(no subject)
Okay, my favourite people - obviously I can't be trusted to write essays all by my lonesome. So, here for your perusal and approval, is an essay I'll be handing in early Friday morning, worh 20% of my final mark in Political Science - the subject I might still be majoring in. A discussion of prime ministerial government, full of logic and bluster and snark, it's about 2700 words long. Do as the icon says, and I'll be the better for it.
Oh, and if this is academically dishonest, could someone please tell me? I'd hate to be unethical.
A King Unchecked: Prime Ministerial Government in Canada
The Canadian federal political system is undeniably identified with the figure at its head: the Prime Minister. The traditional checks and balances on prime ministerial power continue to be wholly ineffective as the Prime Minister, rather than Cabinet, dominates the government. More a result of intrinsic ability to make use of the opportunities presented to him by the Constitution and current customs than any evolution away from "Cabinet" government, a Prime Minister's influence in government remains the pre-eminent one: above Cabinet, above the House of Commons, above the influence of any other body operating in the Canadian political system. Comparing raw prime ministerial power with the traditional, official checks and balances, as well as modern, unofficial checks on the power of the Prime Minister, the inequality between opposing factions becomes simply another inherent truth of the political system. The Prime Minister's influences and powers remain paramount, their greatest checks the unofficial ones, while the "checks and balances" of the system remain ineffective.
The powers of the Prime Minister are many and varied; promised to any leader of the party with majority standing in the House of Commons, or the largest one, backed by the support of other parties, the ability to form the Canadian government brings with it sweeping powers#. Section 11 of the Constitution Act states that "[t]here shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council of Canada"#. Though the Prime Minister is not directly mentioned in the text, the head of Canadian government is afforded, by constitutional writ and common custom, a host of impressive abilities. Not only may he appoint and dismiss the members of Cabinet#, but the Prime Minister also puts in place almost every major government official (from Senate members, to members of the provincial and federal judiciary) save the Speaker of the House, who is instead elected by the House of Commons. Nearly every influential officer of the Canadian federal system owes his or her place to a past or current Prime Minister#.
The Prime Minister's powers include his selection of when to stage an election: he has the ability to advise the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament, a suggestion rarely ignored in the course of Canadian history. Not only does this allow the Prime Minister to select a time that best suits his own interest, and that of his party, but to hold the threat of an imminent election over the elected MPs. Furthermore, the Prime Minister has primacy over the formation of the budget, and, through Cabinet, guides the legislative agenda#.
So, too, does the Prime Minister's relationship with Cabinet reflect his influence. Acting as the Cabinet chair, in fact, sitting in the middle of the seating plan he chooses, the Prime Minister dominates the process and policy put out by Cabinet#. Directing the Cabinet agenda, the Prime Minister can keep items from appearing on said agenda, flood it with items, or simply order the list in a manner he finds convenient#. A comprehensive list of the Prime Minister's duties with regards to Cabinet beyond its chairing, and the setting of the agenda include "[establishing] consensus for Cabinet decisions, [appointing] and [firing] deputy ministers, [establishing] Cabinet committees and [deciding] on their membership"#. With the ability to lead Cabinet in the direction of his choice through his selection of membership, supplemented by his supreme control of Cabinet agenda, decisions (through establishment of consensus), and membership of Cabinet committees, the Prime Minister dominates his Cabinet.
Control of Cabinet, in Canada's history, has largely been a matter of personal preference. While John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier each preferred total control of Cabinet even in the early decades of Confederation#, the more recent Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau elected to have a collegial relationship with Cabinet; Prime Minister Jean Chretien, later still, preferred a tightly controlled Cabinet#. While Macdonald, Laurier and Chretien used the opportunities provided by their power over Cabinet to dominate and Trudeau did not, none of these past Prime Ministers succumbed to Cabinet through weakness, or even as a simple matter of an internal check within the executive on Prime Ministerial power. Those who chose to dominate did so freely.
Moreover, the nature of Cabinet deliberation is another tool available to the Prime Minister. Whatever the result of the 'consensus', the actual deliberations are not open to the public#. As the only Cabinet member with full access to unshared knowledge#, the Prime Minister's advantage over his subordinates is cemented by his ability to rule against the majority opinion in Cabinet during discussions#. Combining his dominance over the final decisions of Cabinet, regardless of internal opinions, and the secret nature of Cabinet deliberations, the public has no idea what the true feelings of any dissenting members are. Unless those members choose to resign the choice position the Prime Minister awarded them, as a method of expressing serious dissatisfaction, the Cabinet must present a united front, supporting the decisions of the Prime Minister#. Cabinet is firmly under the control of its head - not even visible discord can dislodge the powers the Prime Minister holds over it.
