Here's metaphysics, phor you! (And epistemology is the coolest subject in philosophy)
Metaphysics Metaphors
Metaphysic Metaphors
Metaphysi Metaphors
Metaphys Metaphor
Metaphy Metapho
Metaph
What do Metaphysics and Metaphors have in common? You guessed it-- Metaph. And a metaph is a unit of measurement for a bit of objective, real knowledge about the way the world is. Of course, a metaphysic and a metaphor both exceed their bounds as individual metaph units, but contained within them is still a metaph. There are some theories of mind or epistemology that see thought and representation as metaphorical, such that we ought to interpret our representations and knowledge claims about the world as non-literal. For many of these theorists, our theories and perceptions are merely metaphors of the world, left isolated in an intersubjective web of interpretation. But, they warn, this is not to be confused with the way the world really is, that is, without an interpreter. Perhaps, they may add, 'The world' itself requires an interpreter, because 'the world' (as I'm writing it here), is itself a linguistic entity, thus making it part of the intersubjective web through which I'm speaking about things.
I hope to show that this view is close, but simply not close enough. These theorists take what is an otherwise good paradigm shift from the literal to the metaphorical, but completely screw up in figuring out what to do with it, especially as applied to epistemology.
At this point, allow me to make a distinction between the world and 'the world' (the latter having the scare quotes wrapped around it). In order to come to grips with this distinction, imagine the following dialogue between one of these mind-as-metaphor theorists (MM) and some guy trying to deal with the problems of epistemology (EG)...
Epistemology Guy (EG): Dude, epistemology is really confusing! I walked into my epistemology classroom thinking it obvious that I know all kinds of things about the world. For instance, I didn't question the knowledge claim that I was in a classroom, and I didn't question that it was filled with desks, and there was simply no doubt in my mind that epistemology is the coolest subject in philosophy. But now I've come to realize that I can actually doubt all of these things! Dude!
Mind-as-Metaphor Theorist (MM): I'm not at all surprised at your confusion, as you were probably taught the traditional views about mind and epistemology and language, and they are all literalist. Lucky for you, however, I've actually been trained in an opposing paradigm, one which has solved all of these problems.
EG: Well you've got some work to do, because right now I'm not even convinced that you exist.
MM: Okay, it's quite simple really. All you have to do is realize that your knowledge claims are metaphorical instead of literal.
EG: How does that solve anything? Am I in a classroom right now or not? Is it filled with desks or not? Are they made of wood or not? You can't tell me that you know for certain that I'm in a classroom and it is filled with desks and they are made of wood!
MM: There you go again, thinking literally. Rather, say it like this... I am 'in a classroom' and it is 'filled with desks' and they are 'made of wood'.
EG: But I already said that, and I doubted it.
MM: No you didn't, you were being a literalist. You said-- I am in a classroom and it is filled with desks and they are made of wood.
EG: Right.
MM: So say it instead like this-- I am 'in a classroom' and it is 'filled with desks' and they are 'made of wood'.
EG: Okay, at this point you're just fucking with me, aren't you?
MM: No! The difference between the two of them is that when I say it (the way I want you to say it), I mean it metaphorically. Meanwhile, you mean it literally. Obviously, if you mean it literally, you run into all sorts of philosophical problems, such as trying to figure out how your mental image or knowledge claim logically corresponds with the world.
EG: Oh, alright, I see what you mean. But I'm still confused, how is your way any better?
MM: Well, once you come to understand that all knowledge claims are metaphorical, then you realize that when you talk about the world, you mean 'the world'. And when you talk about the classroom, you mean 'the classroom'. And when you talk about the desks, you mean 'the desks'. Since these are metaphors, they get their meaning coherently through a web of intersubjectivity. Your knowledge claims, therefore, can make sense only within this web. Beforehand, you ran into problems because you didn't realize that there can be no such thing as the world outside of 'the world'. You only ran into epistemological confusion because you were still trying to assign 'the world' some kind of logical and literal correspondance to something outside.
EG: I think I get it now. Check this shit out-- I am 'in a classroom' and it is 'filled with desks' and they are 'made of wood'.
MM: Very good! This is only the first step, but you're getting there. I'm very proud of you!
EG: Thanks! But just one more thing....
MM: Sure, what is it?
EG: Am I in a classroom filled with desks that are made of wood, or not?
MM: .....
Are you confused enough yet? If you're like me, you're probably wondering: What happened to the world? What happened to epistemology? In some cranked out effort to turn the world into something we can talk about philosophically, we seem to have to turned it into 'the world' (Either that, or we've turned it into something about which we must remain silent). Of course, though, a myriad of philosophical problems still remain unresolved. For instance, how is 'the world' related to the world? How does 'the world' succeed pragmatically and instrumentally to navigate us through the world?
