Some Post-Referendum Thoughts
The pundits have been punditting away since the outcome of the referendum vote, and will doubtless continue to do in the weeks and months ahead. For what it's worth, here are my thoughts:
1. Scotland Scotland will eventually become independent, but not as quickly as Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP might wish and not until the following three conditions have been fulfilled: (a) the election (and the re-election for subsequent terms) of a majority SNP government at Holyrood with a manifesto commitment to hold another independence referendum; (b) the certainty that a majority of Scots will vote for independence, including those who voted against in 2014 (but several years outside the EU, without regional funding for less favoured areas and free access to EU markets for high-value goods such as whisky and salmon, may help change their minds); and (c) the Tories losing their Westminster majority at the 2020 general election, allowing a coalition of opposition parties to ram through various constitutional reforms, including the grant of a second independence referendum and a change to the electoral system. In practice, of course, the third of these is much the less likely.
2. Northern Ireland The situation for Northern Ireland will be horrendous, with the reintroduction of an international frontier virtually killing off cross-border trade and the loss of regional funding having huge knock-on effects on unemployment and income. (A local friend who moved there as a child in the 1970s says that it then resembled a Third World country, and that without that funding it would still.) The Sinn Fein call for a poll on union with Ireland is mere fantasy, but it may be that some sort of customs union with the Republic will be necessary to stop the plunge into the dark -- even though the hybrid, half-in and half-out (of both the UK and the EU) statelet which would result will require years of negotiations between the various parties. But if Northern Ireland's history of Protestant rejectionism can be overcome, and a customs union of sorts does emerge, then in the longer run Northern Ireland will also be on its way out of the United Kingdom.
3. The Article 50 Process The Commission and the Council have stated their strong desire to bundle the UK out of the EU as soon as possible, perhaps to reduce the potential risk of exit contagion spreading to other Member States, but perhaps also because of long-standing irritation with the UK's consistently negative attitude to "the European project". (Even Blair, supposedly more communitaire-minded than his predecessors, never demonstrated much public enthusiasm for the EU in his speeches to British audiences; and Gordon Brown famously missed the signing ceremony for the Treaty of Lisbon because he thought his appearance before a Commons select committee was more important.) The feeling in Brussels may well be something of the order of kicking the UK out so that the rest can get on with reforging Europe without the drag of the UK whingers. But however rapidly the EU wants the UK to follow the Article 50 process, it seems fairly clear -- as Jack of Kent explains -- that the decision of when to trigger the process is entirely a matter for the Member State which wishes to withdraw. Which means, as he says, that the negotiations for a post-Brexit relationship with the rest of the EU can be commenced and even completed before the Article 50 notification is sent -- or that the process is so delayed that other events supervene and the notification is never sent at all.
4. Unwinding EU Legislation Legal experts have indicated that it could take many years to untangle the UK from EU legislation, but much of it, particularly that related to the provision of goods and services, will have to be retained for the simple reason that if the UK wishes to continue trading with the EU, whether as a member of the EEA or as a WTO third country, it will have to subscribe to EU standards. What is most at risk is social and environmental legislation, such as the Working Time Directive and environmental controls on water quality and air pollution -- but I suspect that much of this may be retained because it would be difficult even for the most EUphobic of Tory ministers to sell people on the idea that they should work 72 hours a week for the same pay as now or that rules intended to protect public health should be scrapped because some Ayn Rand worshipping Business Secretary considers them a burden on business. But although they may be retained, they won't be improved and may even be disregarded -- for example, the Client Earth case against the government for breaches of EU nitrogen dioxide levels may now fall.
(Despite their visceral hatred of it, the Tories may also be unable to unsubscribe the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights, because (a) it is written into the Good Friday Agreement and (b) would require agreement to unsubscribe from the devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales, which will never be forthcoming.)
5. The Impact on UK Business It's no surprise that many businesses are reconsidering their forward plans, and even contemplating moving out of the UK altogether; in any case, the large financial houses will have to leave the City of London for Frankfurt or Paris, or face the loss of their "passports" which allow them to operate within the eurozone (additionally, the non-discrimination clause in Cameron's renegotiation agreement will no longer apply). One is tempted to say "good riddance" to them, since they are largely parasitical and contribute nothing of substance to the country; but there will be other, more unexpected losses, such as the removal of protected designation of origin status from a range of foodstuffs, meaning that in future anyone can market cheddar cheese and bakewell tarts, taking market share from the originals and driving small producers to the wall. But leaving the EU might also block transnational companies such as Amazon, Google, Starbucks, Vodafone and the like from booking their profits in Luxembourg and other tax havens, and require them to start paying realistic taxes on their operations here.