The Prime Minister's Office itself is a large resource, staffed by an ever-growing number of assistants and bureaucrats solely loyal to the figure of the Prime Minister. Described as the 'nexus' of government in Canada, it is a key tool to control as a means of administrating the country#. Like the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office is firmly a resource of the Prime Minister, rather than Cabinet#.
Evidence of prime ministerial influence is obvious in Canadian society. Not only during party campaigns, but also between them, the Prime Minister is the spokesperson of his government, and his party#. In an 1988 Gallup poll, four years after the Mulroney government came into power, only 31% of those polled could name a single Cabinet minister#. Public ignorance of the Cabinet is acceptable, while a government's era of power is usually named after the then-leader#. References to the Trudeau years or the Mulroney government are the accepted method of naming specific eras in Canadian politics, after the Prime Minister that dominated the government at the time. The personality of the Prime Minister permeates the government, just as his influence does public policy.
The popular view of the parliamentary system is that though its executive and legislative bodies are interconnected, it is still defined by the "checks and balances" that each arm of the government holds over the others. This cannot be said in relation to the Prime Minister. The executive (Cabinet), legislative, and judicial bodies of the Canadian federal system simply do not limit prime ministerial power, while unofficial "checks" such as the structure of government, the media, and public opinion provide the closest approximations of controls. The power of appointment largely nullifies the "check" presented by Cabinet, the legislature, and the judiciary on prime ministerial power, while political ability and manoeuvring can minimize the challenge presented by unofficial barriers.
The opportunity for the executive branch as represented by Cabinet to provide a "check" on the power of the prime minister is laughable in theory, let alone in practice. Beholden to the Prime Minister for their positions and influence, Cabinet members risk their status by challenging his will#. Even beyond this forced loyalty, the Cabinet's ability to hamper the Prime Minister is dampened by his virtual monopoly on power in Cabinet; as has been mentioned, the Prime Minister controls Cabinet entirely, with powers over membership, agenda, and final decisions#. Muted by the secrecy of Cabinet deliberations, Ministers can only indicate serious dissent by resigning their position#. Ministers who refuse to risk their position or future success in a government dominated by the current Prime Minister are rendered voiceless. No balance of power can be found in a body directed and effectively silenced by the power upon which it should a provide a "check".
Likewise, the legislature cannot provide a solid obstacle to the rule of the Prime Minister. Kept in line by threat of confidence votes and the rein of party discipline, unable to "check" the Prime Minister through party leadership votes, and in the case of the Senate, sometimes beholden to the Prime Minister for their position, neither house of the legislature can effectively limit prime ministerial power. Though the threat of confidence votes appears to be a tool of the House of Commons against the Prime Minister, it is as much, if not more, a resource used by the Prime Minister to keep members of the legislature in line. Loss of a confidence vote sparks an election (which a Prime Minister may call arbitrarily anyway), a mechanism that may threaten the position of a significant portion of the Members of Parliament#. If a Prime Minister feels comfortable with his chances of re-election, the vote may cause more harm to the individual Members than the Prime Minister himself. Using this threat, the Prime Minister can cow the House of Commons into docility.
So, too, can party discipline limit the ability of the legislature to act as a traditional "check". In a nation where the party stamp defines the expectations of the electorate in terms of a politician's behaviour, rather than the individual personality, party discipline is a powerful restraint#.Though literal forcing of Members of Parliament (those of the Prime Minister's ruling party) to vote along party lines is rare, the expectations of the public for uniform party fronts are powerful tools for dictating a Member's actions#. Moreover, the threat of a leadership vote is a laughable one at best. The election to party leadership leaves the Prime Minister beholden only to key supporters and allies, rather than the caucus as whole#. Removal at the hands of that caucus is rare, and a party leader elected as Prime Minister has the least to fear of any. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker did, in fact, lose a leadership vote, but was not in power, and had not been for two terms#.
The Upper House of the Canadian legislature is even less able to effectively check the power of the Prime Minister. Whether a Senate seat is viewed as a reward for loyalty, or banishment into comfortable obscurity, a member of the Senate appointed by the current Prime Minister owes him that prestige#. While it could be argued that the length of a Senate term provides Members of the Upper House an ability to check new Prime Ministers, the weakness of the Senate as a legislative body, its reputation of irrelevance to the legislative process make it, as a whole, a poor candidate to "check" the power of the Prime Minister. The bodies within the Canadian legislature, be they one of the bicameral chambers, or the parties represented therein, cannot effectively limit the power of the Prime Minister.
