(no subject)
I spent my weekend writing a 4000-5000 word research paper. I haven't slept since Saturday.
Human Rights Abuses by the Tatmadaw in Myanmar
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person” (United Nations 1948). As a member of the United Nations, Myanmar is obligated to uphold all principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however, the policies of the government of Myanmar seem to contradict this in many ways. Myanmar’s history of human rights abuses is long and well documented. After coming under military rule in 1958, the country’s economic and social conditions spiralled downwards until it was listed as one of the United Nations’ Least Developed Countries in December 1987 (Smith 1994). The nation has been in turmoil ever since its independence from Britain in 1948, which has resulted in an oppressive military government that frequently abuses human rights in order to maintain control. While violations of basic human rights are nothing new to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta that rules Myanmar, the degree to which the SPDC employs human rights abuses to oppress its people is a matter of debate.
The focus of this paper’s inquiry is the extent to which human rights abuses by the Tatmadaw, the army of Myanmar, are systematic. A brief historical background will be provided to give context to the issue and explain how the current situation in Myanmar arose, while the body of the paper will deal with the human rights abuses committed most commonly by the Tatmadaw: rape, forced labour, and forced relocations. Each abuse will be discussed in detail and the extent to which it is used systematically will be analyzed. The final part of the paper will include conclusions and a discussion of the implications of the paper’s findings.
Many of Myanmar’s current problems and human rights abuses can be viewed in relation to its history. It is essential to have a firm grasp of Myanmar’s history to comprehend its present situation.
Historical background
For most of its known history, Burma’s various ethnic groups have lived with war (Smith 1994). Power often changed hands among ethnic groups (Smith 1994) and a sense of national unity was never really achieved until the late 18th century (Silverstein 1980), when Burman ruler Alaunghpaya took control of most of the territories that would become modern-day Burma (Smith 1994). In 1885 the British took control of Burma and annexed it as a province of the British Indian empire (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). The British’s ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics served only to inflame historic ethnic tensions between groups (Smith 1994). These tensions and their effects can still be seen in modern-day Burma.
During their rule, the British set up a two-tier system of administration in Burma: one for ‘Ministerial Burma,’ which was dominated by the Burman majority, and one for the ‘Frontier Areas,’ where most ethnic minorities resided (Smith 1994). This division would influence the political and economic development of both groups to a great degree (Smith 1994). The two-tier system also meant that Burma was left without a ‘symbol of indigenous authority’ (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). During the early part of the twentieth century steps were made towards independence until finally, in 1948, Burma seceded from the British Empire (Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
Burma’s early years were tumultuous. Communist insurrection was common and the Burmese government was faced with the problem of forming a unified nation (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). In an effort to regain some control of the country and quell the violent outbreaks that were occurring, the previously apolitical military took on the role of caretaker government (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Civilian rule was restored in 1960, but the military retained significant political power and seized control of the government in 1962 by staging a coup d’état (Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
Under its new ruler, the General Ne Win, Burma’s constitution, as well as all legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, were abolished (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Instead, Ne Win set up a Revolutionary Council comprised mainly of military officers, which conferred on him, as Chairman, all legislative, judicial and executive power (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). He outlawed all political parties other than his own Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which was immune to criticism, and outlawed hundreds of political leaders and activists without trial (Smith 1994). Any resistance or demonstrations against the government were brutally crushed by the military, which readily opened fire on demonstrators (Smith 1991). Ne Win’s government had a two-fold strategy: to crush the insurgencies in the rural countryside, and to establish a “centralized, one-party system of government radiating out from Rangoon into the ethnic minority states” (Smith 1994). It was under this strategy, titled the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,’ that many human rights violations that would later become hallmarks of the Burmese military, such as compulsory relocation, involuntary conscription, and forced labour, first became systematized (Smith 1994).
Continued social and economic degradation led to one of the most publicized events in Burmese history, the uprising of the summer of 1988. On August 8th, 1988, hundreds of thousands of Burmese participated in peaceful demonstrations in Rangoon, demanding an end to the military regime and calling for the restoration of civil and political rights (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). The army’s attempts to crush this opposition resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, most of whom were students and monks (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Further demands for democracy were met with more brutality, and on September 18th the army announced a coup, renaming itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) (Schairer-Vertannes, 2001). An estimated 10, 000 people were killed in the violence that ensued (Smith 1991). With the SLORC came some of the most brutal and horrific human rights abuses in the history of Myanmar.
Rape and Sexual Violence
Since 1948, there have been frequent reports of rape by government troops in war-zones and occupied territory (Smith 1994). These reports occur mainly in areas inhabited predominantly by ethnic minorities (Smith 1994). According to a report released in 2002 by the United States’ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “rape of ethnic women by the SPDC troops … was prevalent in Karen, Mon and Karenni regions,” with the most frequent rapes occurring in the Shan, Karenni, and Karen States (United States 2002). Women in these areas are often the head of their families, their husbands having been the victims of ill health, war, or forced labour (Smith 1994). Thus, an assault against them is an assault against the entire family. In Myanmar there is a great social stigma attached to rape, and many rape victims do not report incidents of sexual violence, as the humiliation that accompanies it is often as traumatizing as the rape itself (Smith 1994). Rape, however, is not always a standalone abuse.