Or maybe you've already plummetted completely into the abyss, and you've been so entangled within this new metaphorical, intersubjective view that you've given up on the world entirely. Perhaps you've even crossed over into complete ridiculousness, and you've come to actually believe that 'the world' is all there is. In the philosophical lingo, they call people like this craz... Errr... Idealists. That's right-- crazy crazy idealists.
Some of you still have hope, however, so let me offer a little medication. The first thing we need to do is ask: Why should we attempt this paradigm shift in the first place, from the literal to the metaphorical? Why would a mind be designed around metaphor instead of being designed to be literal? After all, it sure would be easy to be a literalist. For instance, the secret ambition of all literalists is to solve the problems of knowledge by solving the problem of meaning. It's kind of like knocking down two birds with one stone. I don't want to spend too much time on this, so let me just explain briefly. If you're a literalist, then one way a claim might get its meaning is by having some kind of logical correspondence to the world. But of course, if you can show that a claim has logical correspondence to the world, then that's also how you can have knowledge about the world. So you see, literalists (or just about 95% of what we call 'analytic philosophy') have a habit of confusing the issue of meaning with the issue of knowledge. If they get really crooked and nuts, they start to confuse the issue of knowledge with issues about language, and become philosophers of language instead of epistemologists. Which is pure insanity, by the way.
Alright, so here's why we need a paradigm shift. Quite simply, there is no logical correspondence between our claims and the world. This is unfortunate, because if there were such a logical correspondence, then everything would be really easy, and philosophers could just be logicians instead, and not be at all creative. Thus, the pressing issue we need to answer is concerning why the world, blasted as it is, didn't design us as literalists. And here's the answer: It's because in order to be creatures that get around in the world at all, we must be embodied.
The fact that we are embodied is relevent because being a literalist doesn't work very good when you have a body, and when you would like to perform actions with your body in the world. Having a body means having a point of view. It means being situated somewhere in the world, as an object in-the-world. It means that you are constrained by your form of embodiment. It means occupying some space and time relative to your surroundings. See how I used bold font for the word 'relative' there? That's because it's important. When you have a body, you have a metaphorical relationship to the world, by pragmatic necessity. As your body moves through the world, the 'meaning' of your perception of the world shifts with every step you take, because of how your body shifts in position relative to its surroundings. Thus, meaning has to be loosened up, and it must be presented to you in terms that are relevent to your particular form of embodiment. This is why our minds must be designed to be metaphorical. It must be metaphorical because we're embodied, and our bodies were designed by evolution to navigate successfully in the world to perform actions. Unconscious pragmatics explain why we should expect to be designed in this way.
I'm going through a thousand steps at once, so don't feel bad if you're not following completely. Just make sure you have at least a rough sense for why it is pragmatic for your mind to assign meaning loosely when you're trying to move around (and don't forget that in order to move around, you must consider that you are a particular object which has form and structure, as part of the world). With each movement, your position relative to everything else changes. The information you need to get around isn't merely 'static', or 'literal'. Rather, it is 'changing', 'fluid', and much more akin to a metaphor.
So this brings us back to our mind-as-metaphor theorists who are close but not close enough. For whatever reason, these theorists must forget why it is pragmatic for our minds to be metaphorical. Instead, they just take it for granted that the mind is metaphorical. At least, this is how I rationalize their blunder. What I mean is, these theorists forget all about the world and replace it with 'the world', as if the whole reason why the mind works metaphorically has nothing to do with being embodied in the world.
Rather, our metaphors work precisely because they are scaffolded and informed by the world. In fact, the world makes its own best representation. The fact that this is presented to us metaphorically is not an impediment between us and the world. Rather, it's just a fact about what is pragmatically necessary in order for us to be part of the world, and in order to successfully make claims about it.
All of this brings me right back to what metaphysics and metaphors share in common. What they share is a bridged epistemological relationship or association, one which connects mind with world (which is another way of also showing why epistemology really is the coolest subject in philosophy). And for the sake of having fun with language, I propose to coin a term: Metaph. And a metaph, as I said, is a unit of objective, real knowledge about the way the world really is.
And keep in mind that when I say 'the world', I mean THE WORLD, DAMNIT! THE WORLD!
So please, next time you're in an epistemology classroom, knock on the wood of your desk (hard with your fist, if you must!) and just scream aloud: "The world, damnit! I mean THE WORLD!". The bedazzled look of the others in the room will be your proud indication that the revolution has begun.