Similarly, the judiciary is hindered in its ability to participate in a system of "checks and balances" in Canadian federalism. The power to interpret laws is a key one, solely in the control of the judicial arm of the government, and a healthy possible check on prime ministerial power#. However, the ability to appoint judges both federal and provincial rests in the hands of none other than the Prime Minister#. It would be naïve to assume past Prime Ministers would appoint incompetent judges; so, too, would it be naïve to believe past Prime Ministers would appoint judges that would openly challenge executive authority. Despite recent attempts at reform, the appointment of the judiciary remains as much a power and tool of the Prime Minister as it has ever been#. The "checks and balances" inherent in the Canadian federal system are entirely ineffective in limiting prime ministerial power.
Unofficial "checks", like official ones on prime ministerial power, are largely unable to stem the sheer power of the Prime Minister. Unlike official "checks", however, the unofficial can be effective against Prime Ministers dramatically unskilled in the talents required for the office. The very nature of federalism, the media, and public opinion are three unofficial checks on prime ministerial power; while their influence is weak against a skilled politician, they, ironically, provide better obstacles to domination of the government by the Prime Minister than any official "checks and balances".
The ability of one person to dominate so complex a structure as the Canadian federal system is an issue to be hotly contested. While it can be argued that such an institution is simply too large for one personality to dominate#, several factors can "shrink" the government in relation to the figure of the Prime Minister. Firstly, the Prime Minister's Office, a formidable, well-staffed resource loyal solely to the Prime Minister, greatly increases his ability to be aware of and involved in the many workings of the government, and to influence those he considers key#. According to some sources, it exists primarily to siphon bureaucratic influence from other areas of the government such as the Cabinet and House of Commons#. Furthermore, the Prime Minister stamps his era in power with his personality, his name#. Whatever the size of government, the personality of the Prime Minister can dominate as much in the annals of history as his assistants can aid him in the domination of public policy.
The media can be a harsh critic of an inept Prime Minister. Without the necessary talent or ability to avoid verbal gaffes, the brand of "gotcha" journalism in the Canadian media can be a key tool in damaging the image of a Prime Minister#. However, a talented orator can simply sidestep this problem by making few mistakes at all, while an unskilled speaker can, through the efforts of his many assistants, tailor his public appearances to downplay any faults#. So, too, can investigative journalism be the downfall of a Prime Minister both inept and corrupt. The discover of corruption in government by the media can undermine political authority by damaging public confidence in the office#. However, a "check" that only works in the face of sheer ineptitude is simply not an effective limit on an office hotly sought after by the nation's most talented political figures.
Influenced by the coverage of the Prime Minister by the media, public opinion is undoubtedly the most powerful of the unofficial factors in a Prime Minister's election or defeat. However, the question remains whether or not electoral victory or defeat is, in fact, a "check" on prime ministerial power. Gaining the position of head of the Canadian government through leadership of the majority party, or a party the majority of the House of Commons will follow if it leads the government, the Prime Minister is in the power of a great would-be "check": election#. The Prime Minister plays for "all or nothing" stakes# ; f the public wishes to "check" the Prime Minister by this mechanism they must simply remove him. This process could be viewed as the only ultimate limit on prime ministerial power by removal from office, but, it is, in reality, not a true "check" because of the nature of elections: this does not limit the power of the Prime Minister when in office, it simply exchanges one for another. Though particular power is in the hands of a Prime Minister elected by majority, the holding of the very office opens up a host of sweeping powers such as were identified above. Even public opinion, though a strong mechanism by which the public may elect the leader of their choice, still cannot ultimately and effectively "check" the power of the Prime Minister.
Ultimately, the influence and power of the figure of the Prime Minister is undeniable. When observing the grand powers of appointment, influence over Cabinet, and administrative resources available to the Prime Minister, the checks in place to counter them, both official and unofficial, seem to be as ineffective today as they ever were. No de-evolution has taken place to enfeeble these checks; the power of the Prime Minister seems dependent on his personality and his ability to navigate through weak obstacles such as the efforts of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, rather than the efforts of those surrounding "checks and balances" within as well as beyond the system. The domination of the Prime Minister within the government is a basic truth of the system, supported by constitution and custom, cemented by the Prime Minister's ability to manipulate supposed "checks" on his power.
Anyone who would like to be emailed a copy for serious editing will find their wish happily granted. If you don't ask, it might happen to you anyway.
