tried to convince President Shevardnadze to hold free and fair elections. When he did not, the Bush administration did not immediately denounce the election results, but gradually signaled support for the opposition until they seized power. In the run up to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Bush administration officials also encouraged President Kuchma to hold free and fair elections, and by denying visas to prominent Ukrainian businessmen, signaled to the regime the consequences of a fraudulent vote. These threats did not prevent Kuchma from trying to steal the vote, but they may have helped to constrain the president and his entourage from using force against the demonstrators. Indirectly, American-supported media outlets’ reports on Kuchma’s involvement in the killing of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the vast corruption of Shevardnadze’s Georgian government also helped to undermine the popularity and power of these leaders.
NDI and IRI played active roles in encouraging cooperation among the democratic groups in Serbia and Ukraine, though less so in Georgia. They did so by collecting and then sharing survey data, which underscored the electoral advantage of a single candidate. In both countries, this data pointed to the need to back particular candidates-Voijislav Kostunica in Serbia and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine rather than the more charismatic opposition leaders in both countries at the time (Zoran Djinjic in Serbia and Yulia Timoshenko in Ukraine).