Rape is often used in conjunction with forced labour. As has been reported by both Asia Watch and Amnesty International, many rapes occur after husbands or fathers of the women have been taken for forced labour (Smith 1994). Particularly disturbing were the mass rapes among Muslim women from the Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships in Rakhine State during 1991-1992 (Smith 1994). Some rapes were committed in the women’s homes, with children and relatives present; for others, women would be taken to local military bases and raped repeatedly, in some cases for as long as four months (Smith 1994). Troops will also rape women on compulsory labour tours, such as in the case reported by Anti-Slavery International of six different women who fled to the Thai border in 1992 (Smith 1994).
A report by the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) alleged that the military used rape as a systematic weapon of war, citing the frequency, brutality, rank of those who committed the rapes, and impunity with which they were carried out the crimes as the basis for their reasoning (SWAN 2001). The report notes 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by Burmese soldiers in the Shan State between 1996-2001 (SWAN 2001). Soldiers from 52 different battalions committed these attacks against 625 women (SWAN 2001). Eighty-three percent of rapists were officers, and twenty-five percent of the rapes resulted in death (United States 2002). Based on this, SWAN argues that “the Burmese military is allowing its troops systematically and on a widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan State” (SWAN 2001). This report was corroborated by many first hand accounts from rape victims (United States 2002). Despite these findings, the SPDC rejected this report, finding no instance of rape after launching three internal reviews (United States 2002).
The frequency and impunity with which rape occurs, let alone the rank of the officers that most often commit it, are enough to suggest that it is sanctioned by the SPDC. As outlined in SWAN’s report, rape is a systematic method of subjugating, terrorizing and controlling ethnic minorities in Myanmar.
Forced Labour, Portering, and Conscription
Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment” (United Nations 1948). This is not the case in Myanmar. Despite having ratified the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 29, which prohibits recourse to all forms of forced or compulsory labour, Myanmar has failed to meet its requirements (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Forced labour, portering, and conscription are widespread and regular practises common to all areas of the country where there is a strong Tatmadaw presence. The period of service for this labour can last months and, in extreme cases, years (Smith 1994). At a moment’s notice, civilians can be taken from their homes and forced to construct roads, barracks, and other military infrastructure. Citizens may be taken as porters and forced to carry heavy loads for days or weeks at a time (Amnesty International 2005). Finally, citizens may also be forced into military service without prior notice (United States 2002). The people most often targeted for these duties are ethnic minorities in the border regions of Myanmar, where insurgencies against the SPDC are strongest (Smith 1994). Men, women, and children alike are forced into service, and are almost never compensated for their work (United States 2002).
The practise of unpaid forced labour remains a pervasive and severe problem in Myanmar. Although the penal code provides for the punishment of those who impose forced labour on others, there are no known cases of it being applied (United States 2002). In direct defiance of this law, a forced labour quota is placed on each household in a village by the SPDC. Households must send the quoted number of people to perform the forced labour or face the repercussions (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Children are almost always sent, as they are usually the least productive members in each household (United States 2002). Civilians who refuse to comply with the Tatmadaw’s demands for forced labour face punishment, usually in the form of severe beatings (Amnesty International 2005), although rape and killings are common as well (United States 2002). If citizens are wealthy enough, they are sometimes able to bribe officials to evade having to perform their labour duties (Amnesty International 2005). When adults are unable to work, the Tatmadaw will sometimes conscript children (Amnesty International 2005).
The most common form of forced labour is the construction and maintenance of roads (Amnesty International 2005). Civilians must maintain these roads on a regular basis, and often must rebuild them after the rainy season, which can completely destroy them (Amnesty International 2005). International observers have noted that the government routinely “force[s] citizens to work on infrastructure, construction and maintenance projects” (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Myanmar lacks labour standards and protections for workers, as well as any form of labour unions (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Rural and ethnic populations are most often the victims of forced labour (Schairer-Vertannes 2001), with the use of child labourers being the most serious problem (United States 2002). Border regions are the most heavily affected, particularly the area that borders on Thailand (United States 2002). Forced labour is not exclusive to border regions, however, as the International Labour Organization reported that it had received allegations of forced labour from around the country (United States 2002).
Previously, only areas of counter-insurgency had a heavy Tatmadaw presence (United States 2002). Since the junta has come to ceasefires with a number of militant groups, however, the Tatamadaw’s presence throughout Myanmar has grown.
The spread of the Tatmadaw throughout Myanmar has seen an increase in forced labour (Amnesty International 2005). As Tatmadaw control expands throughout Myanmar, so does their need for barracks, military buildings, motor and railroads, and other infrastructure. The Tatmadaw force ethnic minorities to build all these things as well as work on military farms to help supply food for the army (Amnesty International 2005). Forced construction, however, is not the only form of forced labour that the Tatmadaw performs.