ETA: Oh, and we're playing Chop the Essay, by the way. About 200 words of this has to go, and you have the chance to help me decide which ones.
Oh, and if this is academically dishonest, could someone please tell me? I'd hate to be unethical.
A King Unchecked: Prime Ministerial Government in Canada
The Canadian federal political system is undeniably identified with the figure at its head: the Prime Minister. The traditional checks and balances on prime ministerial power continue to be wholly ineffective as the Prime Minister, rather than Cabinet, dominates the government. More a result of intrinsic ability to make use of the opportunities presented to him by the Constitution and current customs than any evolution away from "Cabinet" government, a Prime Minister's influence in government remains the pre-eminent one: above Cabinet, above the House of Commons, above the influence of any other body operating in the Canadian political system. Comparing raw prime ministerial power with the traditional, official checks and balances, as well as modern, unofficial checks on the power of the Prime Minister, the inequality between opposing factions becomes simply another inherent truth of the political system. The Prime Minister's influences and powers remain paramount, their greatest checks the unofficial ones, while the "checks and balances" of the system remain ineffective.
The powers of the Prime Minister are many and varied; promised to any leader of the party with majority standing in the House of Commons, or the largest one, backed by the support of other parties, the ability to form the Canadian government brings with it sweeping powers#. Section 11 of the Constitution Act states that "[t]here shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council of Canada"#. Though the Prime Minister is not directly mentioned in the text, the head of Canadian government is afforded, by constitutional writ and common custom, a host of impressive abilities. Not only may he appoint and dismiss the members of Cabinet#, but the Prime Minister also puts in place almost every major government official (from Senate members, to members of the provincial and federal judiciary) save the Speaker of the House, who is instead elected by the House of Commons. Nearly every influential officer of the Canadian federal system owes his or her place to a past or current Prime Minister#.
The Prime Minister's powers include his selection of when to stage an election: he has the ability to advise the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament, a suggestion rarely ignored in the course of Canadian history. Not only does this allow the Prime Minister to select a time that best suits his own interest, and that of his party, but to hold the threat of an imminent election over the elected MPs. Furthermore, the Prime Minister has primacy over the formation of the budget, and, through Cabinet, guides the legislative agenda#.
So, too, does the Prime Minister's relationship with Cabinet reflect his influence. Acting as the Cabinet chair, in fact, sitting in the middle of the seating plan he chooses, the Prime Minister dominates the process and policy put out by Cabinet#. Directing the Cabinet agenda, the Prime Minister can keep items from appearing on said agenda, flood it with items, or simply order the list in a manner he finds convenient#. A comprehensive list of the Prime Minister's duties with regards to Cabinet beyond its chairing, and the setting of the agenda include "[establishing] consensus for Cabinet decisions, [appointing] and [firing] deputy ministers, [establishing] Cabinet committees and [deciding] on their membership"#. With the ability to lead Cabinet in the direction of his choice through his selection of membership, supplemented by his supreme control of Cabinet agenda, decisions (through establishment of consensus), and membership of Cabinet committees, the Prime Minister dominates his Cabinet.
Control of Cabinet, in Canada's history, has largely been a matter of personal preference. While John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier each preferred total control of Cabinet even in the early decades of Confederation#, the more recent Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau elected to have a collegial relationship with Cabinet; Prime Minister Jean Chretien, later still, preferred a tightly controlled Cabinet#. While Macdonald, Laurier and Chretien used the opportunities provided by their power over Cabinet to dominate and Trudeau did not, none of these past Prime Ministers succumbed to Cabinet through weakness, or even as a simple matter of an internal check within the executive on Prime Ministerial power. Those who chose to dominate did so freely.
Moreover, the nature of Cabinet deliberation is another tool available to the Prime Minister. Whatever the result of the 'consensus', the actual deliberations are not open to the public#. As the only Cabinet member with full access to unshared knowledge#, the Prime Minister's advantage over his subordinates is cemented by his ability to rule against the majority opinion in Cabinet during discussions#. Combining his dominance over the final decisions of Cabinet, regardless of internal opinions, and the secret nature of Cabinet deliberations, the public has no idea what the true feelings of any dissenting members are. Unless those members choose to resign the choice position the Prime Minister awarded them, as a method of expressing serious dissatisfaction, the Cabinet must present a united front, supporting the decisions of the Prime Minister#. Cabinet is firmly under the control of its head - not even visible discord can dislodge the powers the Prime Minister holds over it.
