Цитатник Англофила по выходным - 19: генерал Джексон о событиях вокруг "броска на Приштину"
Недавно Daily Telegraph в нескольких номерах печатала отрывки из книги генерала Майка Джексона "Soldier: The Autobiography". General Sir Mike Jackson вышел в отставку в прошлом году с высшего военного поста Альбиона Chief of the General Staff. Отрывок, на который я хочу обратить внимание своих френдов (и кое-что из него процитировать - увы, не все: он занимает в газете целый разворот), описывает в деталях знаменитый эпизод 1999 года, известный в России как "бросок на Приштину", когда батальон российских десантников, действуя без согласования с войсками НАТО, неожиданно выдвинулся и занял аэропорт этого сербского города. И свою роль в нем.
В России этот эпизод считается чуть ли не героическим (и редким в новейшей истории вооруженных сил). Показавшим, что если действовать жестко и без оглядки на союзников (они же - наиболее вероятные противники), то только тогда они и признают значимость России. Вот как бравурно характеризовал этот эпизод небезызвестный певец нового имперализма Виталий Третьяков (цитирую по статье С.Митрофонова "Клоуны в мундирах и без", который, кстати, трактовал это событие как "бессмысленную и вредную акцию", единственная цель которой - потешить ложно понимаемое национальное самолюбие. Да, была и такая точка зрения):
"операция "Русский секретный марш - "бросок на Приштину" войдет во все учебник дипломатии и военного искусства ведущих стран мира. Уже по одной этой причине, с точки зрения субъекта геополитики - государства России, этот марш-бросок нужно было осуществить".
Насчет "всех учебников дипломатии и военного искусства ведущих стран мира" - сомневаюсь. Но в России этот уже исторический эпизод, как водится, оброс своей мифологией. Процитирую статью "...И первые стали последними" в Российской газете. Это достаточно интересные воспоминания участника событий. Но вот что он, в частности, пишет:
Клинтон позвонил командующему KFOR (международных сил по поддержанию мира в Косово) британскому генералу Майклу Джексону: разбомбите русских! Потом "спишем" на незнание (русские, действительно, вошли без "стука") обстановки, скажем, думали, что бомбим не вышедших из Косово сербов. Генерал Майкл Джексон не раздумывая сказал историческую фразу: - Господин президент, я не возьму на себя ответственность за начало третьей мировой войны. (выделение - газеты).
Вот из воспоминаний самого генерала Джексона и можно узнать, кому на самом деле он свою "историческую фразу" сказал (не Клинтону, конечно - разговор с президентом США, тем более такой абсурдный, был для генерала не по чину - а непосредственному начальнику американскому генералу Уэсли Кларку. Чей приказ он выполнять отказался. Что в его воспоминаниях подробно и описано, и интересно само по себе). Перед тем, как перейти к их цитированию, добавлю: беглый поиск по Интернету (материалов об этом - море) позволил обнаружить воспоминания "БРОСОК НА ПРИШТИНУ" российского генерала Леонида Ивашова, в то время - начальника Главного управления международного военного сотрудничества Министерства обороны РФ. Политические (а также геополитические) его взгляды хорошо известны и наложили на эти воспоминания отпечаток; однако, думается, что фактология событий, как они виделись военному руководству того времени, изложена более-менее точно. Процитирую отрывок, связанным с генералом Джексоном:
"Как стало известно уже после некоторой стабилизации обстановки в Косово, в НАТО все-таки нашлись горячие головы, которые предлагали вооруженным путем воспрепятствовать российскому контингенту. Американский журнал “Newsweek” сообщил о серьезных разногласиях Верховного главнокомандующего объединенными вооруженными силами НАТО в Европе У. Кларка и военного руководства блока, которые и стали причиной досрочной отставки Кларка. Последний отдал приказ натовским летчикам опередить русских и занять аэродром “Слатина”. Но британский генерал М. Джексон, командовавший натовским контингентом в составе КФОР, отказался выполнять этот приказ. После этого У. Кларк обратился к главкому объединенными вооруженными силами НАТО в южной зоне Европы адмиралу Дж. Эллису с просьбой в спешном порядке направить военные вертолеты в приштинский аэропорт, чтобы они блокировали взлетные полосы и не дали сесть военно-транспортным самолетам из России. Однако адмирал отказался выполнить эту просьбу, сославшись на то, что это не понравилось бы генералу М. Джексону. А тот, в свою очередь, комментируя свое несогласие с действиями У. Кларка, заявил: “Я не собираюсь развязывать третью мировую войну”. Как видим, трезвые головы были и в НАТО, и мы не ошиблись, полагаясь на это."