Forced portering is the practise of forcing people to carry heavy loads for extended periods of time. In war-zones, civilians can be forced to carry arms and ammunition into dangerous front-line areas (Smith 1994). Men, women, and children are all conscripted to work as porters (United States 2002). In areas where landmines are suspected to be, porters are sent ahead of soldiers as minesweepers (Smith 1994). On average, there is one porter per soldier in war-zones (Smith 1994). Porters are often mistreated, beatings are a frequent occurrence, and porters are provided with very little, if any, food or drink (Smith, 1994). Those who are too sick, weak, or wounded to carry on are executed or left for dead (United States, 2002), and female porters are often raped (Smith, 1994). Child porters are forced to carry the equivalent of 6 cans of milk, or 10 mortar rounds for days on end (United States, 2002). If they cannot move fast enough, they are beaten (United States, 2002). While ethnic minorities formed the largest number of porters, members of the Burmese majority were also forced into portering (Smith 1994).
In addition to forced labour and portering, the government has also implemented compulsory military training for civilians since May 2003 (United Nations, 2004). All government employees and their families, as well as members of the general population with no links to government service can be required to attend military training sessions lasting one month part-time or two weeks full-time (United Nations, 2004). Every township must send between 18 and 40 people to this training; the people are usually men, but sometimes women are required as well (United Nations, 2004). Civilians are not compensated for their time and, in some cases, have been required to cover training costs (United Nations, 2004). After completing the training, citizens’ names are registered and they may be called upon to serve at any time (United Nations, 2004).
Not only does the SPDC forcibly recruit adult citizens, it conscripts children as well. There have been numerous allegations of boys from fourteen to sixteen years old being sent to support military activities in ethnic areas (United Nations, 2004). Due to their young age the boys were not put into combat, but were rather assigned to guard duty or carrying equipment (United Nations, 2004). Although this practise has been increasing since 2002 (United Nations 2004), there is evidence that boys have been recruited from as early as 1988 (Smith 1994). Orders issued by the SPDC state that every village must supply one youth per one hundred houses in the village, up to a maximum of five youths for villages of more than four hundred houses, to join the Tatmadaws (Smith 1994). According to UNICEF, boys as young as 14 can be ‘informally conscripted’ into the army (Smith 1994). UNICEF has also discovered the presence of at least one residential military camp in the Shan State where children as young as seven have been recruited for a future life with the Tatmadaw (Smith 1994). There is an obvious methodology to this recruitment that has been condoned by the SPDC, and, without some form of intervention, will continue.
Forced labour is present in many forms in Myanmar. Whether it appears as involuntary construction, portering, or conscription, the use of forced labour clearly contravenes Myanmar’s laws as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Myanmar has ratified. The widespread and frequent use of forced labour, the impunity with which the Tatmadaw act and the blatant disregard of both national and international law suggest that the practise of forced labour is not only sanctioned by the government, but promoted by it as well.
Forced Relocation
Probably the most damaging and divisive human rights abuse carried out by the Tatmadaw is that of forced relocations, as it not only uproots people, but can also involve rape, sexual abuse and forced labour. Forced relocation in Myanmar began under Ne Win’s ‘Four Cuts’ campaign. The campaign, which was instituted shortly after he came to power in 1962, has a very simple strategy: to cut off the four main links - food, finance, intelligence, and recruits - between civilians and armed opposition forces (Smith 1994). Although forced relocation is nothing new to the people of Myanmar, its frequency has increased in the past two decades. Between 1990 and 1999, the Tatmadaw forcefully relocated some four million people for the purposes of natural gas exploration, pipeline projects of multinational oil corporations, and infrastructure development programmes (Maung 1999). Most notable were the relocations of 1996, when hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities were forcibly removed from their homes in the Shan, Kayah, and Kayin States (Amnesty International 2005). As with forced labour human rights abuses, the majority of those affected by forced relocation are Myanmar’s ethnic minorities (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Forced relocations appear to be carried out solely because of the ethnic origin or political beliefs of those being relocated (Amnesty International 1997).
House destruction and land confiscation occur more frequently in areas of counter-insurgency than in peaceful areas (Amnesty International 2005). In these areas, rapes and executions often accompany forced relocations (United States 2002). Refusal to comply with relocation orders can often result in death, as the Tatmadaw have orders to shoot and arrest any persons who remain nearby or in the village in question (Smith 1994). The primary goal of forced relocation is to prevent aid to opposition forces (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). As mentioned earlier, it achieves this through forced relocation by cutting crucial links such as food, finances, communications and recruits to opposition groups (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). In addition to disrupting insurgents, forced relocation also provides a steady stream of labourers for the army’s forced labour programmes (Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
In addition to the reasons laid out by the Four Cuts campaign, villagers are also relocated to ‘new towns’ to make way for commercial or public construction or for internal security and political control (United States 2002). ‘New towns’ generally suffered from greatly reduced infrastructure (United States 2002) and health workers have reported high fatality rates due to poor sanitation (Smith 1994). Compensation is offered occasionally, but is grossly inadequate as citizens are offered much less than market value for their property and are required to pay for plots of land in the new satellite towns (Hudson-Rod, 2005). Unemployment rates of up to eighty percent are common in satellite towns (Smith 1994).
