On topic - Interesting read from Stratfor
A Net Assessment of the World
"...The United States is, by far, the world's most powerful nation. That does not mean that the United States can - or has an interest to - solve the problems of the world, contain the forces that are at work or stand in front of those forces and compel them to stop. Even the toughest guy in the bar can't take on the entire bar and win."
Might look like sweeping general analysis, but an interesting one, nevertheless. The following part sums up most of it, I think:
"After every systemic war, there is an illusion that the victorious coalition will continue to be cohesive and govern as effectively as it fought. After the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna sought to meld the alliance against France into an entity that could manage the peace. After World War I, the Allies (absent the United States) created the League of Nations. After World War II, it was the United Nations. After the Cold War ended, it was assumed that the United Nations, NATO, IMF, World Bank and other multinational institutions could manage the global system. In each case, the victorious powers sought to use wartime alliance structures to manage the post-war world. In each case, they failed, because the thing that bound them together - the enemy - no longer existed. Therefore, the institutions became powerless and the illusion of unity dissolved."
Well, there are a few problems with the last point. The Cold War blocs seem to still be pretty much alive and well. We've seen NATO expanding to include former Soviet satellites and even chunks of what's usually called the Russian "sphere of influence". Also, NATO has taken a new role after the supposed end of the Cold War: it has intervened in the Balkan wars around the time Yugoslavia was collapsing; it has continued to show off its power in places like Libya.
Granted, throughout much of the post-Cold War era, NATO has remained a defensive organization for the most part, but in the meantime it has also obtained an interventionist dimension (and I daresay, an interventionist mindset), emboldened by the absence of its major former rival that had previously balanced it out. I'd call that a new tool with new functions in a new, ever changing and evolving world. As trite as that may sound to our politically experienced ears.
As for the UN, it remains what it has always been: a place where countries could maintain regular contact with one another, and where they could vent out and feel more significant than they are - with little effect in the real world beyond that.
The IMF and the World Bank are currently facing a bit of a strain due to the American response to the fast expanding Chinese influence, a reaction that's inevitable I guess. But that doesn't make these institutions any less viable - they're still considered the cornerstone of the post-WW2 international order.
Further, the author seems to be pretty selective in the types of world orders he describes. The League of Nations wasn't anywhere near being inclusive enough, and it never really allowed the minor participants to put up a real competition with the big players on equal terms.
I don't suppose it'd be too preposterous to describe the Russian invasion of Ukraine (because that's really what it is) as a backlash against constant NATO encroachment - but the fact is, both sides have gone a bit too far, and neither of them is either willing nor in a position to back down from the trenches it has already dug for themselves.
That said, NATO seems to be in trouble in the longer-term, because most of its members have stopped contributing significantly at this point, and they largely rely on the US for defense - to which the US approach to international matters has also contributed with its apparent proneness to unilateral actions. And let's not forget that a significant chunk of those members were probably only accepted in order to spite Russia, or to encircle it more tightly, as per Brzezinski's "Grand Chessboard" doctrine.
Still, some good points were raised in the article - particularly the part where the US doesn't take on its role of a world cop enthusiastically (the Hawks at DC might beg to differ), given that more than half of its exports are actually to North America. That's not an argument you tend hear too often, and it definitely doesn't speak in favor of interventionism. I suppose it's also true, though, that once you've obtained the role of a global hegemon, every step you make in retreat from that position would be perceived as weakness by your rivals, and they'd be sure to step into the vacuum it's bound to create - and even use that momentum to potentially come knocking at your doors, and dump the fruits of all your prior misdoings right at your doorstep.
There's also the point being made by analysts that once a hegemon begins to sense the decline of its dominant position, it tends to become rather erratic, aggressive and unpredictable in its futile attempts to maintain that position - and that doesn't sound very promising for the rest of the world. Still, when we look realistically at the current situation, I don't think anyone in their right mind would prefer someone like, say, China or Russia, playing the global cop role in America's stead. It's just that they'd rather have a more responsible, less selfish, and more respondent global cop they could willingly work with, rather than "the lesser of a few evils" that they're having right now.