Ну вот, а теперь - несколько выдержек из воспоминаний генерала (полностью отрывок можно прочитать по нижеследующей ссылке):
My clash with Nato chief
By General Sir Mike Jackson
Характеристика генерала Кларка:
As the Lieutenant-General (a three-star commander) in charge of Nato's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, I answered to Clark, the four-star Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Saceur). That post is always held by an American in recognition of the preponderant role of the United States in Nato. Wes Clark was something of a loner, a driven, intensely ambitious man with a piercing stare. Often described as "tightly wound", he seemed to bring a disturbing zeal to his work. He had a reputation as a very political sort of general, antagonising his military superiors by going over their heads when they did not give him what he wanted. He was not popular among many of his colleagues, who knew him as the "Perfumed Prince".
О встрече с российскими военными и о мотивах российского руководства:
Following my conference call with Clark, I emerged to find a Russian colonel in full dress uniform, waiting for me. I was introduced to Colonel Gromov, the military attaché in Skopje. He handed me a letter from the Russian ministry of defence, informing me that "the leading element of the Russian KFOR contingent" now controlled the airfield at Pristina. So Gromov had been told by his superiors in Moscow to come and see me. This bizarre performance was confirmation that the Russian column in Pristina wasn't just a rogue element of soldiers doing their own thing. They were part of "the Russian KFOR contingent". The other fact I noticed was that the letter was addressed to me by name as "Commander, KFOR". It seemed to me a significant acknowledgement.
The Russians were saying that they were willing to be part of what we were doing. I've thought about this quite a bit since, and my view is that the Russians were making a point by sending a column into Kosovo. They had been worsted in the Cold War, and there was considerable upset, even indignation, on the Russian side about Nato's expansion and the fact that the alliance had undertaken military action against Serbia without a UN Security Council resolution. The intervention was a reminder that the Russians were still players on the world stage, that they still needed to be treated with respect.
I introduced myself to one of the Russians and asked if I could see General Viktor Zavarzin. I was ushered into the back of his command vehicle. My first impression was of a burly man who seemed somewhat nervous. I greeted him in Russian, even though I had an interpreter with me. He was a bit frosty at first, and it was pretty hard going. Then the rain must have got into the electrics because the vehicle filled with acrid black smoke. We got out and stood in the rain, which was still bucketing down. I said to Zavarzin: "Hey, listen, I used to get wet as a company commander, but generals don't need to get wet. We found a dry place in what remained of the wrecked airport terminal. I had a flask of whisky in my map pocket and I dug it out and offered it to Zavarzin. Relations warmed up after that.
Конфронтация с Кларком:
When I got back to the HQ, I discovered Clark had seemingly become obsessed by the threat of Russian troops invading the Serb enclaves - particularly in the north - and establishing a de facto partition of Kosovo. To prevent this happening, he wanted the runway blocked by KFOR helicopters. My team failed to see the logic in this order. We already controlled the airspace, so the Russians would have to run the Nato gauntlet if they wanted to fly in fixed-wing aircraft. Puttinп helicopters down on the runway would simply confuse the situation, and provoke the Russians.
Clark arrived at 8.40am on Sunday and caught the end of the morning update. He still seemed obsessed by the Russians, and would not focus on anything else. Clark was convinced that they intended to reinforce their troops at the airport. We gave him our intelligence assessment, which was that the Russians had neither the capability nor the political will to confront the international community in this way. Again and again I stressed that confrontation was not the answer. Russian support had been crucial in delivering the deal with the Serbs. They were major players and must be treated as such. To alienate them would be counter-productive in the short- and the long-term. I argued for a more subtle approach, such as isolating the Russians as a prelude to obtaining their participation.
Как Кларк пытался продавить свое решение:
Either Wes wasn't listening, or he wasn't convinced. It seemed that he had discussed the situation by phone with the Nato Secretary-General, Javier Solana, on the flight down to the Balkans, and they had agreed a common position. Clark ordered me to block the runway one way or another. I don't mind admitting that I was furious. We were all tired, frustrated with the stopping and starting, and fed up with being buggered about. After the morning update I indicated to Clark that I wanted a word with him in private, and led the way to my office, closing the door behind us.
