Pro-choicers and pro-lifers are very similar
Yeah, I'm going to post something a little more controversial than usual (I think), but at the moment I'm not worried. I'm just glad that I finally came across a book that was actually quite fair to both main sides of the abortion debate. I think that if more people read this, there would be a lot more understanding and reasonable debate. (I mean, rather than the usual name-calling that misses the point.) Here goes.
The conventional wisdom is that the moral and legal debate over abortion is a dispute between two factions that hold incommensurable value systems. But the conventional wisdom is mistaken, for these factions hold many moral principles in common.
First, each side believes that all humans possess certain rights regardless of whether their governments protect these rights. That is why both sides appeal to what each believes is a fundamental right. The pro-life advocate appeals to "life" whereas the abortion-choice advocate appeals to "liberty" (or "choice"). Both believe that a constitutional regime, to be just, must uphold fundamental rights.
Second, each side believes that its position best exemplifies its opponent's fundamental value. The abortion-choice advocate does not deny that "life" is a value, but argues that his position's appeal to human liberty is a necessary ingredient by which an individual can pursue the fullest and most complete life possible.
On the other hand, the pro-life advocate does not eschew "liberty." She believes that all human liberty is at least limited by another human person's right to life. For example, one has a right to freely pursue any goal one believes is consistent with one's happiness, such as attending a Los Angeles Lakers basketball game. One has, however, no right to freely pursue this goal at the expense of another's life or liberty, such as running over pedestrians with one's car so that one can get to the game on time. And, of course, the pro-life advocate argues that the unborn are persons with a full right to life. And because the act of abortion typically results in the death of the unborn, abortion, with few exceptions, is not morally justified, and for that reason ought to be made illegal.
The abortion-choice advocate does not deny that human persons have a right to life. He just believes that this right to life does not extend to the unborn because they are not full members of the human community. Others, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, Eileen McDonagh, and David Boonin, argue that even if the unborn entity is a full-fledged member of the human community, he or she has no right to use the body of another against that person's will, because such a usage of another's body demands of that person great risk and sacrifice that goes beyond any ordinary moral obligation. Hence, because a pregnant woman is not morally obligated to put herself at great risk and to make a significant sacrifice for another, she is morally justified in removing her unborn offspring even if such a removal results in his or her death. The pro-life advocate does not deny that people have the liberty to make choices that they believe are in their best interests. She just believes that this liberty does not entail the right to choose abortion, for such a choice conflicts with the life, liberty, and interests of another human being (the fetus), who is defenseless, weak, and vulnerable, and has a natural claim upon its parents' care, both pre- and post-natally. Thus, when all is said and done, the debate over abortion is not really about conflicting moral systems. After all, imagine if a pro-life politician were to say the following in a campaign speech: "My party's platform affirms a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy if and only if it does not result in the death of her unborn child." Disagreement over such a plank would not be over the morality of killing human persons; it would be over the metaphysical question of whether the unborn human is included in that category.
From Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice, by Francis J. Beckwith. (Don't let this scare you if you're pro-choice. This book is highly reasonable and respectful.)
The conventional wisdom is that the moral and legal debate over abortion is a dispute between two factions that hold incommensurable value systems. But the conventional wisdom is mistaken, for these factions hold many moral principles in common.
First, each side believes that all humans possess certain rights regardless of whether their governments protect these rights. That is why both sides appeal to what each believes is a fundamental right. The pro-life advocate appeals to "life" whereas the abortion-choice advocate appeals to "liberty" (or "choice"). Both believe that a constitutional regime, to be just, must uphold fundamental rights.
Second, each side believes that its position best exemplifies its opponent's fundamental value. The abortion-choice advocate does not deny that "life" is a value, but argues that his position's appeal to human liberty is a necessary ingredient by which an individual can pursue the fullest and most complete life possible.
On the other hand, the pro-life advocate does not eschew "liberty." She believes that all human liberty is at least limited by another human person's right to life. For example, one has a right to freely pursue any goal one believes is consistent with one's happiness, such as attending a Los Angeles Lakers basketball game. One has, however, no right to freely pursue this goal at the expense of another's life or liberty, such as running over pedestrians with one's car so that one can get to the game on time. And, of course, the pro-life advocate argues that the unborn are persons with a full right to life. And because the act of abortion typically results in the death of the unborn, abortion, with few exceptions, is not morally justified, and for that reason ought to be made illegal.
The abortion-choice advocate does not deny that human persons have a right to life. He just believes that this right to life does not extend to the unborn because they are not full members of the human community. Others, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, Eileen McDonagh, and David Boonin, argue that even if the unborn entity is a full-fledged member of the human community, he or she has no right to use the body of another against that person's will, because such a usage of another's body demands of that person great risk and sacrifice that goes beyond any ordinary moral obligation. Hence, because a pregnant woman is not morally obligated to put herself at great risk and to make a significant sacrifice for another, she is morally justified in removing her unborn offspring even if such a removal results in his or her death. The pro-life advocate does not deny that people have the liberty to make choices that they believe are in their best interests. She just believes that this liberty does not entail the right to choose abortion, for such a choice conflicts with the life, liberty, and interests of another human being (the fetus), who is defenseless, weak, and vulnerable, and has a natural claim upon its parents' care, both pre- and post-natally. Thus, when all is said and done, the debate over abortion is not really about conflicting moral systems. After all, imagine if a pro-life politician were to say the following in a campaign speech: "My party's platform affirms a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy if and only if it does not result in the death of her unborn child." Disagreement over such a plank would not be over the morality of killing human persons; it would be over the metaphysical question of whether the unborn human is included in that category.
From Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice, by Francis J. Beckwith. (Don't let this scare you if you're pro-choice. This book is highly reasonable and respectful.)