Meanwhile, in China...
Ryan’s best contribution to the political discussion last night was China’s reaction to the threat of al Qaeda after September 11. See, he’s Chinese. No accent, but he looks it, enough that we pulled the classic “Can you read this?” on him when it came to a bag of tea sent by Cindy’s sister in Hong Kong, which had some Asian lettering on it.
Anyway, the southwest of China runs up against that volatile Middle East we hear so much about. There is a Muslim population in southwestern China, and the geography of the area is much less “Chinese” than that of the rest of the country, if I may. (It could be that I may not; it’s always a bit brazen to suggest that Part A of a country is representative of the country as a whole while Part B is not.)
I knew all of this. What I didn’t know was how terrified of al Qaeda China had been. Worried that Western forces in Afghanistan would push the terrorists into their country and begin subverting the population, the Chinese government deployed its army extensively along the frontier as soon as it became evident that America would invade Afghanistan.
I hadn’t realized just how afraid of Islamic radicalization China had been, but it makes a lot of sense. I’ve often wondered why China doesn’t suffer from the same kind of problems as Indonesia or Thailand, but never enough to actually investigate the question. Ryan explained it pretty well.
He also characterized Tibet in the same fashion: From China’s point of view, Tibet represents a threat to China’s political stability, on the premise that Tibetan radicals in that region could undermine the authority of the government and the loyalty of the people. Apparently China’s government’s thinking is paranoid with prudence, thinking that even the slightest beginnings of a problem pose a dire, existential threat to their rule, and Chinese society generally.
I have to admire that kind of thinking in part, because it obviously has paid strategic dividends thus far. I shouldn’t have called it “paranoid.” Paranoia would backfire. It’s more like concern, and it would seem that China pushes the envelope of concern right to the boundary of paranoia. In contrast, I have noticed that the governments of the West are much more reactionary, at least these days. This strikes me as an Unfavorable Comparison.
Anyhow, that was Ryan’s best contribution to the table. Oh, and here’s something: When it came to current political events in America, I was the best-informed person at the table. Everything that came up, I knew about already. I was pretty good about current political events worldwide, too. So, while I still have an unassailable amount of history to learn, I find it promising that my political awareness has gotten to the point that it has. That conversation felt like a checkpoint, an objective affirmation of my knowledge (even though all the people at the table were liberal). This is gratifying and promising.
Anyway, the southwest of China runs up against that volatile Middle East we hear so much about. There is a Muslim population in southwestern China, and the geography of the area is much less “Chinese” than that of the rest of the country, if I may. (It could be that I may not; it’s always a bit brazen to suggest that Part A of a country is representative of the country as a whole while Part B is not.)
I knew all of this. What I didn’t know was how terrified of al Qaeda China had been. Worried that Western forces in Afghanistan would push the terrorists into their country and begin subverting the population, the Chinese government deployed its army extensively along the frontier as soon as it became evident that America would invade Afghanistan.
I hadn’t realized just how afraid of Islamic radicalization China had been, but it makes a lot of sense. I’ve often wondered why China doesn’t suffer from the same kind of problems as Indonesia or Thailand, but never enough to actually investigate the question. Ryan explained it pretty well.
He also characterized Tibet in the same fashion: From China’s point of view, Tibet represents a threat to China’s political stability, on the premise that Tibetan radicals in that region could undermine the authority of the government and the loyalty of the people. Apparently China’s government’s thinking is paranoid with prudence, thinking that even the slightest beginnings of a problem pose a dire, existential threat to their rule, and Chinese society generally.
I have to admire that kind of thinking in part, because it obviously has paid strategic dividends thus far. I shouldn’t have called it “paranoid.” Paranoia would backfire. It’s more like concern, and it would seem that China pushes the envelope of concern right to the boundary of paranoia. In contrast, I have noticed that the governments of the West are much more reactionary, at least these days. This strikes me as an Unfavorable Comparison.
Anyhow, that was Ryan’s best contribution to the table. Oh, and here’s something: When it came to current political events in America, I was the best-informed person at the table. Everything that came up, I knew about already. I was pretty good about current political events worldwide, too. So, while I still have an unassailable amount of history to learn, I find it promising that my political awareness has gotten to the point that it has. That conversation felt like a checkpoint, an objective affirmation of my knowledge (even though all the people at the table were liberal). This is gratifying and promising.