In addition to forcing civilians to relocate, military units routinely confiscate “livestock, fuel, food supplies, fishponds, alcoholic drinks, vehicles and money” (United States 2002). Confiscations of property have been common since 1988, but widespread only since 1997, when the SPDC ordered regional commanders to meet their logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the government (United States 2002). The Tatmadaw loot and confiscate property from forcibly relocated persons or persons who are simply away from their homes (United States 2002). In an average relocation, villagers lose their land, their houses, and most if not all of their property (Amnesty International 2005). Entire villages are razed and all property is burned (United States 2002).
A typical relocation unfolds in the following sequence: a notice is posted informing villagers that they must either vacate the village or relocate to a ‘new town’ by a certain date (Smith 1994). Those who fail to comply will be shot or arrested (United States 2003). Once that date is reached, Tatmadaw forces will move into the region, confiscating anything of use (i.e. food, water, livestock, and supplies) and destroying the rest (United States, 2002). Currently, relocation programmes take place in two contexts: as ‘redevelopment’ programmes in urban areas, and as part of counter-insurgency operations in ethnic minority areas, with the ‘Four Cuts’ programme at the heart of both methods (Smith 1994). Although most of the recent relocations have been against ethnic minorities, virtually every group, including the Burman majority, has been subject to forced relocation (Smith 1994). This upset has created a new social order: when relocated, those that can afford to move to a better village do so; those that cannot are sent to less desirable locations, and often end up constantly subject to demands for unpaid labour (Smith 1994). Forced relocation is perhaps Myanmar’s oldest, most systematically abused human rights violation.
Forced relocation is the most terrible of the abuses that the Tatmadaw inflict upon the people of Myanmar. Not only are the relocated left penniless and without a means of gaining a living, the practise is socially divisive and can include other abuses such as forced labour and rape. The continued, widespread, and frequent occurrences of forcible relocation and the similarities between incidents suggest that forcible relocation is no simple government programme, but a systematic method for controlling minorities and limiting ties to opposition groups. Indeed, this was the goal of Ne Win’s original ‘Four Cuts’ programme. Many of those who are relocated end up destitute and worse off than they were before relocation.
Conclusions and Discussion
It is readily apparent that human rights abuses are nothing new to the military of Myanmar. They have been the norm for over forty years, and are an entrenched part of the Tatmadaw’s culture. Various human rights abuses have become a systematic way for the military to oppress the people of Myanmar. While the SPDC suppresses the rights of the Burmese people in many ways, few methods are as invasive, violent, and brutal as those directly conducted by the Tatmadaw. Systematic rape of ethnic minorities as a means of subjugating the people causes irreparable damage to many women and girls, as well as their families. Forced labour, conscription, and portering break up families and strips the people of Myanmar of their dignity. Finally, forced relocations and confiscation of property disrupt the natural social order and can leave many penniless and without a means of earning a living.
Despite a large body of evidence showing that the Tatmadaw are guilty of numerous systematic human rights abuses, the international community has remained largely silent. Although the United States and European Union have imposed harsh economic sanctions, those only hurt the most vulnerable of Myanmar’s people (United Nations 2004). Though the people of Myanmar may unite to overthrow the present government, this scenario would only work if the Tatmadaw were not prepared to combat their fellow citizens; however, they clearly are (Clark 1999). Many NGOs are hesitant to work in Myanmar for fear of that doing so will give legitimacy to the SPDC (Economist, 2001).
In 2001, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the special rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, acknowledged that there had been “positive signals” that indicated the “government’s efforts to make progress in its human rights record” (Maung Than 2002). These efforts were generally focused on moving towards democracy, rather than stopping human rights abuses committed by the Tatmadaw. Although the SPDC revealed a seven-point roadmap towards democracy in 2003 (Economist 2005) and has released over four thousand prisoners since 2000 (Economist 2004), progress towards democracy is slow, and pressure from the Western world appears to have done little to expedite the process (Economist 2005).
Myanmar is set to become president of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2006, which is making some of the group’s more progressive members uneasy (Economist 2004). Although ASEAN refuses to use economic sanctions against Myanmar, they do have the political clout to help move the country in a new direction (Economist 2001). The group’s policy of non-interference has also been ineffective (Economist 2003), and it is not clear what will be effective in a nation where the government has such disregard for its citizens. As shown by the country’s overwhelming support of the National League for Democracy in the 1990 general elections, the will of the people is behind the democratic movement, not a military junta (Economist 2005). All that remains is for the government to follow.
