Putting out the Div. of Fire

[tim1965]

The Cleveland firefighters' union says 48 percent of fire engines, 54 percent of ladder trucks, and 100 percent of ambulances are in fair or poor condition -- imperiling the safety of residents.

How they made that judgement call is unclear, since an Ohio Fire Chiefs study says there's no criteria for assessing firefighting equipment. (No, seriously. "Tradition and personal sentiment" are what's used. OMFG!!!)

Let's review Mayor Jackson's oversight of the Division of Fire, shall we?

• In 2006, the Division of Fire signed a document in which it admitted it had openly discriminated against minority firefighters. It paid $650,000 in back-pay to African American, Asian, and Latino fire personnel instead of spending the money on new equipment and structural repair.
• In 2008, the city rolled out a trial program to have an Advanced Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) or paramedic assigned to each fire company in the city. With the city operating only four Emergency Medical Services (EMS) squads (three squads with four ambulances, and one with five) at the time, EMS response was often too slow (and too deadly). A grievance filed by the EMS union later halted the program. The same year, a scandal hit the fire academy when several paramedic cadets were found to have cheated on exams. The city was in crisis in terms of EMS personnel as 88 paramedics had quit in the last two years for better-paying jobs in the suburbs and other states. In July 2008, the Fire Academy held its first classes in years. A decade earlier, 53 people had passed the test to enter the Fire Academy, but the city only got around to asking them to train a decade later. (The Division of Fire had 883 firefighters that year, and was budgeted for 906. The department was only losing about 25 people a year, so the lack of Fire Academy classes isn't as surprising as it seems.)
• In 2009, an audit of the Division of Fire's completely paper-based payroll system showed an immense amount of and the potential for abuse. Fire Chief Paul Stubbs had promised to automate the payroll and scheduling system three years earlier, but never followed through. By 2011, record-keeping was still so bad that firefighters were not charged for sick leave -- allowing them to cash in huge amounts of accumulated leave at retirement. Four after first taking office, Mayor Jackson finally paid attention to fire and EMS services by proposing a merger between the two divisions. The Fire Academy held its first test-taking (to screen applicants for admission to the academy) since 1998.
• In 2011, a shift-trading scandal was uncovered in the Division of Fire. Some firefighters had worked as few as five days a year, trading shifts with other firefighters. Many of the most egregious shift-traders were working other jobs (like substitute teaching) while getting time-in-position to qualify for luxurious firefighter pensions. Fire Chief Stubbs quietly retired in 2012. Jackson relieved the new Fire Chief, Daryl McGinnis, of duty over the scandal in 2013. (Jackson's reason was that McGinnis had failed to certify graduates of the Fire Academy. While that may be true, it's also true McGinnis had never uncovered the shift-trading.) Firefighters were furious at new time-keeping and personnel rules enacted in the wake of the scandal which largely prevented them from shift-trading in the future. Later, 17 supervisors were later disciplined or dismissed; the union appealed all the punishments. Also in 2011, state budget cuts led Jackson to take engines out of service at Fire Station 21, close Battalion 1 at Fire Station 17, and take Engine 17, Ladder 9, and Ladder 42 out of service.
• In 2012, firefighters were found to have received credit for continuing education they never received. Some supervisors had colluded in the practice. Jackson pooh-pooh'ed the need for such certification, even though it is required by state law, city ordnance, and best-practice professional standards and pushed for by the union. City voters turned down a charter amendment that would have allowed the mayor to appoint the Fire Chief. (Currently, applicants must pass a civil service exam win approval from the city's nonpartisan Civil Service Commission.)
• In 2013, the Fire Academy held its first graduation in four years with 39 recruits (four of whom were paramedics). Jackson just didn't notice that the fire academy had been moribund from 2008 to 2012.
• In 2014, Jackson was notified that a third of all the city's firefighters were eligible to retire, and a whopping 71 percent were within 10 years of retirement. (Firefighters are eligible for retirement after 25 years of service, but most in Cleveland stick around until they have logged between 30 and 33 years.) Nothing was done about it. The same year, an exterminator hired to treat fire stations throughout the city refused to do the work because the city had failed to pay the firm in the past. The same year, the Jackson administration announced a five-year plan to replace and upgrade the city’s safety vehicles. (The first engine was received in November 2015.) NOTE: If this plan got any news attention at the time, I cannot find it.
• Fire Chief Patrick Kelly quit in 2015 after two years on the job. He was under investigation at the time for failing to properly certify cadets at the Fire Academy and failing to ensure that incumbent personnel received the continuing education credits they had trained for. The same year, 35 firefighters were disciplined for violating policies on outside employment, and the firefighters' union finally rejected the proposal to merge fire and EMS units that year.
• In 2016, Angelo Calvillo formally became Cleveland's new Fire Chief. Calvillo asked for only $480,000 in new personnel expenditures and $480,000 in capital expenditures that year (all of which came from the city's hike in income taxes).
• In 2017, the Fire Department got $2.8 million in new funding from the city, which it spent on four support staff, new bulletproof vests, a new records management system, and the reopening of a downtown station. Yet another cheating scandal hit the fire department, this time over promotional exams.