"Saceur, we cannot go on like this," I said with some feeling. "We need to move on. Let me sort it out with Russians." But Clark was unmoved, and insisted that we should block the airfield. "I won't do it! Sir, I just won't do it," I said heatedly.Clark seemed taken aback. "Mike, let's talk about this," he said. Once again I ran through the reasons for my grave reservations about implementing the order. We had established liaison with Russians on the ground. Blocking the runway would not help bring the Russians on side. They were dislocated anyway. Our troops were in position and had already effectively isolated the Russians. The airfield had no operational value at this point.
I made it clear to Clark that I was fed up with taking orders from Washington, from people who seemed to have no appreciation of the problems on the ground. - "Mike, these aren't Washington's orders, they're coming from me." - "By whose authority?" - "By my authority, as Saceur." -"You don't have that authority."- "I do have that authority. I have the authority of the Secretary-General behind me on this."
А вот и "историческая фраза":
-"Sir, I'm not going to start World War Three for you." Again Clark stated what he wanted done. I said to him: "Sir, I'm a three-star general, you can't give me orders like this. I have my own judgment of the situation and I believe that this order is outside our mandate." -"Mike, I'm a four-star general, and I can tell you these things." He insisted that he was giving me a direct order.
Вмешивается начальство:
I told him that I would have to talk to my superiors in London. He telephoned Charles Guthrie, the chief of the defence staff, and outlined the discussion that had just taken place. Guthrie asked to speak to me. I took the phone and moved away from Clark to speak to Guthrie in private. -"I cannot go on," I told him, -"I'm going to have to resign." - "For God's sake, Mike, don't do that," Guthrie replied hastily. "It would be a disaster." He asked to speak to Clark again. -"Well, I must say, Wes," he said, "that I agree with Mike - and so does Hugh." Clark was visibly nonplussed. Hugh Shelton was his boss, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. He had gone out on a limb, and now he found that he had gone too far.
I left the room so that he could call Shelton in Washington. I later gathered that Shelton told him that Washington did want the runways blocked, but not at the expense of a confrontation with the Russians - which seemed to me an outright contradiction in terms. When Clark said that I was resisting his orders, Shelton suggested that he had an "authority problem".
Два генерала в схватке воль и самолюбий:
Clark called me back into the room. -"Mike, do you understand that as a Nato commander I'm giving you a legal order, and if you don't accept that order you'll have to resign your position and get out of the chain of command?" -"Saceur, I do." -"OK. I'm giving you an order to block the runways at Pristina airfield. I want it done. Is that clear?" Saceur was insistent, despite the risk of a confrontation with the Russians... -"Saceur, you're just testing me, aren't you? You don't really want me to do this, do you?" He denied any such motive.
After a little more discussion I left again to check on what was happening. London had played the red card. British forces would not be allowed to block the runway as Clark insisted. Clark seemed to feel somehow that this was my doing. On the contrary; I had deliberately not involved myself to avoid any accusation of collusion, as I felt very strongly that as a commander of a multinational force, I should not act as a Brit per se, or favour any particular national contingent. And though Wes didn't seem to credit this, I also felt a soldier's loyalty to my chain of command. But I felt very strongly that it would be a mistake to confront the Russians.
Линия Джексона победила:
After a short time, Clark and his team left to return to Shape HQ in Belgium. I telephoned Charles Guthrie, who had George Robertson, the Defence Secretary, with him, and my words were relayed to them on the speakerphone. I told them what had happened. -"You may take the view I should go, Secretary of State, CDS," I concluded. But both Guthrie and Robertson were very supportive of the line I had taken. Meanwhile, the MoD had authorised 4 Armoured Brigade to deploy at Pristina airport, isolating it if necessary, but not to block runways.Clark's assistant came on the phone, citing a CNN report of tanks with Russian markings at the airfield. It sounded unlikely, and we soon established that the report referred to Serb tanks moving past the airfield as they withdrew. My view was that Clark's people needed to get a grip and stop panicking over every rumour or ill-informed press report. The next ridiculous, poorly thought-out order I received would be the last, as I would refuse to implement it.
