HBS выпустил кейс про Украину. Посвящен коррупции..
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/4714.html
HBS Case Commentary: Rafael Di Tella
As any businessperson would do in this situation, Zhuk will pay off the UTA [Ukraine Tax Authority] officials. After all, he wouldn't be breaking the law if he did so. The situation clearly suggests that Zhuk is a victim of extortion. According to most nations' laws, succumbing to extortion isn't a crime. So Zhuk will pay off [UTA special agent] Simonenko. He will consider the bribes an additional tax he has to pay for doing business in Ukraine and carry on with his pet project. Make no mistake: That's how the situation would play out in real life. If a businessperson doesn't pay officials when he is a victim of extortion, he doesn't have the stomach to do business in developing countries.
But should Zhuk pay off the officials? That's tougher to answer. I know what Zhuk will do; I don't know what he should do, because that's a moral issue, and we don't know from the case what Zhuk's morality dictates.
Let's think of a framework that might help us. Start by imagining a continuum of corruption cases. At one end, there is extortion of the Simonenko kind. At the other, there are money-laundering schemes that allow businesspeople in cahoots with local politicians to enrich themselves without having to invest in a company. Businessmen like Zhuk usually tell themselves that while they may have to pay off politicians and officials, they would never get involved in rackets of the second kind. Fair enough.
What's interesting is what companies do when they are in the middle of the continuum. Let's say you are a businessperson who wants to do business without bribing officials. One day, you find that a rival company is bribing bureaucrats for favors that are giving it an unbeatable advantage. You realize that if you don't get the preferential treatment your rival is buying, you're going to have to leave the country. In an economic sense, your choices are identical to those Zhuk faces: pay-or quit.
Under those circumstances, the end result will also be the same: Like Zhuk, you will pay a bribe. You'll talk to the corrupt bureaucrat and demand to be treated the same as your rival. When the official says he can extend favors to you only if you agree to do him favors in return, you'll agree. You'll find it easy to justify these favors to yourself by saying that you were the victim of an extortion demand by the bureaucrat. Thus, companies that start paying bribes are actually on a slippery slope. They justify extortion payments, and they justify bribes by saying they're doing only what their rivals are doing. And then…I'm not sure where they will stop on the continuum.
That worries me, because first, it means companies' moral standards are going downhill. Second-and this is something most firms don't realize-companies create a bad business environment by indulging corrupt politicians. When organizations are corrupt, they lose legitimacy. As a result, people demand more regulation, more taxes on companies, and more harassment of firms. That sets off a vicious cycle of policy intervention-and more corruption. It is up to Zhuk to decide what he wants to do: create one software center in Ukraine and risk damning his business in people's eyes, or work to increase the legitimacy of Ukrainian business, even if that means pulling out.
A word of caution. Talking about corruption in emerging countries has become too fashionable. It has few direct benefits and many indirect costs. Since the judicial systems in most developing countries are highly politicized, real-as opposed to rhetorical-progress is unlikely. Real change requires judicial reform, which is hard and takes time. No amount of talking about corruption and bribery is going to change that. This is why I recently proposed the creation of a Harvard-Yale Judicial Observatory. It will consist of a group of law academics and practitioners who can pass judgment on high-profile legal rulings that people suspect are politically motivated. That will change the incentives facing politicized judges and reduce idle corruption talk, and it may even improve the quality of politicians in emerging countries.
Excerpted with permission from "The Shakedown (HBR Case Study and Commentary)," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, March 2005.
HBS Case Commentary: Rafael Di Tella
As any businessperson would do in this situation, Zhuk will pay off the UTA [Ukraine Tax Authority] officials. After all, he wouldn't be breaking the law if he did so. The situation clearly suggests that Zhuk is a victim of extortion. According to most nations' laws, succumbing to extortion isn't a crime. So Zhuk will pay off [UTA special agent] Simonenko. He will consider the bribes an additional tax he has to pay for doing business in Ukraine and carry on with his pet project. Make no mistake: That's how the situation would play out in real life. If a businessperson doesn't pay officials when he is a victim of extortion, he doesn't have the stomach to do business in developing countries.
But should Zhuk pay off the officials? That's tougher to answer. I know what Zhuk will do; I don't know what he should do, because that's a moral issue, and we don't know from the case what Zhuk's morality dictates.
Let's think of a framework that might help us. Start by imagining a continuum of corruption cases. At one end, there is extortion of the Simonenko kind. At the other, there are money-laundering schemes that allow businesspeople in cahoots with local politicians to enrich themselves without having to invest in a company. Businessmen like Zhuk usually tell themselves that while they may have to pay off politicians and officials, they would never get involved in rackets of the second kind. Fair enough.
What's interesting is what companies do when they are in the middle of the continuum. Let's say you are a businessperson who wants to do business without bribing officials. One day, you find that a rival company is bribing bureaucrats for favors that are giving it an unbeatable advantage. You realize that if you don't get the preferential treatment your rival is buying, you're going to have to leave the country. In an economic sense, your choices are identical to those Zhuk faces: pay-or quit.
Under those circumstances, the end result will also be the same: Like Zhuk, you will pay a bribe. You'll talk to the corrupt bureaucrat and demand to be treated the same as your rival. When the official says he can extend favors to you only if you agree to do him favors in return, you'll agree. You'll find it easy to justify these favors to yourself by saying that you were the victim of an extortion demand by the bureaucrat. Thus, companies that start paying bribes are actually on a slippery slope. They justify extortion payments, and they justify bribes by saying they're doing only what their rivals are doing. And then…I'm not sure where they will stop on the continuum.
That worries me, because first, it means companies' moral standards are going downhill. Second-and this is something most firms don't realize-companies create a bad business environment by indulging corrupt politicians. When organizations are corrupt, they lose legitimacy. As a result, people demand more regulation, more taxes on companies, and more harassment of firms. That sets off a vicious cycle of policy intervention-and more corruption. It is up to Zhuk to decide what he wants to do: create one software center in Ukraine and risk damning his business in people's eyes, or work to increase the legitimacy of Ukrainian business, even if that means pulling out.
A word of caution. Talking about corruption in emerging countries has become too fashionable. It has few direct benefits and many indirect costs. Since the judicial systems in most developing countries are highly politicized, real-as opposed to rhetorical-progress is unlikely. Real change requires judicial reform, which is hard and takes time. No amount of talking about corruption and bribery is going to change that. This is why I recently proposed the creation of a Harvard-Yale Judicial Observatory. It will consist of a group of law academics and practitioners who can pass judgment on high-profile legal rulings that people suspect are politically motivated. That will change the incentives facing politicized judges and reduce idle corruption talk, and it may even improve the quality of politicians in emerging countries.
Excerpted with permission from "The Shakedown (HBR Case Study and Commentary)," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, March 2005.