Metaphysic Metaphors
Metaphysi Metaphors
Metaphys Metaphor
Metaphy Metapho
Metaph
What do Metaphysics and Metaphors have in common? You guessed it-- Metaph. And a metaph is a unit of measurement for a bit of objective, real knowledge about the way the world is. Of course, a metaphysic and a metaphor both exceed their bounds as individual metaph units, but contained within them is still a metaph. There are some theories of mind or epistemology that see thought and representation as metaphorical, such that we ought to interpret our representations and knowledge claims about the world as non-literal. For many of these theorists, our theories and perceptions are merely metaphors of the world, left isolated in an intersubjective web of interpretation. But, they warn, this is not to be confused with the way the world really is, that is, without an interpreter. Perhaps, they may add, 'The world' itself requires an interpreter, because 'the world' (as I'm writing it here), is itself a linguistic entity, thus making it part of the intersubjective web through which I'm speaking about things.
I hope to show that this view is close, but simply not close enough. These theorists take what is an otherwise good paradigm shift from the literal to the metaphorical, but completely screw up in figuring out what to do with it, especially as applied to epistemology.
At this point, allow me to make a distinction between the world and 'the world' (the latter having the scare quotes wrapped around it). In order to come to grips with this distinction, imagine the following dialogue between one of these mind-as-metaphor theorists (MM) and some guy trying to deal with the problems of epistemology (EG)...
Epistemology Guy (EG): Dude, epistemology is really confusing! I walked into my epistemology classroom thinking it obvious that I know all kinds of things about the world. For instance, I didn't question the knowledge claim that I was in a classroom, and I didn't question that it was filled with desks, and there was simply no doubt in my mind that epistemology is the coolest subject in philosophy. But now I've come to realize that I can actually doubt all of these things! Dude!
Mind-as-Metaphor Theorist (MM): I'm not at all surprised at your confusion, as you were probably taught the traditional views about mind and epistemology and language, and they are all literalist. Lucky for you, however, I've actually been trained in an opposing paradigm, one which has solved all of these problems.
EG: Well you've got some work to do, because right now I'm not even convinced that you exist.
MM: Okay, it's quite simple really. All you have to do is realize that your knowledge claims are metaphorical instead of literal.
EG: How does that solve anything? Am I in a classroom right now or not? Is it filled with desks or not? Are they made of wood or not? You can't tell me that you know for certain that I'm in a classroom and it is filled with desks and they are made of wood!
MM: There you go again, thinking literally. Rather, say it like this... I am 'in a classroom' and it is 'filled with desks' and they are 'made of wood'.
EG: But I already said that, and I doubted it.
MM: No you didn't, you were being a literalist. You said-- I am in a classroom and it is filled with desks and they are made of wood.
EG: Right.
MM: So say it instead like this-- I am 'in a classroom' and it is 'filled with desks' and they are 'made of wood'.
EG: Okay, at this point you're just fucking with me, aren't you?
MM: No! The difference between the two of them is that when I say it (the way I want you to say it), I mean it metaphorically. Meanwhile, you mean it literally. Obviously, if you mean it literally, you run into all sorts of philosophical problems, such as trying to figure out how your mental image or knowledge claim logically corresponds with the world.
EG: Oh, alright, I see what you mean. But I'm still confused, how is your way any better?
MM: Well, once you come to understand that all knowledge claims are metaphorical, then you realize that when you talk about the world, you mean 'the world'. And when you talk about the classroom, you mean 'the classroom'. And when you talk about the desks, you mean 'the desks'. Since these are metaphors, they get their meaning coherently through a web of intersubjectivity. Your knowledge claims, therefore, can make sense only within this web. Beforehand, you ran into problems because you didn't realize that there can be no such thing as the world outside of 'the world'. You only ran into epistemological confusion because you were still trying to assign 'the world' some kind of logical and literal correspondance to something outside.
EG: I think I get it now. Check this shit out-- I am 'in a classroom' and it is 'filled with desks' and they are 'made of wood'.
MM: Very good! This is only the first step, but you're getting there. I'm very proud of you!
EG: Thanks! But just one more thing....
MM: Sure, what is it?
EG: Am I in a classroom filled with desks that are made of wood, or not?
MM: .....
Are you confused enough yet? If you're like me, you're probably wondering: What happened to the world? What happened to epistemology? In some cranked out effort to turn the world into something we can talk about philosophically, we seem to have to turned it into 'the world' (Either that, or we've turned it into something about which we must remain silent). Of course, though, a myriad of philosophical problems still remain unresolved. For instance, how is 'the world' related to the world? How does 'the world' succeed pragmatically and instrumentally to navigate us through the world?