Кризис позади:
In fact, the crisis was over. We had avoided an unnecessary and potentially dangerous confrontation with the Russians. But my relationship with my superior officer, General Wesley Clark, had suffered. I had come to the brink of refusing a direct order, although in the event it had not quite come to that. And Clark himself had been damaged. Two months later it was announced that he would be replaced as Supreme Allied Commander earlier than expected.
В России этот эпизод считается чуть ли не героическим (и редким в новейшей истории вооруженных сил). Показавшим, что если действовать жестко и без оглядки на союзников (они же - наиболее вероятные противники), то только тогда они и признают значимость России. Вот как бравурно характеризовал этот эпизод небезызвестный певец нового имперализма Виталий Третьяков (цитирую по статье С.Митрофонова "Клоуны в мундирах и без", который, кстати, трактовал это событие как "бессмысленную и вредную акцию", единственная цель которой - потешить ложно понимаемое национальное самолюбие. Да, была и такая точка зрения):
"операция "Русский секретный марш - "бросок на Приштину" войдет во все учебник дипломатии и военного искусства ведущих стран мира. Уже по одной этой причине, с точки зрения субъекта геополитики - государства России, этот марш-бросок нужно было осуществить".
Насчет "всех учебников дипломатии и военного искусства ведущих стран мира" - сомневаюсь. Но в России этот уже исторический эпизод, как водится, оброс своей мифологией. Процитирую статью "...И первые стали последними" в Российской газете. Это достаточно интересные воспоминания участника событий. Но вот что он, в частности, пишет:
Клинтон позвонил командующему KFOR (международных сил по поддержанию мира в Косово) британскому генералу Майклу Джексону: разбомбите русских! Потом "спишем" на незнание (русские, действительно, вошли без "стука") обстановки, скажем, думали, что бомбим не вышедших из Косово сербов. Генерал Майкл Джексон не раздумывая сказал историческую фразу: - Господин президент, я не возьму на себя ответственность за начало третьей мировой войны. (выделение - газеты).
Вот из воспоминаний самого генерала Джексона и можно узнать, кому на самом деле он свою "историческую фразу" сказал (не Клинтону, конечно - разговор с президентом США, тем более такой абсурдный, был для генерала не по чину - а непосредственному начальнику американскому генералу Уэсли Кларку. Чей приказ он выполнять отказался. Что в его воспоминаниях подробно и описано, и интересно само по себе). Перед тем, как перейти к их цитированию, добавлю: беглый поиск по Интернету (материалов об этом - море) позволил обнаружить воспоминания "БРОСОК НА ПРИШТИНУ" российского генерала Леонида Ивашова, в то время - начальника Главного управления международного военного сотрудничества Министерства обороны РФ. Политические (а также геополитические) его взгляды хорошо известны и наложили на эти воспоминания отпечаток; однако, думается, что фактология событий, как они виделись военному руководству того времени, изложена более-менее точно. Процитирую отрывок, связанным с генералом Джексоном:
"Как стало известно уже после некоторой стабилизации обстановки в Косово, в НАТО все-таки нашлись горячие головы, которые предлагали вооруженным путем воспрепятствовать российскому контингенту. Американский журнал “Newsweek” сообщил о серьезных разногласиях Верховного главнокомандующего объединенными вооруженными силами НАТО в Европе У. Кларка и военного руководства блока, которые и стали причиной досрочной отставки Кларка. Последний отдал приказ натовским летчикам опередить русских и занять аэродром “Слатина”. Но британский генерал М. Джексон, командовавший натовским контингентом в составе КФОР, отказался выполнять этот приказ. После этого У. Кларк обратился к главкому объединенными вооруженными силами НАТО в южной зоне Европы адмиралу Дж. Эллису с просьбой в спешном порядке направить военные вертолеты в приштинский аэропорт, чтобы они блокировали взлетные полосы и не дали сесть военно-транспортным самолетам из России. Однако адмирал отказался выполнить эту просьбу, сославшись на то, что это не понравилось бы генералу М. Джексону. А тот, в свою очередь, комментируя свое несогласие с действиями У. Кларка, заявил: “Я не собираюсь развязывать третью мировую войну”. Как видим, трезвые головы были и в НАТО, и мы не ошиблись, полагаясь на это."