Human Rights Abuses by the Tatmadaw in Myanmar
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person” (United Nations 1948). As a member of the United Nations, Myanmar is obligated to uphold all principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however, the policies of the government of Myanmar seem to contradict this in many ways. Myanmar’s history of human rights abuses is long and well documented. After coming under military rule in 1958, the country’s economic and social conditions spiralled downwards until it was listed as one of the United Nations’ Least Developed Countries in December 1987 (Smith 1994). The nation has been in turmoil ever since its independence from Britain in 1948, which has resulted in an oppressive military government that frequently abuses human rights in order to maintain control. While violations of basic human rights are nothing new to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta that rules Myanmar, the degree to which the SPDC employs human rights abuses to oppress its people is a matter of debate.
The focus of this paper’s inquiry is the extent to which human rights abuses by the Tatmadaw, the army of Myanmar, are systematic. A brief historical background will be provided to give context to the issue and explain how the current situation in Myanmar arose, while the body of the paper will deal with the human rights abuses committed most commonly by the Tatmadaw: rape, forced labour, and forced relocations. Each abuse will be discussed in detail and the extent to which it is used systematically will be analyzed. The final part of the paper will include conclusions and a discussion of the implications of the paper’s findings.
Many of Myanmar’s current problems and human rights abuses can be viewed in relation to its history. It is essential to have a firm grasp of Myanmar’s history to comprehend its present situation.
Historical background
For most of its known history, Burma’s various ethnic groups have lived with war (Smith 1994). Power often changed hands among ethnic groups (Smith 1994) and a sense of national unity was never really achieved until the late 18th century (Silverstein 1980), when Burman ruler Alaunghpaya took control of most of the territories that would become modern-day Burma (Smith 1994). In 1885 the British took control of Burma and annexed it as a province of the British Indian empire (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). The British’s ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics served only to inflame historic ethnic tensions between groups (Smith 1994). These tensions and their effects can still be seen in modern-day Burma.
During their rule, the British set up a two-tier system of administration in Burma: one for ‘Ministerial Burma,’ which was dominated by the Burman majority, and one for the ‘Frontier Areas,’ where most ethnic minorities resided (Smith 1994). This division would influence the political and economic development of both groups to a great degree (Smith 1994). The two-tier system also meant that Burma was left without a ‘symbol of indigenous authority’ (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). During the early part of the twentieth century steps were made towards independence until finally, in 1948, Burma seceded from the British Empire (Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
Burma’s early years were tumultuous. Communist insurrection was common and the Burmese government was faced with the problem of forming a unified nation (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). In an effort to regain some control of the country and quell the violent outbreaks that were occurring, the previously apolitical military took on the role of caretaker government (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Civilian rule was restored in 1960, but the military retained significant political power and seized control of the government in 1962 by staging a coup d’état (Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
Under its new ruler, the General Ne Win, Burma’s constitution, as well as all legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, were abolished (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Instead, Ne Win set up a Revolutionary Council comprised mainly of military officers, which conferred on him, as Chairman, all legislative, judicial and executive power (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). He outlawed all political parties other than his own Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which was immune to criticism, and outlawed hundreds of political leaders and activists without trial (Smith 1994). Any resistance or demonstrations against the government were brutally crushed by the military, which readily opened fire on demonstrators (Smith 1991). Ne Win’s government had a two-fold strategy: to crush the insurgencies in the rural countryside, and to establish a “centralized, one-party system of government radiating out from Rangoon into the ethnic minority states” (Smith 1994). It was under this strategy, titled the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,’ that many human rights violations that would later become hallmarks of the Burmese military, such as compulsory relocation, involuntary conscription, and forced labour, first became systematized (Smith 1994).
Continued social and economic degradation led to one of the most publicized events in Burmese history, the uprising of the summer of 1988. On August 8th, 1988, hundreds of thousands of Burmese participated in peaceful demonstrations in Rangoon, demanding an end to the military regime and calling for the restoration of civil and political rights (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). The army’s attempts to crush this opposition resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, most of whom were students and monks (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Further demands for democracy were met with more brutality, and on September 18th the army announced a coup, renaming itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) (Schairer-Vertannes, 2001). An estimated 10, 000 people were killed in the violence that ensued (Smith 1991). With the SLORC came some of the most brutal and horrific human rights abuses in the history of Myanmar.
Rape and Sexual Violence
Since 1948, there have been frequent reports of rape by government troops in war-zones and occupied territory (Smith 1994). These reports occur mainly in areas inhabited predominantly by ethnic minorities (Smith 1994). According to a report released in 2002 by the United States’ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “rape of ethnic women by the SPDC troops … was prevalent in Karen, Mon and Karenni regions,” with the most frequent rapes occurring in the Shan, Karenni, and Karen States (United States 2002). Women in these areas are often the head of their families, their husbands having been the victims of ill health, war, or forced labour (Smith 1994). Thus, an assault against them is an assault against the entire family. In Myanmar there is a great social stigma attached to rape, and many rape victims do not report incidents of sexual violence, as the humiliation that accompanies it is often as traumatizing as the rape itself (Smith 1994). Rape, however, is not always a standalone abuse.