Or maybe you've already plummetted completely into the abyss, and you've been so entangled within this new metaphorical, intersubjective view that you've given up on the world entirely. Perhaps you've even crossed over into complete ridiculousness, and you've come to actually believe that 'the world' is all there is. In the philosophical lingo, they call people like this craz... Errr... Idealists. That's right-- crazy crazy idealists.
Some of you still have hope, however, so let me offer a little medication. The first thing we need to do is ask: Why should we attempt this paradigm shift in the first place, from the literal to the metaphorical? Why would a mind be designed around metaphor instead of being designed to be literal? After all, it sure would be easy to be a literalist. For instance, the secret ambition of all literalists is to solve the problems of knowledge by solving the problem of meaning. It's kind of like knocking down two birds with one stone. I don't want to spend too much time on this, so let me just explain briefly. If you're a literalist, then one way a claim might get its meaning is by having some kind of logical correspondence to the world. But of course, if you can show that a claim has logical correspondence to the world, then that's also how you can have knowledge about the world. So you see, literalists (or just about 95% of what we call 'analytic philosophy') have a habit of confusing the issue of meaning with the issue of knowledge. If they get really crooked and nuts, they start to confuse the issue of knowledge with issues about language, and become philosophers of language instead of epistemologists. Which is pure insanity, by the way.
Alright, so here's why we need a paradigm shift. Quite simply, there is no logical correspondence between our claims and the world. This is unfortunate, because if there were such a logical correspondence, then everything would be really easy, and philosophers could just be logicians instead, and not be at all creative. Thus, the pressing issue we need to answer is concerning why the world, blasted as it is, didn't design us as literalists. And here's the answer: It's because in order to be creatures that get around in the world at all, we must be embodied.
The fact that we are embodied is relevent because being a literalist doesn't work very good when you have a body, and when you would like to perform actions with your body in the world. Having a body means having a point of view. It means being situated somewhere in the world, as an object in-the-world. It means that you are constrained by your form of embodiment. It means occupying some space and time relative to your surroundings. See how I used bold font for the word 'relative' there? That's because it's important. When you have a body, you have a metaphorical relationship to the world, by pragmatic necessity. As your body moves through the world, the 'meaning' of your perception of the world shifts with every step you take, because of how your body shifts in position relative to its surroundings. Thus, meaning has to be loosened up, and it must be presented to you in terms that are relevent to your particular form of embodiment. This is why our minds must be designed to be metaphorical. It must be metaphorical because we're embodied, and our bodies were designed by evolution to navigate successfully in the world to perform actions. Unconscious pragmatics explain why we should expect to be designed in this way.
I'm going through a thousand steps at once, so don't feel bad if you're not following completely. Just make sure you have at least a rough sense for why it is pragmatic for your mind to assign meaning loosely when you're trying to move around (and don't forget that in order to move around, you must consider that you are a particular object which has form and structure, as part of the world). With each movement, your position relative to everything else changes. The information you need to get around isn't merely 'static', or 'literal'. Rather, it is 'changing', 'fluid', and much more akin to a metaphor.
So this brings us back to our mind-as-metaphor theorists who are close but not close enough. For whatever reason, these theorists must forget why it is pragmatic for our minds to be metaphorical. Instead, they just take it for granted that the mind is metaphorical. At least, this is how I rationalize their blunder. What I mean is, these theorists forget all about the world and replace it with 'the world', as if the whole reason why the mind works metaphorically has nothing to do with being embodied in the world.
Rather, our metaphors work precisely because they are scaffolded and informed by the world. In fact, the world makes its own best representation. The fact that this is presented to us metaphorically is not an impediment between us and the world. Rather, it's just a fact about what is pragmatically necessary in order for us to be part of the world, and in order to successfully make claims about it.
All of this brings me right back to what metaphysics and metaphors share in common. What they share is a bridged epistemological relationship or association, one which connects mind with world (which is another way of also showing why epistemology really is the coolest subject in philosophy). And for the sake of having fun with language, I propose to coin a term: Metaph. And a metaph, as I said, is a unit of objective, real knowledge about the way the world really is.
And keep in mind that when I say 'the world', I mean THE WORLD, DAMNIT! THE WORLD!
So please, next time you're in an epistemology classroom, knock on the wood of your desk (hard with your fist, if you must!) and just scream aloud: "The world, damnit! I mean THE WORLD!". The bedazzled look of the others in the room will be your proud indication that the revolution has begun.