(no subject)
There is a "Model of evolution of technological civilizations" by an Ukrainian analyst Vladimir Stus, which posits alternation of periods of slow economic growth and accelerated economic growth in the evolution of civilizations.
According to this model we live during the period of accelerated rates of growth named "Modern" (pronounced in a French manner), that began in the second half of 19th century and is about to end in the nearest future. The previous period of accelerated growth in Western civilization (which later became a global civilization) was a period that started in the second half of 15th century (the period of Great Geographic Discoveries, of Renaissance and of Reformation - "The Early Modern") and it lasted until the beginning of the Thirty Years War in Central Europe. Thereupon there was a period of civilizational crisis, "the Time of Turmoil" - Thirty Years War that marked the transition to a prolonged period of slow growth in Central Europe (maritime powers suffered much less due to newly discovered territories, suitable for colonization and due to discovery of new types of plants, suitable for farming). Then, during the Age of Industrial Revolutions the yet narrow middle class has emerged, so that numerous innovations, produced on the basis of the fundamental scientific discoveries, made in the second half of 19th century, became commercially successful. This development formed a positive feedback loop: "growth of the middle class - growth of funding of R&D - more innovations - growth of the middle class". In the first part of the 20th century more fundamental scientific discoveries were made, that made possible more innovations, however, in the second part of the 20th century the potential of fundamental scientific discoveries became exhausted. By inertia, funding of R&D in our period of overmature Modern (Postmodern) is still high around the globe, but it will fall sharply after all the measures to preserve the globalized world of Modern (most notably - growth of debt) become exhausted. The elites of the main countries have proven to be inventive, but they cannot cancel the inevitable. If at the present time new innovations emerged, capable of significantly decreasing the part of necessary (!) expenditures in the spending patterns of the global middle class - then they would create monetary space for new effective demand for products and services, and this development would allow further postponing of the civilizational crisis of deceleration. Without such innovations the Time of Turmoil on the civilizational level will begin in the course of the next few years. Such innovations are unlikely, thus, the civilization is facing a very long crisis of adaptation to the low rates of both science-and-technology progress and of economic growth. Naturally, the prevailing economic growth paradigm will shift from the paradigm of intensive growth to the paradigm of extensive growth (meaning that the portion of investments in production of goods and services with high value added will drop precipitously, while the portion of investments in production and processing of renewable resources will rise massively). And there will be countries and territories with favorable conditions for economic growth in the extensive growth paradigm, for them the period of civilizational crisis will be much shorter than in countries with unfavorable conditions (the number of the latter will be much greater). In countries with unfavorable conditions the Time of Turmoil may last several decades, during which they will lose a substantial part of their population, similarly to what happened in some regions of Germany during Thirty Years War. Many countries with unfavorable conditions will disintegrate in the course of the Time of Turmoil, some of the presently rich and influential countries among them. And soon after the beginning of an acute phase of the civilizational crisis funding of R&D will drop sharply globally, similarly to what happened in post-Soviet countries in the beginning of 1990's. In the long run in countries with favorable conditions for extensive economic growth a new Early Modern (Premodern) will begin, characterized by moderate traditionalism, stable economic growth and consolidation of alliances, while in countries or territories with unfavorable conditions there will be deep regionalization and hard traditionalism
According to this model we live during the period of accelerated rates of growth named "Modern" (pronounced in a French manner), that began in the second half of 19th century and is about to end in the nearest future. The previous period of accelerated growth in Western civilization (which later became a global civilization) was a period that started in the second half of 15th century (the period of Great Geographic Discoveries, of Renaissance and of Reformation - "The Early Modern") and it lasted until the beginning of the Thirty Years War in Central Europe. Thereupon there was a period of civilizational crisis, "the Time of Turmoil" - Thirty Years War that marked the transition to a prolonged period of slow growth in Central Europe (maritime powers suffered much less due to newly discovered territories, suitable for colonization and due to discovery of new types of plants, suitable for farming). Then, during the Age of Industrial Revolutions the yet narrow middle class has emerged, so that numerous innovations, produced on the basis of the fundamental scientific discoveries, made in the second half of 19th century, became commercially successful. This development formed a positive feedback loop: "growth of the middle class - growth of funding of R&D - more innovations - growth of the middle class". In the first part of the 20th century more fundamental scientific discoveries were made, that made possible more innovations, however, in the second part of the 20th century the potential of fundamental scientific discoveries became exhausted. By inertia, funding of R&D in our period of overmature Modern (Postmodern) is still high around the globe, but it will fall sharply after all the measures to preserve the globalized world of Modern (most notably - growth of debt) become exhausted. The elites of the main countries have proven to be inventive, but they cannot cancel the inevitable. If at the present time new innovations emerged, capable of significantly decreasing the part of necessary (!) expenditures in the spending patterns of the global middle class - then they would create monetary space for new effective demand for products and services, and this development would allow further postponing of the civilizational crisis of deceleration. Without such innovations the Time of Turmoil on the civilizational level will begin in the course of the next few years. Such innovations are unlikely, thus, the civilization is facing a very long crisis of adaptation to the low rates of both science-and-technology progress and of economic growth. Naturally, the prevailing economic growth paradigm will shift from the paradigm of intensive growth to the paradigm of extensive growth (meaning that the portion of investments in production of goods and services with high value added will drop precipitously, while the portion of investments in production and processing of renewable resources will rise massively). And there will be countries and territories with favorable conditions for economic growth in the extensive growth paradigm, for them the period of civilizational crisis will be much shorter than in countries with unfavorable conditions (the number of the latter will be much greater). In countries with unfavorable conditions the Time of Turmoil may last several decades, during which they will lose a substantial part of their population, similarly to what happened in some regions of Germany during Thirty Years War. Many countries with unfavorable conditions will disintegrate in the course of the Time of Turmoil, some of the presently rich and influential countries among them. And soon after the beginning of an acute phase of the civilizational crisis funding of R&D will drop sharply globally, similarly to what happened in post-Soviet countries in the beginning of 1990's. In the long run in countries with favorable conditions for extensive economic growth a new Early Modern (Premodern) will begin, characterized by moderate traditionalism, stable economic growth and consolidation of alliances, while in countries or territories with unfavorable conditions there will be deep regionalization and hard traditionalism