Rape is often used in conjunction with forced labour. As has been reported by both Asia Watch and Amnesty International, many rapes occur after husbands or fathers of the women have been taken for forced labour (Smith 1994). Particularly disturbing were the mass rapes among Muslim women from the Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships in Rakhine State during 1991-1992 (Smith 1994). Some rapes were committed in the women’s homes, with children and relatives present; for others, women would be taken to local military bases and raped repeatedly, in some cases for as long as four months (Smith 1994). Troops will also rape women on compulsory labour tours, such as in the case reported by Anti-Slavery International of six different women who fled to the Thai border in 1992 (Smith 1994).
A report by the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) alleged that the military used rape as a systematic weapon of war, citing the frequency, brutality, rank of those who committed the rapes, and impunity with which they were carried out the crimes as the basis for their reasoning (SWAN 2001). The report notes 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by Burmese soldiers in the Shan State between 1996-2001 (SWAN 2001). Soldiers from 52 different battalions committed these attacks against 625 women (SWAN 2001). Eighty-three percent of rapists were officers, and twenty-five percent of the rapes resulted in death (United States 2002). Based on this, SWAN argues that “the Burmese military is allowing its troops systematically and on a widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan State” (SWAN 2001). This report was corroborated by many first hand accounts from rape victims (United States 2002). Despite these findings, the SPDC rejected this report, finding no instance of rape after launching three internal reviews (United States 2002).
The frequency and impunity with which rape occurs, let alone the rank of the officers that most often commit it, are enough to suggest that it is sanctioned by the SPDC. As outlined in SWAN’s report, rape is a systematic method of subjugating, terrorizing and controlling ethnic minorities in Myanmar.
Forced Labour, Portering, and Conscription
Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment” (United Nations 1948). This is not the case in Myanmar. Despite having ratified the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 29, which prohibits recourse to all forms of forced or compulsory labour, Myanmar has failed to meet its requirements (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Forced labour, portering, and conscription are widespread and regular practises common to all areas of the country where there is a strong Tatmadaw presence. The period of service for this labour can last months and, in extreme cases, years (Smith 1994). At a moment’s notice, civilians can be taken from their homes and forced to construct roads, barracks, and other military infrastructure. Citizens may be taken as porters and forced to carry heavy loads for days or weeks at a time (Amnesty International 2005). Finally, citizens may also be forced into military service without prior notice (United States 2002). The people most often targeted for these duties are ethnic minorities in the border regions of Myanmar, where insurgencies against the SPDC are strongest (Smith 1994). Men, women, and children alike are forced into service, and are almost never compensated for their work (United States 2002).
The practise of unpaid forced labour remains a pervasive and severe problem in Myanmar. Although the penal code provides for the punishment of those who impose forced labour on others, there are no known cases of it being applied (United States 2002). In direct defiance of this law, a forced labour quota is placed on each household in a village by the SPDC. Households must send the quoted number of people to perform the forced labour or face the repercussions (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Children are almost always sent, as they are usually the least productive members in each household (United States 2002). Civilians who refuse to comply with the Tatmadaw’s demands for forced labour face punishment, usually in the form of severe beatings (Amnesty International 2005), although rape and killings are common as well (United States 2002). If citizens are wealthy enough, they are sometimes able to bribe officials to evade having to perform their labour duties (Amnesty International 2005). When adults are unable to work, the Tatmadaw will sometimes conscript children (Amnesty International 2005).
The most common form of forced labour is the construction and maintenance of roads (Amnesty International 2005). Civilians must maintain these roads on a regular basis, and often must rebuild them after the rainy season, which can completely destroy them (Amnesty International 2005). International observers have noted that the government routinely “force[s] citizens to work on infrastructure, construction and maintenance projects” (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Myanmar lacks labour standards and protections for workers, as well as any form of labour unions (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Rural and ethnic populations are most often the victims of forced labour (Schairer-Vertannes 2001), with the use of child labourers being the most serious problem (United States 2002). Border regions are the most heavily affected, particularly the area that borders on Thailand (United States 2002). Forced labour is not exclusive to border regions, however, as the International Labour Organization reported that it had received allegations of forced labour from around the country (United States 2002).
Previously, only areas of counter-insurgency had a heavy Tatmadaw presence (United States 2002). Since the junta has come to ceasefires with a number of militant groups, however, the Tatamadaw’s presence throughout Myanmar has grown.
The spread of the Tatmadaw throughout Myanmar has seen an increase in forced labour (Amnesty International 2005). As Tatmadaw control expands throughout Myanmar, so does their need for barracks, military buildings, motor and railroads, and other infrastructure. The Tatmadaw force ethnic minorities to build all these things as well as work on military farms to help supply food for the army (Amnesty International 2005). Forced construction, however, is not the only form of forced labour that the Tatmadaw performs.
