(no subject)
Unpublished.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
Could the Unity for Gallaudet Protest have been prosecuted better?
Earl Mikell
Eisenhower: “We’re soldiers, you and I. There can only be one commander. One conductor of this orchestra.”
Churchill: “One supreme commander in the air, on the ground, at sea.”
Eisenhower: “Or face inter-service bickering, clashing egos, conflicting deployments. One invasion, one commander.”
- Dwight Eisenhower and Winston Churchill, “IKE: Countdown to D-Day”
Dwight David Eisenhower is lionized today for his handling of the greatest invasion the world has ever known: D-Day, June 6, 1944, properly known as Operation Overlord. Yet maybe Overlord would have failed if not for his insistence on having one supreme commander to oversee the operation. It was his belief that having one clear overall commander in charge of the Allied effort in Europe would prevent inter-service rivalry, bureaucratic obstacles, war by committee-ism, and so on. Asking for the position was a big gamble fraught with a slippery slope, as seeing as it would put the named commander in charge of a massive armada of soldiers, planes, and ships, perhaps the largest in the world's history. Today we all know what happened. It paid off, and Eisenhower is rightly venerated in the present day as the man who liberated a continent.
It is rather interesting to note that Eisenhower's liberation of Europe, part of the epic drama that was World War II, gave birth to the concept of utilizing military strategy and tactics for the world at large, outside the realm and horrors of war. What's also interesting, however, is that the concept of overall military organization, what he essentially argued for, is also becoming prevalent out in the civilian world, as well. Clear chains of commands led by one overall commander, areas of responsibilities, campaign plans, and so on: how Eisenhower approached D-Day on a military scale is now being replicated on a smaller, commercialized scale, in today's world, with great success. These groups and businesses win awards regularly, make profits, and establish higher standards for everybody else to follow. This is Eisenhower's legacy, made into reality in better and peaceful times.
So having considered the fruits of Eisenhower's labor, we should take a look at the Unity for Gallaudet protest through the prism of his legacy, given that we did not adopt his approach. Let's start first with the aftermath of the protests. The bottom line is indisputable: Jane Fernandes was removed from the presidency through the efforts of the protesters. It created momentum for full-on change, starting with Robert Davila's ascension to the presidency, and the shakeups of the university's administration, staff and policy process followed in his wake.
But the victory was costly. The media and public were led to believe it was merely just a temper tantrum by the students, and it affected global perception of Gallaudet University. The MSCHE stepped up its oversight of the university, and left our accreditation dangling on a thin string. Gallaudet's fiscal and administrative state remained on shaky ground, peering into the abyss of failure and closure. We have yet to feel the full repercussions of 2006, in all actuality.
That does not mean that the protest and the deposal of Fernandes was the wrong thing to do. On the contrary, it was absolutely the right thing to do. But the cost incurred makes it worth asking: could the protest have been conducted more efficiently? One mistake is apparent today: the failure to fully anticipate a Fernandes election and plan a protest against it, prior to May 1. It is also our understanding that the first week of October had been marked as the week of protest, timed to coincide with the Board of Trustees meeting. At that point, there was nothing else beyond that week. That is another mistake; the failure to have contingency plans laid down.
The biggest, however, was not having an overall commander in charge to plan ahead and execute them against the Jordan/Fernandes regime, along with responding to issues on the ground and being the face of the protest. That was Eisenhower's role with Overlord and beyond, and it was the conduit for the Allied victory. There was no such role during the protest. An ad-hoc committee ran the protest, and disorganized responses and actions were taken, often late, in response to the administration's own. There was no point man, and any general understanding of what the protest was doing and planned to do was often incomplete, given different messages and actions from different lead protesters.
Having one man, or woman, in charge of the protest, if planned ahead, would have made much if not all of these issues go away. The protest would have effectively attacked the administration's stance on Fernandes earlier, and made a coherent case for Fernandes' dismissal. Multiple, and visible, avenues of assault would have been undertaken, from using the media in all venues, and to getting the public on our side and so on. Such a commander would have been more capable of quickly responding to events on the ground, and keep things in control. Contingencies would have been implemented.
Such a protest, conducted this way, would have mitigated the fallout from October 2006. It may have even knocked out Fernandes earlier. Overlord resulted in a certain and undisputed victory; our victory cost us more and is still disputed in some quarters. However, the bottom line is still what matters today, even 63 years after Normandy. And the bottom line is we won, albeit at a price. So basically we should and must consider the Unity for Gallaudet protest a victory, and also a lesson learned, for the future. Interestingly enough, Eisenhower also planned for a defeat: "Our landings in the Cherbourg - Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold, and I have withdrawn our troops…" Imagine what our message would have been if we had lost on October 28, 2006.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
Could the Unity for Gallaudet Protest have been prosecuted better?