That's a sad history of neglect.

But what about those vehicles? The Cleveland Division of Fire operates 35 firefighting vehicles, in addition to a number of command, support, maintenance, and specialty vehicles (such as hazmat trucks). Is the Division not getting new equipment?

It's amazingly hard to figure out when the Division of Fire gets new equipment. Jackson's Mayor's Annual Report used to document this, but he stopped putting those out in 2015. It seems, however, that 11 engines and four ladder trucks have been replaced since 2006.

Allegedly, Jackson implemented a "five year plan" in 2014 to replace firefighting vehicles in the Division of Fire.

• 2008 - Two engines, one ladder truck. (Also two command vehicles.)
• 2009 - No new vehicles. (Also one new Battalion Commander vehicle.)
• 2010 - Two engines. (Also one new Battalion Commander vehicle.)
• 2011 - One ladder truck.
• 2012 - No new vehicles.
• 2013 - No new vehicles.
• 2014 - One engine.
• 2015 - Four engines, one ladder truck. (Also one investigation and one Assistant Chief vehicle.)
• 2016 - No new vehicles.
• 2017 - Two engines, one ladder truck.

Jackson had a "five-year capital budget" from 2011 to 2016. These showed when Jackson planned for firefighting vehicles to be purchased, but his administration stopped publishing these in 2017.

• 2011 capital plan - Proposed spending zero in 2011 and $750,000 a year for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 on vehicles.
• 2012 capital plan - Proposed spending zero in 2012, 2013, and 2014, and $750,000 a year for 2015 and 2016 on vehicles.
• 2013 capital plan - Proposed spending zero in 2013 and 2014, $750,000 in 2015 and 2016, and zero in 2017 on vehicles.
• 2014 capital plan - Zero expenditures for the next five years.
• 2015 capital plan - Zero expenditures for the next five years.
• 2016 capital plan - Zero expenditures for the next five years.
• 2017 capital plan - Zero expenditures for the next five years.

It's possible Jackson put vehicle expenditures somewhere else in the budget, but the city's budget documents are notoriously absent on details.

There's very little in the way of hard data on when to replace a fire engine or ladder. The Ohio Fire Chiefs, in a 2003 report, said "tradition and personal sentiment" generally told fire departments when to replace their vehicles. (If you can believe that!) The National Fire Protection Association requires engines and ladders to pass annual service tests, but it's not clear if the Division of Fire is doing those tests or what the results are. The state of Ohio requires ladder trucks to undergo safety testing annually, but the union says that isn't happening.

Refurbishment rather than replacement of existing firefighting vehicles is possible, but once again there are no criteria, decision-making rules, or matrices to help fire departments decide when refurbishment rather than replacement is a good idea.