Forced portering is the practise of forcing people to carry heavy loads for extended periods of time. In war-zones, civilians can be forced to carry arms and ammunition into dangerous front-line areas (Smith 1994). Men, women, and children are all conscripted to work as porters (United States 2002). In areas where landmines are suspected to be, porters are sent ahead of soldiers as minesweepers (Smith 1994). On average, there is one porter per soldier in war-zones (Smith 1994). Porters are often mistreated, beatings are a frequent occurrence, and porters are provided with very little, if any, food or drink (Smith, 1994). Those who are too sick, weak, or wounded to carry on are executed or left for dead (United States, 2002), and female porters are often raped (Smith, 1994). Child porters are forced to carry the equivalent of 6 cans of milk, or 10 mortar rounds for days on end (United States, 2002). If they cannot move fast enough, they are beaten (United States, 2002). While ethnic minorities formed the largest number of porters, members of the Burmese majority were also forced into portering (Smith 1994).
In addition to forced labour and portering, the government has also implemented compulsory military training for civilians since May 2003 (United Nations, 2004). All government employees and their families, as well as members of the general population with no links to government service can be required to attend military training sessions lasting one month part-time or two weeks full-time (United Nations, 2004). Every township must send between 18 and 40 people to this training; the people are usually men, but sometimes women are required as well (United Nations, 2004). Civilians are not compensated for their time and, in some cases, have been required to cover training costs (United Nations, 2004). After completing the training, citizens’ names are registered and they may be called upon to serve at any time (United Nations, 2004).
Not only does the SPDC forcibly recruit adult citizens, it conscripts children as well. There have been numerous allegations of boys from fourteen to sixteen years old being sent to support military activities in ethnic areas (United Nations, 2004). Due to their young age the boys were not put into combat, but were rather assigned to guard duty or carrying equipment (United Nations, 2004). Although this practise has been increasing since 2002 (United Nations 2004), there is evidence that boys have been recruited from as early as 1988 (Smith 1994). Orders issued by the SPDC state that every village must supply one youth per one hundred houses in the village, up to a maximum of five youths for villages of more than four hundred houses, to join the Tatmadaws (Smith 1994). According to UNICEF, boys as young as 14 can be ‘informally conscripted’ into the army (Smith 1994). UNICEF has also discovered the presence of at least one residential military camp in the Shan State where children as young as seven have been recruited for a future life with the Tatmadaw (Smith 1994). There is an obvious methodology to this recruitment that has been condoned by the SPDC, and, without some form of intervention, will continue.
Forced labour is present in many forms in Myanmar. Whether it appears as involuntary construction, portering, or conscription, the use of forced labour clearly contravenes Myanmar’s laws as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Myanmar has ratified. The widespread and frequent use of forced labour, the impunity with which the Tatmadaw act and the blatant disregard of both national and international law suggest that the practise of forced labour is not only sanctioned by the government, but promoted by it as well.
Forced Relocation
Probably the most damaging and divisive human rights abuse carried out by the Tatmadaw is that of forced relocations, as it not only uproots people, but can also involve rape, sexual abuse and forced labour. Forced relocation in Myanmar began under Ne Win’s ‘Four Cuts’ campaign. The campaign, which was instituted shortly after he came to power in 1962, has a very simple strategy: to cut off the four main links - food, finance, intelligence, and recruits - between civilians and armed opposition forces (Smith 1994). Although forced relocation is nothing new to the people of Myanmar, its frequency has increased in the past two decades. Between 1990 and 1999, the Tatmadaw forcefully relocated some four million people for the purposes of natural gas exploration, pipeline projects of multinational oil corporations, and infrastructure development programmes (Maung 1999). Most notable were the relocations of 1996, when hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities were forcibly removed from their homes in the Shan, Kayah, and Kayin States (Amnesty International 2005). As with forced labour human rights abuses, the majority of those affected by forced relocation are Myanmar’s ethnic minorities (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). Forced relocations appear to be carried out solely because of the ethnic origin or political beliefs of those being relocated (Amnesty International 1997).
House destruction and land confiscation occur more frequently in areas of counter-insurgency than in peaceful areas (Amnesty International 2005). In these areas, rapes and executions often accompany forced relocations (United States 2002). Refusal to comply with relocation orders can often result in death, as the Tatmadaw have orders to shoot and arrest any persons who remain nearby or in the village in question (Smith 1994). The primary goal of forced relocation is to prevent aid to opposition forces (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). As mentioned earlier, it achieves this through forced relocation by cutting crucial links such as food, finances, communications and recruits to opposition groups (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). In addition to disrupting insurgents, forced relocation also provides a steady stream of labourers for the army’s forced labour programmes (Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
In addition to the reasons laid out by the Four Cuts campaign, villagers are also relocated to ‘new towns’ to make way for commercial or public construction or for internal security and political control (United States 2002). ‘New towns’ generally suffered from greatly reduced infrastructure (United States 2002) and health workers have reported high fatality rates due to poor sanitation (Smith 1994). Compensation is offered occasionally, but is grossly inadequate as citizens are offered much less than market value for their property and are required to pay for plots of land in the new satellite towns (Hudson-Rod, 2005). Unemployment rates of up to eighty percent are common in satellite towns (Smith 1994).
