It's not just about killing infidels
ISIS has made the news for its atrocities in the recent months, but it's even more interesting how they stay in power at the time when the AK47s and RPGs are silent. Not to mention that it's important to understand what sustains their power, if we want to be able to move on from engaging them in violent conflicts (which is the first step) to creating conditions that would further prevent their re-emergence (i.e. off-war time management).
War has changed in recent times. We've been hearing of hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, etc. The thing is, war has ceased being about states and standing armies clashing in a conventional conflict. Now it's mostly a clash of states with non-state players. It's telling that most peace agreements of our time have been between a state and a non-state group. Which is why we have to understand how these groups work, what drives them, and what keeps them afloat. And this doesn't only concern the way they fight and the reason they fight, but also what they're doing while they're not fighting. In other words, we need to know the whole picture.
For example, Hezbollah. They're mostly known for their armed confrontation with Israel, but in fact, since their inception in the 80s, they've created a political party of their own, a social service network, and of course a military. Also, Hamas, who've been in charge of the suicide attacks in Gaza, are now running the Palestinian autonomy there. So these groups are more than just fighters, they've become complex quasi-state organizations. They've got communication apparatus (media, internet websites, social media), and now ISIS has also launched a print newspaper in English, which they use to recruit more people for their cause. They invest in fund-raising, as opposed to looting. They set up profitable businesses, even construction companies! All of this helps them fortify their positions, and provide stable source of funding, and all in all, it establishes a specific brand that new recruits could then look up to.
These groups go even beyond that: they build relations with the population they're controlling, by setting up social services. They build schools, they run hospitals, they provide micro loans. Hezbollah does that, and the Taliban do it too. This wins hearts and minds. It's what makes the locals shield them and hide them, and in many cases support them with all their heart. But most importantly, they do what previous governments have been incapable of doing: they provide safety. They fill the power vacuum that's left by incompetent and corrupt governments. Sure, the safety and security that these groups provides often comes at a very steep price. But in general, people are ultimately prepared to have that for the sake of stability. This is why even when there are elections, the so called "democratic" forces are more likely to suffer a defeat than win: Hamas' election win in 2006 is proof of that. And also that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (although that didn't work so well for them in the end).
It's strange, then, that despite the complexity of this situation, most of the world only thinks of violence and war when these groups are being mentioned. And so we end up making the wrong conclusions, having an incomplete picture, and wondering what is it that we're failing to understand. In order to be able to counter these groups in the long term, we'll need to look at all aspects of their activity. Because they serve a hybrid function, the same way they're conducting a hybrid warfare. And we need a hybrid approach to them. The main thing is that they rise and stay in power because they fill a vacuum that's been left by government - so they play both an armed and political role, and both provide political governance and conduct violent struggle.
With time, these groups evolve. They take more complex tasks, and they start to look more like a state, a government. After all, how should we call Hezbollah at this point? They run a certain territory in the same way a government runs a country. They have all the functions of a government, including garbage picking and running the sewage system. Is that still just another guerrilla group? Or is it something new, something like a quasi-state? Same question about ISIS. The lines start to become rather blurred. We've been too accustomed to a world of states, but now we have non-states, failed states, quasi-states, and anything in between. The weaker the states in a given region are, the more likely that such quasi-state groups would emerge, and fill the vacuum.
And there's only one solution to this situation. In order to counter them, the governments of real states would have to invest more in non-military tools. Filling the governance vacuum has to be the top priority for governments, if they're to be sustainable. So in a sense, governments could learn a lot from such armed groups who are striving to substitute the governments themselves. Because warring at war time is one thing, but holding to that power requires something more than just instilling fear and subordination in the populace. You need to be able to transcend the violence stage and move on to non-violence mode adequately. Otherwise your rule won't last very long.
If you're beginning to think that this looks more like a contest between states and pseudo-states, it is because that's true. Sure, military power can win some battles, or even a war, but it won't provide long-term stability. In order to achieve stability, you need long-term investment in filling that governance vacuum. And that's what has allowed these groups to flourish. They're beating the traditional governments in their own game. And beating them back into oblivion is only possible if governments step up their own game, and push them out of the governance market by winning back the hearts and minds of the people. Until then, we'll all be just scratching our heads and wondering what went wrong.