6. A More Unequal Country As is becoming obvious, the vote to leave was the revolt of those left behind by globalisation against the metropolitan elite which had been ignoring them for decades. "If you’ve got money, you vote in -- if you haven’t got money, you vote out", as a Leave campaigner quoted by The Guardian's John Harris put it. "Here is a country so imbalanced it has effectively fallen over" he noted when comparing the vote shares for Remain "69% in Tory Kensington and Chelsea; 75% in Camden; 78% in Hackney" with those for Leave in "Great Yarmouth (71%), Castle Point in Essex (73%), and Redcar and Cleveland (66%)." It's ironic (in a way) that having initially promised to heal "broken Britain", the austerity policies pursued by Cameron and Osborne have made things worse -- which means that, like it or not, future governments will have to start spending money in the poorer parts of Britain, replacing the regional funding that will no longer come from the EU. Finding the money for that could entail the indefinite deferment or even cancellation of big infrastructure projects such as HS2, CrossRail 2 and Heathrow's third runway which will be of no benefit to other than the elite (and will now cost more anyway: the more uncertain the future, the greater the risk and thus the higher the costs of borrowing to pay for them). The biggest white elephant of them all, a replacement for Trident, may have to be foregone.
7. A Poorer Country The UK, or what's left of it, will be a much poorer country -- economically, obviously, but in many other ways as well. Poorer scientifically, because the country will no longer have access to joint research funding or joint projects, meaning that anyone wishing to pursue a high-level career may have to relocate, or even take out citizenship of an EU country. Poorer culturally and artistically, because British museums and galleries will now be outside the European Museums Network and thus less able to borrow items for big exhibitions, while artists and writers could feel less connected to the rest of the world and thus less inspired by it (unless they too relocate). Poorer ethnically and linguistically, because in time the million-odd (three million, according to some sources) EU citizens living here will leave, taking their culture and delicatessens with them. The country will, over time, become narrower-minded and less cosmopolitan.
8. The Future England It is entirely possible to imagine a future England -- probably an England and Wales, given how narrowly Wales voted in favour of devolution in 1999 and how, through historical inertia, it seems to stick to London -- that by the middle of this century has reverted to one resembling that of the Tudor period: an insignificant and uninfluential island off the northwest corner of Europe, without an empire or a role, pretending to itself that it still counts for something but in practice is marginalised by everyone else. On the other hand, there's a lot to be said for small countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, even Switzerland -- somehow their populations seem happier, better adjusted, less likely to cause trouble for others.
I should also say something about the future of the EU. But at this point my crystal ball grows cloudy -- I've probably said quite enough for the present -- and that must wait for another day.
1. Scotland Scotland will eventually become independent, but not as quickly as Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP might wish and not until the following three conditions have been fulfilled: (a) the election (and the re-election for subsequent terms) of a majority SNP government at Holyrood with a manifesto commitment to hold another independence referendum; (b) the certainty that a majority of Scots will vote for independence, including those who voted against in 2014 (but several years outside the EU, without regional funding for less favoured areas and free access to EU markets for high-value goods such as whisky and salmon, may help change their minds); and (c) the Tories losing their Westminster majority at the 2020 general election, allowing a coalition of opposition parties to ram through various constitutional reforms, including the grant of a second independence referendum and a change to the electoral system. In practice, of course, the third of these is much the less likely.
2. Northern Ireland The situation for Northern Ireland will be horrendous, with the reintroduction of an international frontier virtually killing off cross-border trade and the loss of regional funding having huge knock-on effects on unemployment and income. (A local friend who moved there as a child in the 1970s says that it then resembled a Third World country, and that without that funding it would still.) The Sinn Fein call for a poll on union with Ireland is mere fantasy, but it may be that some sort of customs union with the Republic will be necessary to stop the plunge into the dark -- even though the hybrid, half-in and half-out (of both the UK and the EU) statelet which would result will require years of negotiations between the various parties. But if Northern Ireland's history of Protestant rejectionism can be overcome, and a customs union of sorts does emerge, then in the longer run Northern Ireland will also be on its way out of the United Kingdom.
3. The Article 50 Process The Commission and the Council have stated their strong desire to bundle the UK out of the EU as soon as possible, perhaps to reduce the potential risk of exit contagion spreading to other Member States, but perhaps also because of long-standing irritation with the UK's consistently negative attitude to "the European project". (Even Blair, supposedly more communitaire-minded than his predecessors, never demonstrated much public enthusiasm for the EU in his speeches to British audiences; and Gordon Brown famously missed the signing ceremony for the Treaty of Lisbon because he thought his appearance before a Commons select committee was more important.) The feeling in Brussels may well be something of the order of kicking the UK out so that the rest can get on with reforging Europe without the drag of the UK whingers. But however rapidly the EU wants the UK to follow the Article 50 process, it seems fairly clear -- as Jack of Kent explains -- that the decision of when to trigger the process is entirely a matter for the Member State which wishes to withdraw. Which means, as he says, that the negotiations for a post-Brexit relationship with the rest of the EU can be commenced and even completed before the Article 50 notification is sent -- or that the process is so delayed that other events supervene and the notification is never sent at all.