The Prime Minister's Office itself is a large resource, staffed by an ever-growing number of assistants and bureaucrats solely loyal to the figure of the Prime Minister. Described as the 'nexus' of government in Canada, it is a key tool to control as a means of administrating the country#. Like the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office is firmly a resource of the Prime Minister, rather than Cabinet#.
Evidence of prime ministerial influence is obvious in Canadian society. Not only during party campaigns, but also between them, the Prime Minister is the spokesperson of his government, and his party#. In an 1988 Gallup poll, four years after the Mulroney government came into power, only 31% of those polled could name a single Cabinet minister#. Public ignorance of the Cabinet is acceptable, while a government's era of power is usually named after the then-leader#. References to the Trudeau years or the Mulroney government are the accepted method of naming specific eras in Canadian politics, after the Prime Minister that dominated the government at the time. The personality of the Prime Minister permeates the government, just as his influence does public policy.
The popular view of the parliamentary system is that though its executive and legislative bodies are interconnected, it is still defined by the "checks and balances" that each arm of the government holds over the others. This cannot be said in relation to the Prime Minister. The executive (Cabinet), legislative, and judicial bodies of the Canadian federal system simply do not limit prime ministerial power, while unofficial "checks" such as the structure of government, the media, and public opinion provide the closest approximations of controls. The power of appointment largely nullifies the "check" presented by Cabinet, the legislature, and the judiciary on prime ministerial power, while political ability and manoeuvring can minimize the challenge presented by unofficial barriers.
The opportunity for the executive branch as represented by Cabinet to provide a "check" on the power of the prime minister is laughable in theory, let alone in practice. Beholden to the Prime Minister for their positions and influence, Cabinet members risk their status by challenging his will#. Even beyond this forced loyalty, the Cabinet's ability to hamper the Prime Minister is dampened by his virtual monopoly on power in Cabinet; as has been mentioned, the Prime Minister controls Cabinet entirely, with powers over membership, agenda, and final decisions#. Muted by the secrecy of Cabinet deliberations, Ministers can only indicate serious dissent by resigning their position#. Ministers who refuse to risk their position or future success in a government dominated by the current Prime Minister are rendered voiceless. No balance of power can be found in a body directed and effectively silenced by the power upon which it should a provide a "check".
Likewise, the legislature cannot provide a solid obstacle to the rule of the Prime Minister. Kept in line by threat of confidence votes and the rein of party discipline, unable to "check" the Prime Minister through party leadership votes, and in the case of the Senate, sometimes beholden to the Prime Minister for their position, neither house of the legislature can effectively limit prime ministerial power. Though the threat of confidence votes appears to be a tool of the House of Commons against the Prime Minister, it is as much, if not more, a resource used by the Prime Minister to keep members of the legislature in line. Loss of a confidence vote sparks an election (which a Prime Minister may call arbitrarily anyway), a mechanism that may threaten the position of a significant portion of the Members of Parliament#. If a Prime Minister feels comfortable with his chances of re-election, the vote may cause more harm to the individual Members than the Prime Minister himself. Using this threat, the Prime Minister can cow the House of Commons into docility.
So, too, can party discipline limit the ability of the legislature to act as a traditional "check". In a nation where the party stamp defines the expectations of the electorate in terms of a politician's behaviour, rather than the individual personality, party discipline is a powerful restraint#.Though literal forcing of Members of Parliament (those of the Prime Minister's ruling party) to vote along party lines is rare, the expectations of the public for uniform party fronts are powerful tools for dictating a Member's actions#. Moreover, the threat of a leadership vote is a laughable one at best. The election to party leadership leaves the Prime Minister beholden only to key supporters and allies, rather than the caucus as whole#. Removal at the hands of that caucus is rare, and a party leader elected as Prime Minister has the least to fear of any. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker did, in fact, lose a leadership vote, but was not in power, and had not been for two terms#.
The Upper House of the Canadian legislature is even less able to effectively check the power of the Prime Minister. Whether a Senate seat is viewed as a reward for loyalty, or banishment into comfortable obscurity, a member of the Senate appointed by the current Prime Minister owes him that prestige#. While it could be argued that the length of a Senate term provides Members of the Upper House an ability to check new Prime Ministers, the weakness of the Senate as a legislative body, its reputation of irrelevance to the legislative process make it, as a whole, a poor candidate to "check" the power of the Prime Minister. The bodies within the Canadian legislature, be they one of the bicameral chambers, or the parties represented therein, cannot effectively limit the power of the Prime Minister.