Ну вот, а теперь - несколько выдержек из воспоминаний генерала (полностью отрывок можно прочитать по нижеследующей ссылке):
My clash with Nato chief
By General Sir Mike Jackson
Характеристика генерала Кларка:
As the Lieutenant-General (a three-star commander) in charge of Nato's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, I answered to Clark, the four-star Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Saceur). That post is always held by an American in recognition of the preponderant role of the United States in Nato. Wes Clark was something of a loner, a driven, intensely ambitious man with a piercing stare. Often described as "tightly wound", he seemed to bring a disturbing zeal to his work. He had a reputation as a very political sort of general, antagonising his military superiors by going over their heads when they did not give him what he wanted. He was not popular among many of his colleagues, who knew him as the "Perfumed Prince".
О встрече с российскими военными и о мотивах российского руководства:
Following my conference call with Clark, I emerged to find a Russian colonel in full dress uniform, waiting for me. I was introduced to Colonel Gromov, the military attaché in Skopje. He handed me a letter from the Russian ministry of defence, informing me that "the leading element of the Russian KFOR contingent" now controlled the airfield at Pristina. So Gromov had been told by his superiors in Moscow to come and see me. This bizarre performance was confirmation that the Russian column in Pristina wasn't just a rogue element of soldiers doing their own thing. They were part of "the Russian KFOR contingent". The other fact I noticed was that the letter was addressed to me by name as "Commander, KFOR". It seemed to me a significant acknowledgement.
The Russians were saying that they were willing to be part of what we were doing. I've thought about this quite a bit since, and my view is that the Russians were making a point by sending a column into Kosovo. They had been worsted in the Cold War, and there was considerable upset, even indignation, on the Russian side about Nato's expansion and the fact that the alliance had undertaken military action against Serbia without a UN Security Council resolution. The intervention was a reminder that the Russians were still players on the world stage, that they still needed to be treated with respect.
I introduced myself to one of the Russians and asked if I could see General Viktor Zavarzin. I was ushered into the back of his command vehicle. My first impression was of a burly man who seemed somewhat nervous. I greeted him in Russian, even though I had an interpreter with me. He was a bit frosty at first, and it was pretty hard going. Then the rain must have got into the electrics because the vehicle filled with acrid black smoke. We got out and stood in the rain, which was still bucketing down. I said to Zavarzin: "Hey, listen, I used to get wet as a company commander, but generals don't need to get wet. We found a dry place in what remained of the wrecked airport terminal. I had a flask of whisky in my map pocket and I dug it out and offered it to Zavarzin. Relations warmed up after that.
Конфронтация с Кларком:
When I got back to the HQ, I discovered Clark had seemingly become obsessed by the threat of Russian troops invading the Serb enclaves - particularly in the north - and establishing a de facto partition of Kosovo. To prevent this happening, he wanted the runway blocked by KFOR helicopters. My team failed to see the logic in this order. We already controlled the airspace, so the Russians would have to run the Nato gauntlet if they wanted to fly in fixed-wing aircraft. Puttinп helicopters down on the runway would simply confuse the situation, and provoke the Russians.
Clark arrived at 8.40am on Sunday and caught the end of the morning update. He still seemed obsessed by the Russians, and would not focus on anything else. Clark was convinced that they intended to reinforce their troops at the airport. We gave him our intelligence assessment, which was that the Russians had neither the capability nor the political will to confront the international community in this way. Again and again I stressed that confrontation was not the answer. Russian support had been crucial in delivering the deal with the Serbs. They were major players and must be treated as such. To alienate them would be counter-productive in the short- and the long-term. I argued for a more subtle approach, such as isolating the Russians as a prelude to obtaining their participation.
Как Кларк пытался продавить свое решение:
Either Wes wasn't listening, or he wasn't convinced. It seemed that he had discussed the situation by phone with the Nato Secretary-General, Javier Solana, on the flight down to the Balkans, and they had agreed a common position. Clark ordered me to block the runway one way or another. I don't mind admitting that I was furious. We were all tired, frustrated with the stopping and starting, and fed up with being buggered about. After the morning update I indicated to Clark that I wanted a word with him in private, and led the way to my office, closing the door behind us.
