Ethical First Principles

[tongodeon]

I've been getting presented with a lot of ethical thought experiments lately. Often in real world contexts by people who don't read this blog. At work someone asked me why we can't trade box office futures but we *can* gamble in Vegas. On a different online forum someone asked me whether killing an enemy soldier for your country is any better than

Comments

[tongodeon]

Kant argued that the only absolutely good thing is a good will, a position which is considered deontological rather than consequentialist. Obviously a consequentialist case can be made - a world of people with good intentions would be nicer than a world of people with bad intentions. Then again any consequentialist position can be supported with a deontological argument by asserting that the consequences happen that way due to the principle's inherent "just so" moral truth.

What about edge cases? Let's say that certain errors in the general population's judgement caused more bad than good. Our tenancy to commit unnecessary genocide while trying to protect against exaggerated or illusory threats. Economic bubbles resulting from well intentioned effort to bring wealth and comfort to their families.

There's no right answer here, just first principles. If you think an action is moral because it seems well intentioned and reasonable, even if it most often results in bad consequences, you're more of a deontologist. The bad consequences make it bad. If you think an action that usually results in bad consequences is immoral, even if most people do it with the best of intentions, you're more consequentialist. You can't blame them for trying their best.

[simont]

I'm inclined to think that the case in your last paragraph is a contradiction in terms: excluding special cases such as diminished responsibility or non-culpable ignorance of vital facts, an action which most often results in bad consequences can't be both well intentioned and reasonable in the first place! Precisely the point of 'reasonable' in this sort of situation is to recognise that consequences other than your intended one might occur, and to take those into account too when deciding whether a given action is the best expression of your good intentions.

[tongodeon]

excluding special cases such as diminished responsibility or non-culpable ignorance of vital facts

I'm trying to construct an admittedly hypothetical and artificial edge case. Please assume, for the sake of our discussion, that common common cognitive biases caused well informed people with good intentions to make choices and take actions with bad outcomes. Are those choices more bad (due to outcome) or more good (due to intent)? Again, there's no right answer here, it just depends which principle you value more.

(As an aside, it seems unfair to exclude those cases. They're not "special" - they're a major source of evil in the world. Most people who do evil do it with the best of intentions. Also, excluding "ignorance of vital facts" would exclude a major argument in favor of good intention. That's why we value good intention: we can't be certain whether its outcome will be good, all that we can be certain of is that our intent was good.)

[simont]

Are those choices more bad (due to outcome) or more good (due to intent)?

I would say that an action performed with good intention but with some sort of cognitive bias preventing you from recognising the more likely bad outcome may or may not be morally culpable, depending on whether the cognitive bias is one you could reasonably have been expected to spot and allow for. That last clause is what disqualifies your previous hypothetical example in my book: the way you described it was that the action most often had bad consequences, and I think that most cognitive-bias excuses become untenable in the situation where you already know that lots of other people screw up when attempting the same thing. Drink-driving, for example: of course anybody who drives drunk has good intentions (to complete their journey without mishap), but everybody knows that it often doesn't work out that way, and the cognitive-bias excuses ("I thought I was a better driver than that / I'd just be extra careful / I could hold my drink") are not generally looked on with favour because you're expected not to succumb to the temptation to believe all those other people who crashed their cars drunk just aren't as good as you.

Ignorance of vital facts: the point is that you could excuse drunk drivers much more easily in the days before there'd been research, laws, awareness campaigns and so on, because then the cognitive bias excuses became much more understandable - not because the bias itself was any different, but because there wasn't all this readily available information around which you could and should have used to compensate for that bias.

The thing is that although I've come down on the side of (potential) outcome over intention in that particular example, that doesn't mean I believe outcome trumps intention. Both are important. I don't believe good intentions make an action good in spite of (reasonably predictable) bad outcomes, and neither do I believe that good outcomes make an action good in spite of bad intentions: incompetent malice and well-meaning negligence are both bad, though of course neither is as bad as competent malice.

That's why we value good intention: we can't be certain whether its outcome will be good, all that we can be certain of is that our intent was good.

Precisely what I'm rejecting is the false dichotomy between judging on the actual outcome (which we can't be certain of when we make the choice to which the moral value is ascribed) or judging on the pure intention regardless of outcome (which, taken literally, would see nothing to condemn in drunk driving in cases where an accident did not in fact happen). The question is, what were the likely outcomes, to within your reasonable ability to judge them before the fact?

[tongodeon]

I don't think drunk driving is a good example, mostly because I see "completing their journey without mishap" more as the absence of bad intent than the presence of good intent. "I hope I get away with this" isn't the foundation of a good choice, it's just attempting to limit the consequences of what we understand is a bad choice.

Vaccine deniers might be a better example. They genuinely think they're performing a good deed and making a positive difference, a misconception based on deep-seated cognitive biases that we all have. Obviously they're wrong, but is their choice merely factually wrong or is it morally wrong?

that doesn't mean I believe outcome trumps intention. Both are important.

I'm definitely not trying to force a false choice by saying that we can only pick one. I think that all three are popular and valid ways to judge morality, and that it's both difficult and unnecessary to pick one to the exclusion of others.