Waterboarding, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and the US Bank Tower Plot
The biggest, best example of the success and effectiveness of torture is the plot to destroy Los Angeles's US Bank Tower, which we learned about from waterboarding Khaled Sheikh Mohammed:
Not only did they break Khaled Sheikh Mohammed; not only was the information he gave them valuable; not only did it save lives; but Ross’s sources include people within the CIA who are opposed to the practices.
I am dubious of this claim.
The US Bank Tower was first revealed by President Bush on February 9, 2006:
In the weeks after September the 11th, while Americans were still recovering from an unprecedented strike on our homeland, al Qaeda was already busy planning its next attack. We now know that in October 2001, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad -- the mastermind of the September the 11th attacks -- had already set in motion a plan to have terrorist operatives hijack an airplane using shoe bombs to breach the cockpit door, and fly the plane into the tallest building on the West Coast. We believe the intended target was Liberty [sic] Tower in Los Angeles, California.*
Rather than use Arab hijackers as he had on September the 11th, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad sought out young men from Southeast Asia -- whom he believed would not arouse as much suspicion. To help carry out this plan, he tapped a terrorist named Hambali, one of the leaders of an al Qaeda affiliated group in Southeast Asia called "Jemaah Islamiyah" JI terrorists were responsible for a series of deadly attacks in Southeast Asia, and members of the group had trained with al Qaeda. Hambali recruited several key operatives who had been training in Afghanistan. Once the operatives were recruited, they met with Osama bin Laden, and then began preparations for the West Coast attack.
Their plot was derailed in early 2002 when a Southeast Asian nation arrested a key al Qaeda operative. Subsequent debriefings and other intelligence operations made clear the intended target, and how al Qaeda hoped to execute it. This critical intelligence helped other allies capture the ringleaders and other known operatives who had been recruited for this plot. The West Coast plot had been thwarted.
Which aspects of this plot could Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's waterboarding have revealed? We knew about shoe bombs from Richard Reid, captured in December 22, 2001. We know about Jemaah Islamiyah from the Bali Bomb attack on October 12, 2002. We learned about Al Qaeda's penchant to fly planes into buildings on September 11, 2001. Zaini Zakaria, the pilot for the plot, was arrested by Malaysian authorities in December 2002. According to Bush, the plot was "derailed in early 2002". Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on March 1, 2003.
Khaled Sheikh Mohammed could not have "provided valuable information and saved lives" when all aspects of the plot were well-known and the attack had been foiled prior to his capture.
The only possible way I see KSM's waterboarding could have influenced the response to this plot - and I haven't found anyone who has made this claim - is in the capture of Riduan Isamuddin aka Hambali who was captured in Thailand in August 2003.
Not only did they break Khaled Sheikh Mohammed; not only was the information he gave them valuable; not only did it save lives; but Ross’s sources include people within the CIA who are opposed to the practices.
I am dubious of this claim.
The US Bank Tower was first revealed by President Bush on February 9, 2006:
In the weeks after September the 11th, while Americans were still recovering from an unprecedented strike on our homeland, al Qaeda was already busy planning its next attack. We now know that in October 2001, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad -- the mastermind of the September the 11th attacks -- had already set in motion a plan to have terrorist operatives hijack an airplane using shoe bombs to breach the cockpit door, and fly the plane into the tallest building on the West Coast. We believe the intended target was Liberty [sic] Tower in Los Angeles, California.*
Rather than use Arab hijackers as he had on September the 11th, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad sought out young men from Southeast Asia -- whom he believed would not arouse as much suspicion. To help carry out this plan, he tapped a terrorist named Hambali, one of the leaders of an al Qaeda affiliated group in Southeast Asia called "Jemaah Islamiyah" JI terrorists were responsible for a series of deadly attacks in Southeast Asia, and members of the group had trained with al Qaeda. Hambali recruited several key operatives who had been training in Afghanistan. Once the operatives were recruited, they met with Osama bin Laden, and then began preparations for the West Coast attack.
Their plot was derailed in early 2002 when a Southeast Asian nation arrested a key al Qaeda operative. Subsequent debriefings and other intelligence operations made clear the intended target, and how al Qaeda hoped to execute it. This critical intelligence helped other allies capture the ringleaders and other known operatives who had been recruited for this plot. The West Coast plot had been thwarted.
Which aspects of this plot could Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's waterboarding have revealed? We knew about shoe bombs from Richard Reid, captured in December 22, 2001. We know about Jemaah Islamiyah from the Bali Bomb attack on October 12, 2002. We learned about Al Qaeda's penchant to fly planes into buildings on September 11, 2001. Zaini Zakaria, the pilot for the plot, was arrested by Malaysian authorities in December 2002. According to Bush, the plot was "derailed in early 2002". Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on March 1, 2003.
Khaled Sheikh Mohammed could not have "provided valuable information and saved lives" when all aspects of the plot were well-known and the attack had been foiled prior to his capture.
The only possible way I see KSM's waterboarding could have influenced the response to this plot - and I haven't found anyone who has made this claim - is in the capture of Riduan Isamuddin aka Hambali who was captured in Thailand in August 2003.