Helping friends you deeply love with the process of moving is the most melancholy event one can experience, especially when you know despite what is said between you, that you won't see each other again
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Re: descartesthefacadeAugust 15 2008, 06:11:36 UTC
Scientists know that life is merely a state in which matter is organized in a particular manner and gains the ability to replicate itself and carry on particular biological functions. Therefore, science now has the ability to explain the fundamental properties of life in terms of purely physical scientific processes. Therefore, is it so far outside the realm of possibility that it will someday be the case for mental processes as well? What I do not understand in conversations like these is why individuals cannot seem to comprehend the possibility that they are nothing more than the sum of cells reacting to the environment.The fundamental definition of life is merely a continued reaction to change, and human life is no different. It seems to me that the only difference between human existence and the existence of animals is the amount of information that humans can use when priming memories. Ask yourself if there is any difference between your memory and your imagination, your brain doesn't know the difference. Is it really so outside the realm of possibility that Jeff Watson isn't really an individual but rather a culmination of experiences made by a specific biological vessel? In regards to your argument about pain not being identical to particular neurons firing, I'd ask why the two can't be identical? It has been shown that the two events coincide with each other and scientists have discovered that certain individuals born with conditions like CIPA prevent them from ever feeling pain at all because they lack the particular neurons that would normally fire to cause pain. In terms of your mention of scientists not being capable of dismissing the notions of the souls existence, I would question that logic as the basis of ontology is fundamentally scientific and relies off of nothing other than the ability to measure correlations between occurring events that cause measurable change. When I mentioned mental events not causing physical changes I meant simply in the sense that the intangible mind has never been shown to be able to cause physical changes in the brain. For instance, you may be able to think about standing up and then do it. However, that is all explainable through physical properties. You cannot however, will your self to cause a biological change in your brain that would change the way you think, that is only accomplished through physical experiences.
the nature of sciencektlAugust 15 2008, 19:38:05 UTC
But I have to disagree - Science can't know that life is "merely" anything. It can know that life involves matter organized in a particular manner, but it can't claim to give any "complete" answer to a question such as "what is life?", it can't use words like "merely".
Science can't even give an adequate answer to the question "What is this sliver of wood?" If a chemist claimed that "this sliver of wood is merely a particular concoction of molecules", he would be wrong. Why? Because a physicist could reply "no, this sliver of wood is an arrangement of atoms with various numbers of electrons in constant flux." And a biologist could object that "No, this sliver of wood is merely a particular arrangement of a certain type of cells." And a botanist could object that "no, this sliver of wood is merely a piece of a pine tree from a particular species with a particular genetic code". And of course a dentist would say "No, this sliver of wood is merely a toothpick for cleaning my teeth."
Words like "merely" or "only" don't apply to scientific conclusions. Science does not aim to boil things down to discover their true "essences" independent of all human experience. In place of trying to determine what "really" is the case, empiricism changed the world by just trying to find the patterns in repeated observable events. It's interest isn't in some sort of final "truth" but rather in maximizing simplicity, coherence, and predictive power.
With that context . . . I agree of course that cognitive science could succeed in providing an explanation for mental processes which uses only the terms of chemistry, or physics, or some other language game. But would that be a complete explanation of what we mean by "mind" that would make all language games we use for talking about the mind outdated? It doesn't seem that way to me -- no more than "continued reaction to change" comes close to getting at the complex and rich meanings we associate with the word "life".
In the same way, taking "Jeff Watson is the culmination of experiences made by a specific biological vessel", this phrase is no closer to reality than "Jeff Watson is an individual" or "Jeff Watson is a camcorder in the middle of an carbon sandwich". All of these phrases are metaphors -- there is no such thing as a "biological vessel" any more than there is a "carbon sandwich" or an "individual". All of these are human interpretive acts imposed on top of reality so that we can understand it better.
So, getting back to the mind question . . . the very statement that "some person does not feel pain because he lacks certain neurons" would contradict the statement that "pain is just neurons firing". Of course, if pain equals neurons firing, there would be no way to test for pain except to look at neurons, and there would be no "person" involved "feeling" the pain. Just because X implies Y and Y implies X does not mean that X = Y, this is a basic rule of logic.
All this sums up why I don't think science can comment on ontological questions -- it can't say what exists or not, it can only describe the relations between the things we tell it that exist. No amount of empirical observation and data would be enough to conclude that the two of the floating orbs of carbon-compounds in your house are "dogs" since one cannot observe the concept of a "dog" (for that matter, one can't observe the concept of "carbon" or the concept of an "atom"). Only a human interpreter can say whether dogs exist or not. The same would apply to the soul, wouldn't it?
In terms of your mention of scientists not being capable of dismissing the notions of the souls existence, I would question that logic as the basis of ontology is fundamentally scientific and relies off of nothing other than the ability to measure correlations between occurring events that cause measurable change.
When I mentioned mental events not causing physical changes I meant simply in the sense that the intangible mind has never been shown to be able to cause physical changes in the brain. For instance, you may be able to think about standing up and then do it. However, that is all explainable through physical properties. You cannot however, will your self to cause a biological change in your brain that would change the way you think, that is only accomplished through physical experiences.
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Science can't even give an adequate answer to the question "What is this sliver of wood?" If a chemist claimed that "this sliver of wood is merely a particular concoction of molecules", he would be wrong. Why? Because a physicist could reply "no, this sliver of wood is an arrangement of atoms with various numbers of electrons in constant flux." And a biologist could object that "No, this sliver of wood is merely a particular arrangement of a certain type of cells." And a botanist could object that "no, this sliver of wood is merely a piece of a pine tree from a particular species with a particular genetic code". And of course a dentist would say "No, this sliver of wood is merely a toothpick for cleaning my teeth."
Words like "merely" or "only" don't apply to scientific conclusions. Science does not aim to boil things down to discover their true "essences" independent of all human experience. In place of trying to determine what "really" is the case, empiricism changed the world by just trying to find the patterns in repeated observable events. It's interest isn't in some sort of final "truth" but rather in maximizing simplicity, coherence, and predictive power.
With that context . . . I agree of course that cognitive science could succeed in providing an explanation for mental processes which uses only the terms of chemistry, or physics, or some other language game. But would that be a complete explanation of what we mean by "mind" that would make all language games we use for talking about the mind outdated? It doesn't seem that way to me -- no more than "continued reaction to change" comes close to getting at the complex and rich meanings we associate with the word "life".
In the same way, taking "Jeff Watson is the culmination of experiences made by a specific biological vessel", this phrase is no closer to reality than "Jeff Watson is an individual" or "Jeff Watson is a camcorder in the middle of an carbon sandwich". All of these phrases are metaphors -- there is no such thing as a "biological vessel" any more than there is a "carbon sandwich" or an "individual". All of these are human interpretive acts imposed on top of reality so that we can understand it better.
So, getting back to the mind question . . . the very statement that "some person does not feel pain because he lacks certain neurons" would contradict the statement that "pain is just neurons firing". Of course, if pain equals neurons firing, there would be no way to test for pain except to look at neurons, and there would be no "person" involved "feeling" the pain. Just because X implies Y and Y implies X does not mean that X = Y, this is a basic rule of logic.
All this sums up why I don't think science can comment on ontological questions -- it can't say what exists or not, it can only describe the relations between the things we tell it that exist. No amount of empirical observation and data would be enough to conclude that the two of the floating orbs of carbon-compounds in your house are "dogs" since one cannot observe the concept of a "dog" (for that matter, one can't observe the concept of "carbon" or the concept of an "atom"). Only a human interpreter can say whether dogs exist or not. The same would apply to the soul, wouldn't it?
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