War has changed in recent times. We've been hearing of hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, etc. The thing is, war has ceased being about states and standing armies clashing in a conventional conflict. Now it's mostly a clash of states with non-state players. It's telling that most peace agreements of our time have been between a state and a non-state group. Which is why we have to understand how these groups work, what drives them, and what keeps them afloat. And this doesn't only concern the way they fight and the reason they fight, but also what they're doing while they're not fighting. In other words, we need to know the whole picture.
For example, Hezbollah. They're mostly known for their armed confrontation with Israel, but in fact, since their inception in the 80s, they've created a political party of their own, a social service network, and of course a military. Also, Hamas, who've been in charge of the suicide attacks in Gaza, are now running the Palestinian autonomy there. So these groups are more than just fighters, they've become complex quasi-state organizations. They've got communication apparatus (media, internet websites, social media), and now ISIS has also launched a print newspaper in English, which they use to recruit more people for their cause. They invest in fund-raising, as opposed to looting. They set up profitable businesses, even construction companies! All of this helps them fortify their positions, and provide stable source of funding, and all in all, it establishes a specific brand that new recruits could then look up to.
These groups go even beyond that: they build relations with the population they're controlling, by setting up social services. They build schools, they run hospitals, they provide micro loans. Hezbollah does that, and the Taliban do it too. This wins hearts and minds. It's what makes the locals shield them and hide them, and in many cases support them with all their heart. But most importantly, they do what previous governments have been incapable of doing: they provide safety. They fill the power vacuum that's left by incompetent and corrupt governments. Sure, the safety and security that these groups provides often comes at a very steep price. But in general, people are ultimately prepared to have that for the sake of stability. This is why even when there are elections, the so called "democratic" forces are more likely to suffer a defeat than win: Hamas' election win in 2006 is proof of that. And also that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (although that didn't work so well for them in the end).
It's strange, then, that despite the complexity of this situation, most of the world only thinks of violence and war when these groups are being mentioned. And so we end up making the wrong conclusions, having an incomplete picture, and wondering what is it that we're failing to understand. In order to be able to counter these groups in the long term, we'll need to look at all aspects of their activity. Because they serve a hybrid function, the same way they're conducting a hybrid warfare. And we need a hybrid approach to them. The main thing is that they rise and stay in power because they fill a vacuum that's been left by government - so they play both an armed and political role, and both provide political governance and conduct violent struggle.
With time, these groups evolve. They take more complex tasks, and they start to look more like a state, a government. After all, how should we call Hezbollah at this point? They run a certain territory in the same way a government runs a country. They have all the functions of a government, including garbage picking and running the sewage system. Is that still just another guerrilla group? Or is it something new, something like a quasi-state? Same question about ISIS. The lines start to become rather blurred. We've been too accustomed to a world of states, but now we have non-states, failed states, quasi-states, and anything in between. The weaker the states in a given region are, the more likely that such quasi-state groups would emerge, and fill the vacuum.
And there's only one solution to this situation. In order to counter them, the governments of real states would have to invest more in non-military tools. Filling the governance vacuum has to be the top priority for governments, if they're to be sustainable. So in a sense, governments could learn a lot from such armed groups who are striving to substitute the governments themselves. Because warring at war time is one thing, but holding to that power requires something more than just instilling fear and subordination in the populace. You need to be able to transcend the violence stage and move on to non-violence mode adequately. Otherwise your rule won't last very long.
If you're beginning to think that this looks more like a contest between states and pseudo-states, it is because that's true. Sure, military power can win some battles, or even a war, but it won't provide long-term stability. In order to achieve stability, you need long-term investment in filling that governance vacuum. And that's what has allowed these groups to flourish. They're beating the traditional governments in their own game. And beating them back into oblivion is only possible if governments step up their own game, and push them out of the governance market by winning back the hearts and minds of the people. Until then, we'll all be just scratching our heads and wondering what went wrong.