"Saceur, we cannot go on like this," I said with some feeling. "We need to move on. Let me sort it out with Russians." But Clark was unmoved, and insisted that we should block the airfield. "I won't do it! Sir, I just won't do it," I said heatedly.Clark seemed taken aback. "Mike, let's talk about this," he said. Once again I ran through the reasons for my grave reservations about implementing the order. We had established liaison with Russians on the ground. Blocking the runway would not help bring the Russians on side. They were dislocated anyway. Our troops were in position and had already effectively isolated the Russians. The airfield had no operational value at this point.
I made it clear to Clark that I was fed up with taking orders from Washington, from people who seemed to have no appreciation of the problems on the ground. - "Mike, these aren't Washington's orders, they're coming from me." - "By whose authority?" - "By my authority, as Saceur." -"You don't have that authority."- "I do have that authority. I have the authority of the Secretary-General behind me on this."
А вот и "историческая фраза":
-"Sir, I'm not going to start World War Three for you." Again Clark stated what he wanted done. I said to him: "Sir, I'm a three-star general, you can't give me orders like this. I have my own judgment of the situation and I believe that this order is outside our mandate." -"Mike, I'm a four-star general, and I can tell you these things." He insisted that he was giving me a direct order.
Вмешивается начальство:
I told him that I would have to talk to my superiors in London. He telephoned Charles Guthrie, the chief of the defence staff, and outlined the discussion that had just taken place. Guthrie asked to speak to me. I took the phone and moved away from Clark to speak to Guthrie in private. -"I cannot go on," I told him, -"I'm going to have to resign." - "For God's sake, Mike, don't do that," Guthrie replied hastily. "It would be a disaster." He asked to speak to Clark again. -"Well, I must say, Wes," he said, "that I agree with Mike - and so does Hugh." Clark was visibly nonplussed. Hugh Shelton was his boss, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. He had gone out on a limb, and now he found that he had gone too far.
I left the room so that he could call Shelton in Washington. I later gathered that Shelton told him that Washington did want the runways blocked, but not at the expense of a confrontation with the Russians - which seemed to me an outright contradiction in terms. When Clark said that I was resisting his orders, Shelton suggested that he had an "authority problem".
Два генерала в схватке воль и самолюбий:
Clark called me back into the room. -"Mike, do you understand that as a Nato commander I'm giving you a legal order, and if you don't accept that order you'll have to resign your position and get out of the chain of command?" -"Saceur, I do." -"OK. I'm giving you an order to block the runways at Pristina airfield. I want it done. Is that clear?" Saceur was insistent, despite the risk of a confrontation with the Russians... -"Saceur, you're just testing me, aren't you? You don't really want me to do this, do you?" He denied any such motive.
After a little more discussion I left again to check on what was happening. London had played the red card. British forces would not be allowed to block the runway as Clark insisted. Clark seemed to feel somehow that this was my doing. On the contrary; I had deliberately not involved myself to avoid any accusation of collusion, as I felt very strongly that as a commander of a multinational force, I should not act as a Brit per se, or favour any particular national contingent. And though Wes didn't seem to credit this, I also felt a soldier's loyalty to my chain of command. But I felt very strongly that it would be a mistake to confront the Russians.
Линия Джексона победила:
After a short time, Clark and his team left to return to Shape HQ in Belgium. I telephoned Charles Guthrie, who had George Robertson, the Defence Secretary, with him, and my words were relayed to them on the speakerphone. I told them what had happened. -"You may take the view I should go, Secretary of State, CDS," I concluded. But both Guthrie and Robertson were very supportive of the line I had taken. Meanwhile, the MoD had authorised 4 Armoured Brigade to deploy at Pristina airport, isolating it if necessary, but not to block runways.Clark's assistant came on the phone, citing a CNN report of tanks with Russian markings at the airfield. It sounded unlikely, and we soon established that the report referred to Serb tanks moving past the airfield as they withdrew. My view was that Clark's people needed to get a grip and stop panicking over every rumour or ill-informed press report. The next ridiculous, poorly thought-out order I received would be the last, as I would refuse to implement it.
Кризис позади:
In fact, the crisis was over. We had avoided an unnecessary and potentially dangerous confrontation with the Russians. But my relationship with my superior officer, General Wesley Clark, had suffered. I had come to the brink of refusing a direct order, although in the event it had not quite come to that. And Clark himself had been damaged. Two months later it was announced that he would be replaced as Supreme Allied Commander earlier than expected.