4. Unwinding EU Legislation Legal experts have indicated that it could take many years to untangle the UK from EU legislation, but much of it, particularly that related to the provision of goods and services, will have to be retained for the simple reason that if the UK wishes to continue trading with the EU, whether as a member of the EEA or as a WTO third country, it will have to subscribe to EU standards. What is most at risk is social and environmental legislation, such as the Working Time Directive and environmental controls on water quality and air pollution -- but I suspect that much of this may be retained because it would be difficult even for the most EUphobic of Tory ministers to sell people on the idea that they should work 72 hours a week for the same pay as now or that rules intended to protect public health should be scrapped because some Ayn Rand worshipping Business Secretary considers them a burden on business. But although they may be retained, they won't be improved and may even be disregarded -- for example, the Client Earth case against the government for breaches of EU nitrogen dioxide levels may now fall.
(Despite their visceral hatred of it, the Tories may also be unable to unsubscribe the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights, because (a) it is written into the Good Friday Agreement and (b) would require agreement to unsubscribe from the devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales, which will never be forthcoming.)
5. The Impact on UK Business It's no surprise that many businesses are reconsidering their forward plans, and even contemplating moving out of the UK altogether; in any case, the large financial houses will have to leave the City of London for Frankfurt or Paris, or face the loss of their "passports" which allow them to operate within the eurozone (additionally, the non-discrimination clause in Cameron's renegotiation agreement will no longer apply). One is tempted to say "good riddance" to them, since they are largely parasitical and contribute nothing of substance to the country; but there will be other, more unexpected losses, such as the removal of protected designation of origin status from a range of foodstuffs, meaning that in future anyone can market cheddar cheese and bakewell tarts, taking market share from the originals and driving small producers to the wall. But leaving the EU might also block transnational companies such as Amazon, Google, Starbucks, Vodafone and the like from booking their profits in Luxembourg and other tax havens, and require them to start paying realistic taxes on their operations here.
6. A More Unequal Country As is becoming obvious, the vote to leave was the revolt of those left behind by globalisation against the metropolitan elite which had been ignoring them for decades. "If you’ve got money, you vote in -- if you haven’t got money, you vote out", as a Leave campaigner quoted by The Guardian's John Harris put it. "Here is a country so imbalanced it has effectively fallen over" he noted when comparing the vote shares for Remain "69% in Tory Kensington and Chelsea; 75% in Camden; 78% in Hackney" with those for Leave in "Great Yarmouth (71%), Castle Point in Essex (73%), and Redcar and Cleveland (66%)." It's ironic (in a way) that having initially promised to heal "broken Britain", the austerity policies pursued by Cameron and Osborne have made things worse -- which means that, like it or not, future governments will have to start spending money in the poorer parts of Britain, replacing the regional funding that will no longer come from the EU. Finding the money for that could entail the indefinite deferment or even cancellation of big infrastructure projects such as HS2, CrossRail 2 and Heathrow's third runway which will be of no benefit to other than the elite (and will now cost more anyway: the more uncertain the future, the greater the risk and thus the higher the costs of borrowing to pay for them). The biggest white elephant of them all, a replacement for Trident, may have to be foregone.
7. A Poorer Country The UK, or what's left of it, will be a much poorer country -- economically, obviously, but in many other ways as well. Poorer scientifically, because the country will no longer have access to joint research funding or joint projects, meaning that anyone wishing to pursue a high-level career may have to relocate, or even take out citizenship of an EU country. Poorer culturally and artistically, because British museums and galleries will now be outside the European Museums Network and thus less able to borrow items for big exhibitions, while artists and writers could feel less connected to the rest of the world and thus less inspired by it (unless they too relocate). Poorer ethnically and linguistically, because in time the million-odd (three million, according to some sources) EU citizens living here will leave, taking their culture and delicatessens with them. The country will, over time, become narrower-minded and less cosmopolitan.
8. The Future England It is entirely possible to imagine a future England -- probably an England and Wales, given how narrowly Wales voted in favour of devolution in 1999 and how, through historical inertia, it seems to stick to London -- that by the middle of this century has reverted to one resembling that of the Tudor period: an insignificant and uninfluential island off the northwest corner of Europe, without an empire or a role, pretending to itself that it still counts for something but in practice is marginalised by everyone else. On the other hand, there's a lot to be said for small countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, even Switzerland -- somehow their populations seem happier, better adjusted, less likely to cause trouble for others.
I should also say something about the future of the EU. But at this point my crystal ball grows cloudy -- I've probably said quite enough for the present -- and that must wait for another day.