Why the insurgents stop targeting Americans, start targeting Iraqis
I've been doing a bit more thinking about the insurgency starting to favor Iraqi targets American targets. US casualties have declined every week starting in November. What happened back in November to convince the insurgency that they didn't need to worry about America as much as other Iraqis? I went back to the archives and noticed two new trends that started during that time period.
First, realistic discussion or action on "withdrawing troops from Iraq" got serious legs on all fronts:
Second, the Iraqis had their own Abu Ghraib, which helped take their mind off our Abu Ghraib:
It makes sense that we'd see a drop in American attacks and an increase in Iraqi government attacks after a month like this. Iraqis are suspicious of American motives and doubt our honesty when we say we're going to leave. The insurgency has grown as more Iraqis become convinced that we're going to keep discovering more reasons to stay until they start giving us more reasons to leave. Now there's is no reason to argue about "when or whether we should withdraw". The withdrawal has been announced and is under way. The insurgency understands this and is turning their attention to more relevant, longer-term local enemies. "How quickly should we withdraw" and "how many marines should be left to guard the embassy", and "what are we doing with the permanent bases" remain valid questions, of course.
(I left one major event off the above list: the December 15 election. Although it was an undeniably important event I can't figure out why the insurgents would increase attacks against a government whose election they supported. Maybe because the IAF and INL still only won 23% of the vote? "Screw you guys, we tried it your way the last time and we came in third.")
First, realistic discussion or action on "withdrawing troops from Iraq" got serious legs on all fronts:
- November 13 - Iraqi president Jalal Talabani tells British television that Iraqi troops could replace UK forces by the close of 2006.
- November 17 - John Murtha says "The U.S. cannot accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. It is time to bring them home.", the first serious open discussion about
- November 21 - Arab League members urge a timetable for eventual troop withdrawal
- November 23 - The Pentagon announces plans to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq by early 2006.
- December 16 - Bulgaria starts withdrawing its troops from Iraq.
- December 22 - Tony Blair makes a surprise visit to Basra in Iraq, to address 4,000 British soldiers and discuss withdrawal.
- December 23 - The Pentagon announces that it will begin drawing down troops from Iraq.
- December 27 - The new right-wing government of Poland announces it will keep troops in Iraq until the end of 2006.
- January 24 - Officer Andrew Krepinevich presents a 136 page report to the Army saying that they cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq even if they wanted to.
Second, the Iraqis had their own Abu Ghraib, which helped take their mind off our Abu Ghraib:
- November 15 - 173 prisoners are found in an Iraqi government bunker in Baghdad, having been starved, beaten and tortured.
- November 20 - Police operating in Basra torture at least two civilians to death with electric drills
- November 24 - Prisoners at an Iraqi detention centre revealed to the BBC details of apparent widespread use of torture and abuse in prisons and detention centres in Iraq.
- November 27 - Ayad Allawi accuses fellow Shias in the government of being responsible for death squads and secret torture centres.
- December 13 - The U.S. ambassador issues a statement saying that the total number of abused prisoners found so far in jails run by the Shiite-led Interior Ministry is about 121.
It makes sense that we'd see a drop in American attacks and an increase in Iraqi government attacks after a month like this. Iraqis are suspicious of American motives and doubt our honesty when we say we're going to leave. The insurgency has grown as more Iraqis become convinced that we're going to keep discovering more reasons to stay until they start giving us more reasons to leave. Now there's is no reason to argue about "when or whether we should withdraw". The withdrawal has been announced and is under way. The insurgency understands this and is turning their attention to more relevant, longer-term local enemies. "How quickly should we withdraw" and "how many marines should be left to guard the embassy", and "what are we doing with the permanent bases" remain valid questions, of course.
(I left one major event off the above list: the December 15 election. Although it was an undeniably important event I can't figure out why the insurgents would increase attacks against a government whose election they supported. Maybe because the IAF and INL still only won 23% of the vote? "Screw you guys, we tried it your way the last time and we came in third.")