Реальный мировой порядок
Доктор Джордж Фридман на проводе, или "не бывает бывших чекистов".
The Real World Order -- By George Friedman, 18.8.2008:
In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.
Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.
The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.
...The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.
We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another. ( Stratfor )
Перевод ранее опубликованного обзора Фридмана:
"Русские стерпели все, но дискуссия относительно вступления Украины в НАТО была представлена как основная угроза для российской национальной безопасности. Это сделало бы Россию беззащитной и привело бы к ее дестабилизации. Когда Соединенные Штаты пошли еще дальше, предлагая также включение в Альянс Грузии, в результате чего НАТО проникла бы вглубь Кавказа, вывод россиян был однозначным - они публично заявили о том, что Соединенные Штаты намерены окружить и разорвать Россию
...
Отталкиваясь от украинского опыта, россияне убедились в том, что Соединенные Штаты реализуют план стратегического окружения и удушения России. Из опыта Косово, они пришли к выводу, что Соединенные Штаты и Европа не были готовы рассмотреть российские предложения, даже если они касались незначительных деталей. Это было последней каплей. Если русские пожелания не могут учитываться даже в незначительных вопросах, как это, то очевидно, что Россия и Запад находятся в конфликте. Для русских, как мы уже говорили, вопрос заключался в том, как реагировать. Получив отказ в вопросе по Косово, россияне решили ответить там, где у них были все карты на руках - в Южной Осетии". ( inoСМИ.Ru )
Доктор Джордж Фридман о ракетах в Польше: "Это сигнал для России"
Click to viewThe Real World Order -- By George Friedman, 18.8.2008:
In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.
Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.
The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.
...The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.
We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another. ( Stratfor )
Перевод ранее опубликованного обзора Фридмана:
"Русские стерпели все, но дискуссия относительно вступления Украины в НАТО была представлена как основная угроза для российской национальной безопасности. Это сделало бы Россию беззащитной и привело бы к ее дестабилизации. Когда Соединенные Штаты пошли еще дальше, предлагая также включение в Альянс Грузии, в результате чего НАТО проникла бы вглубь Кавказа, вывод россиян был однозначным - они публично заявили о том, что Соединенные Штаты намерены окружить и разорвать Россию
...
Отталкиваясь от украинского опыта, россияне убедились в том, что Соединенные Штаты реализуют план стратегического окружения и удушения России. Из опыта Косово, они пришли к выводу, что Соединенные Штаты и Европа не были готовы рассмотреть российские предложения, даже если они касались незначительных деталей. Это было последней каплей. Если русские пожелания не могут учитываться даже в незначительных вопросах, как это, то очевидно, что Россия и Запад находятся в конфликте. Для русских, как мы уже говорили, вопрос заключался в том, как реагировать. Получив отказ в вопросе по Косово, россияне решили ответить там, где у них были все карты на руках - в Южной Осетии". ( inoСМИ.Ru )
Доктор Джордж Фридман о ракетах в Польше: "Это сигнал для России"