In addition to forcing civilians to relocate, military units routinely confiscate “livestock, fuel, food supplies, fishponds, alcoholic drinks, vehicles and money” (United States 2002). Confiscations of property have been common since 1988, but widespread only since 1997, when the SPDC ordered regional commanders to meet their logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the government (United States 2002). The Tatmadaw loot and confiscate property from forcibly relocated persons or persons who are simply away from their homes (United States 2002). In an average relocation, villagers lose their land, their houses, and most if not all of their property (Amnesty International 2005). Entire villages are razed and all property is burned (United States 2002).
A typical relocation unfolds in the following sequence: a notice is posted informing villagers that they must either vacate the village or relocate to a ‘new town’ by a certain date (Smith 1994). Those who fail to comply will be shot or arrested (United States 2003). Once that date is reached, Tatmadaw forces will move into the region, confiscating anything of use (i.e. food, water, livestock, and supplies) and destroying the rest (United States, 2002). Currently, relocation programmes take place in two contexts: as ‘redevelopment’ programmes in urban areas, and as part of counter-insurgency operations in ethnic minority areas, with the ‘Four Cuts’ programme at the heart of both methods (Smith 1994). Although most of the recent relocations have been against ethnic minorities, virtually every group, including the Burman majority, has been subject to forced relocation (Smith 1994). This upset has created a new social order: when relocated, those that can afford to move to a better village do so; those that cannot are sent to less desirable locations, and often end up constantly subject to demands for unpaid labour (Smith 1994). Forced relocation is perhaps Myanmar’s oldest, most systematically abused human rights violation.
Forced relocation is the most terrible of the abuses that the Tatmadaw inflict upon the people of Myanmar. Not only are the relocated left penniless and without a means of gaining a living, the practise is socially divisive and can include other abuses such as forced labour and rape. The continued, widespread, and frequent occurrences of forcible relocation and the similarities between incidents suggest that forcible relocation is no simple government programme, but a systematic method for controlling minorities and limiting ties to opposition groups. Indeed, this was the goal of Ne Win’s original ‘Four Cuts’ programme. Many of those who are relocated end up destitute and worse off than they were before relocation.
Conclusions and Discussion
It is readily apparent that human rights abuses are nothing new to the military of Myanmar. They have been the norm for over forty years, and are an entrenched part of the Tatmadaw’s culture. Various human rights abuses have become a systematic way for the military to oppress the people of Myanmar. While the SPDC suppresses the rights of the Burmese people in many ways, few methods are as invasive, violent, and brutal as those directly conducted by the Tatmadaw. Systematic rape of ethnic minorities as a means of subjugating the people causes irreparable damage to many women and girls, as well as their families. Forced labour, conscription, and portering break up families and strips the people of Myanmar of their dignity. Finally, forced relocations and confiscation of property disrupt the natural social order and can leave many penniless and without a means of earning a living.
Despite a large body of evidence showing that the Tatmadaw are guilty of numerous systematic human rights abuses, the international community has remained largely silent. Although the United States and European Union have imposed harsh economic sanctions, those only hurt the most vulnerable of Myanmar’s people (United Nations 2004). Though the people of Myanmar may unite to overthrow the present government, this scenario would only work if the Tatmadaw were not prepared to combat their fellow citizens; however, they clearly are (Clark 1999). Many NGOs are hesitant to work in Myanmar for fear of that doing so will give legitimacy to the SPDC (Economist, 2001).
In 2001, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the special rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, acknowledged that there had been “positive signals” that indicated the “government’s efforts to make progress in its human rights record” (Maung Than 2002). These efforts were generally focused on moving towards democracy, rather than stopping human rights abuses committed by the Tatmadaw. Although the SPDC revealed a seven-point roadmap towards democracy in 2003 (Economist 2005) and has released over four thousand prisoners since 2000 (Economist 2004), progress towards democracy is slow, and pressure from the Western world appears to have done little to expedite the process (Economist 2005).
Myanmar is set to become president of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2006, which is making some of the group’s more progressive members uneasy (Economist 2004). Although ASEAN refuses to use economic sanctions against Myanmar, they do have the political clout to help move the country in a new direction (Economist 2001). The group’s policy of non-interference has also been ineffective (Economist 2003), and it is not clear what will be effective in a nation where the government has such disregard for its citizens. As shown by the country’s overwhelming support of the National League for Democracy in the 1990 general elections, the will of the people is behind the democratic movement, not a military junta (Economist 2005). All that remains is for the government to follow.