Similarly, the judiciary is hindered in its ability to participate in a system of "checks and balances" in Canadian federalism. The power to interpret laws is a key one, solely in the control of the judicial arm of the government, and a healthy possible check on prime ministerial power#. However, the ability to appoint judges both federal and provincial rests in the hands of none other than the Prime Minister#. It would be naïve to assume past Prime Ministers would appoint incompetent judges; so, too, would it be naïve to believe past Prime Ministers would appoint judges that would openly challenge executive authority. Despite recent attempts at reform, the appointment of the judiciary remains as much a power and tool of the Prime Minister as it has ever been#. The "checks and balances" inherent in the Canadian federal system are entirely ineffective in limiting prime ministerial power.
Unofficial "checks", like official ones on prime ministerial power, are largely unable to stem the sheer power of the Prime Minister. Unlike official "checks", however, the unofficial can be effective against Prime Ministers dramatically unskilled in the talents required for the office. The very nature of federalism, the media, and public opinion are three unofficial checks on prime ministerial power; while their influence is weak against a skilled politician, they, ironically, provide better obstacles to domination of the government by the Prime Minister than any official "checks and balances".
The ability of one person to dominate so complex a structure as the Canadian federal system is an issue to be hotly contested. While it can be argued that such an institution is simply too large for one personality to dominate#, several factors can "shrink" the government in relation to the figure of the Prime Minister. Firstly, the Prime Minister's Office, a formidable, well-staffed resource loyal solely to the Prime Minister, greatly increases his ability to be aware of and involved in the many workings of the government, and to influence those he considers key#. According to some sources, it exists primarily to siphon bureaucratic influence from other areas of the government such as the Cabinet and House of Commons#. Furthermore, the Prime Minister stamps his era in power with his personality, his name#. Whatever the size of government, the personality of the Prime Minister can dominate as much in the annals of history as his assistants can aid him in the domination of public policy.
The media can be a harsh critic of an inept Prime Minister. Without the necessary talent or ability to avoid verbal gaffes, the brand of "gotcha" journalism in the Canadian media can be a key tool in damaging the image of a Prime Minister#. However, a talented orator can simply sidestep this problem by making few mistakes at all, while an unskilled speaker can, through the efforts of his many assistants, tailor his public appearances to downplay any faults#. So, too, can investigative journalism be the downfall of a Prime Minister both inept and corrupt. The discover of corruption in government by the media can undermine political authority by damaging public confidence in the office#. However, a "check" that only works in the face of sheer ineptitude is simply not an effective limit on an office hotly sought after by the nation's most talented political figures.
Influenced by the coverage of the Prime Minister by the media, public opinion is undoubtedly the most powerful of the unofficial factors in a Prime Minister's election or defeat. However, the question remains whether or not electoral victory or defeat is, in fact, a "check" on prime ministerial power. Gaining the position of head of the Canadian government through leadership of the majority party, or a party the majority of the House of Commons will follow if it leads the government, the Prime Minister is in the power of a great would-be "check": election#. The Prime Minister plays for "all or nothing" stakes# ; f the public wishes to "check" the Prime Minister by this mechanism they must simply remove him. This process could be viewed as the only ultimate limit on prime ministerial power by removal from office, but, it is, in reality, not a true "check" because of the nature of elections: this does not limit the power of the Prime Minister when in office, it simply exchanges one for another. Though particular power is in the hands of a Prime Minister elected by majority, the holding of the very office opens up a host of sweeping powers such as were identified above. Even public opinion, though a strong mechanism by which the public may elect the leader of their choice, still cannot ultimately and effectively "check" the power of the Prime Minister.
Ultimately, the influence and power of the figure of the Prime Minister is undeniable. When observing the grand powers of appointment, influence over Cabinet, and administrative resources available to the Prime Minister, the checks in place to counter them, both official and unofficial, seem to be as ineffective today as they ever were. No de-evolution has taken place to enfeeble these checks; the power of the Prime Minister seems dependent on his personality and his ability to navigate through weak obstacles such as the efforts of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, rather than the efforts of those surrounding "checks and balances" within as well as beyond the system. The domination of the Prime Minister within the government is a basic truth of the system, supported by constitution and custom, cemented by the Prime Minister's ability to manipulate supposed "checks" on his power.
Anyone who would like to be emailed a copy for serious editing will find their wish happily granted. If you don't ask, it might happen to you anyway.
ETA: Oh, and we're playing Chop the Essay, by the way. About 200 words of this has to go, and you have the chance to help me decide which ones.