"...The United States is, by far, the world's most powerful nation. That does not mean that the United States can - or has an interest to - solve the problems of the world, contain the forces that are at work or stand in front of those forces and compel them to stop. Even the toughest guy in the bar can't take on the entire bar and win."
Might look like sweeping general analysis, but an interesting one, nevertheless. The following part sums up most of it, I think:
"After every systemic war, there is an illusion that the victorious coalition will continue to be cohesive and govern as effectively as it fought. After the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna sought to meld the alliance against France into an entity that could manage the peace. After World War I, the Allies (absent the United States) created the League of Nations. After World War II, it was the United Nations. After the Cold War ended, it was assumed that the United Nations, NATO, IMF, World Bank and other multinational institutions could manage the global system. In each case, the victorious powers sought to use wartime alliance structures to manage the post-war world. In each case, they failed, because the thing that bound them together - the enemy - no longer existed. Therefore, the institutions became powerless and the illusion of unity dissolved."
Well, there are a few problems with the last point. The Cold War blocs seem to still be pretty much alive and well. We've seen NATO expanding to include former Soviet satellites and even chunks of what's usually called the Russian "sphere of influence". Also, NATO has taken a new role after the supposed end of the Cold War: it has intervened in the Balkan wars around the time Yugoslavia was collapsing; it has continued to show off its power in places like Libya.
Granted, throughout much of the post-Cold War era, NATO has remained a defensive organization for the most part, but in the meantime it has also obtained an interventionist dimension (and I daresay, an interventionist mindset), emboldened by the absence of its major former rival that had previously balanced it out. I'd call that a new tool with new functions in a new, ever changing and evolving world. As trite as that may sound to our politically experienced ears.
As for the UN, it remains what it has always been: a place where countries could maintain regular contact with one another, and where they could vent out and feel more significant than they are - with little effect in the real world beyond that.
The IMF and the World Bank are currently facing a bit of a strain due to the American response to the fast expanding Chinese influence, a reaction that's inevitable I guess. But that doesn't make these institutions any less viable - they're still considered the cornerstone of the post-WW2 international order.
Further, the author seems to be pretty selective in the types of world orders he describes. The League of Nations wasn't anywhere near being inclusive enough, and it never really allowed the minor participants to put up a real competition with the big players on equal terms.
I don't suppose it'd be too preposterous to describe the Russian invasion of Ukraine (because that's really what it is) as a backlash against constant NATO encroachment - but the fact is, both sides have gone a bit too far, and neither of them is either willing nor in a position to back down from the trenches it has already dug for themselves.
That said, NATO seems to be in trouble in the longer-term, because most of its members have stopped contributing significantly at this point, and they largely rely on the US for defense - to which the US approach to international matters has also contributed with its apparent proneness to unilateral actions. And let's not forget that a significant chunk of those members were probably only accepted in order to spite Russia, or to encircle it more tightly, as per Brzezinski's "Grand Chessboard" doctrine.
Still, some good points were raised in the article - particularly the part where the US doesn't take on its role of a world cop enthusiastically (the Hawks at DC might beg to differ), given that more than half of its exports are actually to North America. That's not an argument you tend hear too often, and it definitely doesn't speak in favor of interventionism. I suppose it's also true, though, that once you've obtained the role of a global hegemon, every step you make in retreat from that position would be perceived as weakness by your rivals, and they'd be sure to step into the vacuum it's bound to create - and even use that momentum to potentially come knocking at your doors, and dump the fruits of all your prior misdoings right at your doorstep.
There's also the point being made by analysts that once a hegemon begins to sense the decline of its dominant position, it tends to become rather erratic, aggressive and unpredictable in its futile attempts to maintain that position - and that doesn't sound very promising for the rest of the world. Still, when we look realistically at the current situation, I don't think anyone in their right mind would prefer someone like, say, China or Russia, playing the global cop role in America's stead. It's just that they'd rather have a more responsible, less selfish, and more respondent global cop they could willingly work with, rather than "the lesser of a few evils" that they're having right now.