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Universe Is Probably A Simulation: Neil DeGrasse Tyson
So, Neil deGrasse Tyson has argued during the latest Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate that statistically, it's far more likely that we live in a simulated universe rather than a real one. It's not exactly a novel idea, and has a lot more to do with philosophy rather than actual empirical science, but it's a fascinating thought indeed.
Video of the entire debate:
Some of the comments under the article are worth noting, be it for the succinct wrap-up of the whole theory, or the masterful refutation thereof. Like this exchange:
Comment 1.
"DeGrasse Tyson is not making a religious argument, he's making a probabilistic argument. Given the following two assumptions:
1) There is one "real", infinite universe
2) It is possible in this universe to create simulated universes
It follows from these two assumptions that there are an infinite number of simulated universes. A randomly chosen person exists in either the one "real" universe or one of the infinite number of simulations. Neil DeGrasse Tyson is arguing that in this scenario a randomly chosen person is more likely to exist in one of the simulations than in the one "real" universe. Recognizing himself as the randomly chosen person, he would not be surprised to find that he lives in a simulation. There is nothing religious about it, and it is not a new argument."
Comment 2.
"1) Why assume only one "real" universe? Hypothetically there are an infinite number of them. Certainly the "many worlds" model, if you extrapolate it all the way back to the big bang, allows a multiverse in which not only every possible universe with our physical laws exists, but every possible universe with every possible set of physical laws.
2) Now let's also suppose that simulating a universe requires effort, resources and energy, as all computing does. The amount of actual simulating going on is effectively limited to that which some beings are willing to invest in. This strikes me as a much more restrictive set than the multiverse.
This to me tips the odds the other way, against the likelihood that we are in a simulation: there are endless "real" universes for free, vs. just those that some entity wants to plow the energy and resources into designing and simulating."
...And maybe the sky is blue because we live inside the eye of a blue-eyed giant named MaCumber.
My take on the whole matter? There was a time when empirical exploration was called science, and conjecture was the domain of philosophy and metaphysics. Evidently, that time is no more.
How is this political, you may ask? Well, here's a question. When does science stop being science and becomes philosophy, thus rendering itself no longer eligible for being subsidized by government and state budgets? Do disciplines like cosmology fall in the domain of actual (empirical) science - you know, the one using the scientific method, formulating falsifiable and testable hypotheses, making predictions that could be either confirmed or rejected through observation?
And by extension, should such "classical" type of scientific endeavors like the above-described be the sole focus of government funding, or should those more "exotic" fields of scientific inquiry be mostly reserved for "whimsical" private billionaires and/or companies with too much spare money, spare time and spare imagination on their hands? Here I guess the argument could be made that science encompasses a whole array of activities, from strictly practical fields to more broadly defined theoretical ones - and all of those work in accord to produce the end result, namely constant progress in the understanding of the workings of the universe, and subsequently the practical (technological) applications thereof. So maybe we can't just cut right in the "middle" between practical (empirical) and theoretic (metaphysical) inquiry - because such a definite middle simply does not exist.
Theoretical science (even wild speculation type of theoretical science) has often been a few steps ahead of technological capability, only to see itself being validated and confirmed (or rejected) much later when technology catches up with the human imagination. The examples are numerous. Perhaps we shouldn't be so disparaging about speculative theory after all? Especially if it steps upon decades and centuries of accumulated data, or at least the fundamental laws of maths, stats and logic.
Thoughts?
So, Neil deGrasse Tyson has argued during the latest Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate that statistically, it's far more likely that we live in a simulated universe rather than a real one. It's not exactly a novel idea, and has a lot more to do with philosophy rather than actual empirical science, but it's a fascinating thought indeed.
Video of the entire debate:
Some of the comments under the article are worth noting, be it for the succinct wrap-up of the whole theory, or the masterful refutation thereof. Like this exchange:
Comment 1.
"DeGrasse Tyson is not making a religious argument, he's making a probabilistic argument. Given the following two assumptions:
1) There is one "real", infinite universe
2) It is possible in this universe to create simulated universes
It follows from these two assumptions that there are an infinite number of simulated universes. A randomly chosen person exists in either the one "real" universe or one of the infinite number of simulations. Neil DeGrasse Tyson is arguing that in this scenario a randomly chosen person is more likely to exist in one of the simulations than in the one "real" universe. Recognizing himself as the randomly chosen person, he would not be surprised to find that he lives in a simulation. There is nothing religious about it, and it is not a new argument."
Comment 2.
"1) Why assume only one "real" universe? Hypothetically there are an infinite number of them. Certainly the "many worlds" model, if you extrapolate it all the way back to the big bang, allows a multiverse in which not only every possible universe with our physical laws exists, but every possible universe with every possible set of physical laws.
2) Now let's also suppose that simulating a universe requires effort, resources and energy, as all computing does. The amount of actual simulating going on is effectively limited to that which some beings are willing to invest in. This strikes me as a much more restrictive set than the multiverse.
This to me tips the odds the other way, against the likelihood that we are in a simulation: there are endless "real" universes for free, vs. just those that some entity wants to plow the energy and resources into designing and simulating."
...And maybe the sky is blue because we live inside the eye of a blue-eyed giant named MaCumber.
My take on the whole matter? There was a time when empirical exploration was called science, and conjecture was the domain of philosophy and metaphysics. Evidently, that time is no more.
How is this political, you may ask? Well, here's a question. When does science stop being science and becomes philosophy, thus rendering itself no longer eligible for being subsidized by government and state budgets? Do disciplines like cosmology fall in the domain of actual (empirical) science - you know, the one using the scientific method, formulating falsifiable and testable hypotheses, making predictions that could be either confirmed or rejected through observation?
And by extension, should such "classical" type of scientific endeavors like the above-described be the sole focus of government funding, or should those more "exotic" fields of scientific inquiry be mostly reserved for "whimsical" private billionaires and/or companies with too much spare money, spare time and spare imagination on their hands? Here I guess the argument could be made that science encompasses a whole array of activities, from strictly practical fields to more broadly defined theoretical ones - and all of those work in accord to produce the end result, namely constant progress in the understanding of the workings of the universe, and subsequently the practical (technological) applications thereof. So maybe we can't just cut right in the "middle" between practical (empirical) and theoretic (metaphysical) inquiry - because such a definite middle simply does not exist.
Theoretical science (even wild speculation type of theoretical science) has often been a few steps ahead of technological capability, only to see itself being validated and confirmed (or rejected) much later when technology catches up with the human imagination. The examples are numerous. Perhaps we shouldn't be so disparaging about speculative theory after all? Especially if it steps upon decades and centuries of accumulated data, or at least the fundamental laws of maths, stats and logic.
Thoughts?