Earl Mikell
Eisenhower: “We’re soldiers, you and I. There can only be one commander. One conductor of this orchestra.”
Churchill: “One supreme commander in the air, on the ground, at sea.”
Eisenhower: “Or face inter-service bickering, clashing egos, conflicting deployments. One invasion, one commander.”
- Dwight Eisenhower and Winston Churchill, “IKE: Countdown to D-Day”
Dwight David Eisenhower is lionized today for his handling of the greatest invasion the world has ever known: D-Day, June 6, 1944, properly known as Operation Overlord. Yet maybe Overlord would have failed if not for his insistence on having one supreme commander to oversee the operation. It was his belief that having one clear overall commander in charge of the Allied effort in Europe would prevent inter-service rivalry, bureaucratic obstacles, war by committee-ism, and so on. Asking for the position was a big gamble fraught with a slippery slope, as seeing as it would put the named commander in charge of a massive armada of soldiers, planes, and ships, perhaps the largest in the world's history. Today we all know what happened. It paid off, and Eisenhower is rightly venerated in the present day as the man who liberated a continent.
It is rather interesting to note that Eisenhower's liberation of Europe, part of the epic drama that was World War II, gave birth to the concept of utilizing military strategy and tactics for the world at large, outside the realm and horrors of war. What's also interesting, however, is that the concept of overall military organization, what he essentially argued for, is also becoming prevalent out in the civilian world, as well. Clear chains of commands led by one overall commander, areas of responsibilities, campaign plans, and so on: how Eisenhower approached D-Day on a military scale is now being replicated on a smaller, commercialized scale, in today's world, with great success. These groups and businesses win awards regularly, make profits, and establish higher standards for everybody else to follow. This is Eisenhower's legacy, made into reality in better and peaceful times.
So having considered the fruits of Eisenhower's labor, we should take a look at the Unity for Gallaudet protest through the prism of his legacy, given that we did not adopt his approach. Let's start first with the aftermath of the protests. The bottom line is indisputable: Jane Fernandes was removed from the presidency through the efforts of the protesters. It created momentum for full-on change, starting with Robert Davila's ascension to the presidency, and the shakeups of the university's administration, staff and policy process followed in his wake.
But the victory was costly. The media and public were led to believe it was merely just a temper tantrum by the students, and it affected global perception of Gallaudet University. The MSCHE stepped up its oversight of the university, and left our accreditation dangling on a thin string. Gallaudet's fiscal and administrative state remained on shaky ground, peering into the abyss of failure and closure. We have yet to feel the full repercussions of 2006, in all actuality.
That does not mean that the protest and the deposal of Fernandes was the wrong thing to do. On the contrary, it was absolutely the right thing to do. But the cost incurred makes it worth asking: could the protest have been conducted more efficiently? One mistake is apparent today: the failure to fully anticipate a Fernandes election and plan a protest against it, prior to May 1. It is also our understanding that the first week of October had been marked as the week of protest, timed to coincide with the Board of Trustees meeting. At that point, there was nothing else beyond that week. That is another mistake; the failure to have contingency plans laid down.
The biggest, however, was not having an overall commander in charge to plan ahead and execute them against the Jordan/Fernandes regime, along with responding to issues on the ground and being the face of the protest. That was Eisenhower's role with Overlord and beyond, and it was the conduit for the Allied victory. There was no such role during the protest. An ad-hoc committee ran the protest, and disorganized responses and actions were taken, often late, in response to the administration's own. There was no point man, and any general understanding of what the protest was doing and planned to do was often incomplete, given different messages and actions from different lead protesters.
Having one man, or woman, in charge of the protest, if planned ahead, would have made much if not all of these issues go away. The protest would have effectively attacked the administration's stance on Fernandes earlier, and made a coherent case for Fernandes' dismissal. Multiple, and visible, avenues of assault would have been undertaken, from using the media in all venues, and to getting the public on our side and so on. Such a commander would have been more capable of quickly responding to events on the ground, and keep things in control. Contingencies would have been implemented.
Such a protest, conducted this way, would have mitigated the fallout from October 2006. It may have even knocked out Fernandes earlier. Overlord resulted in a certain and undisputed victory; our victory cost us more and is still disputed in some quarters. However, the bottom line is still what matters today, even 63 years after Normandy. And the bottom line is we won, albeit at a price. So basically we should and must consider the Unity for Gallaudet protest a victory, and also a lesson learned, for the future. Interestingly enough, Eisenhower also planned for a defeat: "Our landings in the Cherbourg - Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold, and I have withdrawn our troops…" Imagine what our message would have been if we had lost on October 28, 2006.