Ends not justifying/unjustifying the means, or, The trouble with theory
To put it simply, this danger arises from Enlightenment thinkers' insistence that truth and the consequences of truth be kept absolutely distinct -- both conceptually and emotionally. They should be kept so distinct because, logically, no assertion about the consequences (positive or negative) of a truth claim can have any implications for the truth value of that claim. The following four examples will bring this out clearly. In each of them the first assertions are standard postmodernist critiques of the "Enlightenment project" and the "Responses" (which are logically and semantically identical) are the classical Enlightenment repostes to such critiques.
1. "The enlightenment doctrine that beliefs based on 'reason' and 'science' are superior to beliefs based on 'religion' and 'superstition' has been used to justify cultural contempt of non-western societies, and processes of imperialist conquest and cultural domination."
Response: "Yes, but is that doctrine true?"
2. "The enlightenment belief that reason, and the science based on it, can be used to understand and control nature and natural forces has led to destructive abuse of the world's ecosystems and the current environmental crisis."
Response: "Yes, but is such a belief true?"
3. "The belief that there are 'natural,' biological, and evolutionary differences between the sexes has been used to justify a wide range of gender inequalities and oppressions."
Response: "Yes, but is such a belief true?"
4. "The belief that there are 'natural,' biological, and evolutionary differences among different human 'races' has been used to justify various forms of racial discrimination, oppression, and even genocide."
Response: "Yes, but is such a belief true?"
So we see that it is always possible to ask, in response to any proposition stating that a belief has had X or Y, social, political, cultural, or environmental consequences, whether, nonetheless, the belief itself is true. That is to say that beliefs A, B, or C may have had pernicious consequences X, Y, or Z, tells us nothing, in and of itself, about whether beliefs A, B, or C are true. [...]
* a belief may be true, but its truth may have been "misunderstood" or "misconstrued" by those who have acted upon it (and thus produced the consequences), or
* the alleged consequences may not be consequences of the belief at all, but developments or outcomes produced by some other factor or factors entirely, or
* the belief may be false, but acting upon it may have "accidentally," or by good fortune, produced some desirable consequences.
From The Trouble with Theory: the educational costs of postmodernism by Gavin Kitching.
1. "The enlightenment doctrine that beliefs based on 'reason' and 'science' are superior to beliefs based on 'religion' and 'superstition' has been used to justify cultural contempt of non-western societies, and processes of imperialist conquest and cultural domination."
Response: "Yes, but is that doctrine true?"
2. "The enlightenment belief that reason, and the science based on it, can be used to understand and control nature and natural forces has led to destructive abuse of the world's ecosystems and the current environmental crisis."
Response: "Yes, but is such a belief true?"
3. "The belief that there are 'natural,' biological, and evolutionary differences between the sexes has been used to justify a wide range of gender inequalities and oppressions."
Response: "Yes, but is such a belief true?"
4. "The belief that there are 'natural,' biological, and evolutionary differences among different human 'races' has been used to justify various forms of racial discrimination, oppression, and even genocide."
Response: "Yes, but is such a belief true?"
So we see that it is always possible to ask, in response to any proposition stating that a belief has had X or Y, social, political, cultural, or environmental consequences, whether, nonetheless, the belief itself is true. That is to say that beliefs A, B, or C may have had pernicious consequences X, Y, or Z, tells us nothing, in and of itself, about whether beliefs A, B, or C are true. [...]
* a belief may be true, but its truth may have been "misunderstood" or "misconstrued" by those who have acted upon it (and thus produced the consequences), or
* the alleged consequences may not be consequences of the belief at all, but developments or outcomes produced by some other factor or factors entirely, or
* the belief may be false, but acting upon it may have "accidentally," or by good fortune, produced some desirable consequences.
From The Trouble with Theory: the educational costs of postmodernism by Gavin Kitching.