A refurbished European Commission
Five former prime ministers (not counting the chairman himself), two former foreign ministers, and a well-pronounced leader. Juncker's European Commission which will essentially be EU's government for the next 5-year term, is looking formidable. But what does that European government actually mean for Europe? And will it be somehow different from the previous one? Here's a humble attempt to look into the matter a bit more closely.
The first thing that sticks out is the change of structure. Jean-Claude Juncker's EC will have a much more horizontal structure than Barroso's, which was very hierarchical. The 6 Deputy Presidents will be responsible for the most essential EU policies and will be supervising the other commissaires. There's also a more comprehensive checks-and-balances system now. Even the High representative for foreign affairs won't have their own unilateral role, but will be sharing that branch of government with the commissioners for neighbor relations, development, humanitarian aid, and trade. (A tiny piece of trivia is that the VP will again be stationed at the building of the EC, which makes the foreign policy department an instrument of the entire European Commission, not just the VP). Which is why positions like that of new Bulgarian star Kristalina Georgieva will be of particular importance, as they'll be the ones to provide stability and internal cohesion in a structure that'll be looking more like a network of clusters, each of them grouped around the respective commissioner.
Secondly, there's an obvious attempt for gaining more independence form the European Council. The new European Commission will have a large number of former prime ministers and high-ranking politicians from their respective countries: a total of 18 former national government members, which will make it more difficult to manipulate, but also probably more prone to trench wars between the factions. But that's also for a purpose. Juncker and his VPs will have to be the ultimate arbiters in case of conflict. The larger number of political figures also makes this EC more political and less expert-technocrat. It's possible that this would preserve its efficiency and will protect it from the influence and weight of the European Council (essentially the EU parliament, where all member states are represented), which has dominated all other European institutions, especially since the break of the financial crisis.
Thirdly, a possible consequence will be the largely mitigated negative effects from the bigger number of commissioners. If the new cluster structure does work well, it'll see fewer problems stemming from the large number of branches, which were endemic for the Barroso era. In May last year, right after Croatia became the 28th member state, all EU countries unanimously decided not to apply the decisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was planning to decrease the number of commissioners by almost 1/3. Thus, Barroso's EC had to continue functioning with 26 commissioners (plus a President and a High representative), and as many diverse, mostly arbitrarily distributed branches for these top bureaucrats.
There'll also be changes in fundamental policy. The 2nd Barroso EC was completely defined by the financial crisis and the economic consequences for the member states. Juncker's team will of course continue to pursue growth and the creation of more jobs in the EU, but it's also putting two ambitious goals in front of itself: the creation of a European energy union, and restoring the public's trust to the European institutions. Two of Juncker's VPs, Alenka Bratusek of Slovenia and Frans Timmermans of the Netherlands are entrusted with these respective tasks. Along with the commissioner for energy and climate, and probably aided by the co-authors of the idea for a European energy union (France and Poland), Bratusek will have to carry out this critically important next step in Europe's integration.
There's also a clear confirmation of the clinical death of the idea for further EU expansion, at least for the time being. The Austrian commissioner in the EC, Johannes Hahn is getting a branch that'll literally be dealing with the European Neighborhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations. This is a clear sign for something that's been known in Brussels for quite a while: the further EU expansion has been halted, but also the term "expansion", itself, has become non-PC. Outright disdain for expansion among the European citizens has become so strong that even the European institutions whose obligation is to work for expansion, are compelled to put that idea into the closet, at least for a while. And, while Turkey has already gotten over this fact, the countries in the Western Balkans will probably go through some political turmoil, due to the wider gap that's opening between them and their European prospects, and the realization that the doors are being shut right under their noses. This will likely force some countries to re-define their priorities, with unpredictable consequences. So the EU has to send a clear signal to those countries that they're not forgotten. Because desperation is the worst possible advisor.
So what's the place of Central and Eastern Europe in this picture? The term "new members" has become pejorative for quite a while now, especially for established regional powers like Poland, who believe that after 10 years of EU membership, and unprecedented economic and social development, they deserve to be treated as equal members. Well, this is practically a fact in Juncker's European Commission. Three of the six VPs are from the "new" Europe: the above mentioned Georgieva, Bratusek and Valdis Dombrovskis of Latvia, the latter being entrusted huge sectors like the economic and social issues, jobs, financial stability, internal markets, entrepreneurship, and regional policy. Dombrovskis is not just a former prime minister, he was the one who reformed Latvia's finances and brought his country out of the financial crisis that was threatening to develop like the Greek scenario. If we count the new European Council chairman Donald Tusk, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have definitely received a huge chunk of the pie now. Which is of course a very good sign.
What about the "old" members, then? Well, UK, France and Germany will continue to be the most influential countries in the EU, that's for sure. So it was logical to expect that they'd be granted important branches. Surprisingly, at first sight, they were not. Still, if we look more closely, we'll find out that although they don't have VPs in the new EC, their expectations were met, more or less. UK got what the London City wants the most: the financial markets, and control on the European financial policies - so they'll be able to guarantee independent decision-making in the financial sphere for the separate member states. France got the economic policy, thus protecting the French economy from "Germanization". And Germany, Europe's top exporter, instead of taking the expected trade branch (including the main position on the table at the negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic trade agreement), requested the digital econoomy policies instead. The next integration step will be the evolution of the digital market, and that's exactly where Germany is the front-runner. Also, they've got a number of important secondary positions: from the chief of staff to the Council's secretary-general.
So, after all this bargaining and negotiating, we might be finally witnessing the formation of an effective and working EU government. And if he plays his cards well, Juncker could be the new Delors, the politician who facilitated the transformation of the European Commission into the European Union, and turned a patchwork of nation-states (many of them former rivals and enemies) into a functioning confederation, the seeking of consensus being the main trait that defines the way it conducts its politics.
The first thing that sticks out is the change of structure. Jean-Claude Juncker's EC will have a much more horizontal structure than Barroso's, which was very hierarchical. The 6 Deputy Presidents will be responsible for the most essential EU policies and will be supervising the other commissaires. There's also a more comprehensive checks-and-balances system now. Even the High representative for foreign affairs won't have their own unilateral role, but will be sharing that branch of government with the commissioners for neighbor relations, development, humanitarian aid, and trade. (A tiny piece of trivia is that the VP will again be stationed at the building of the EC, which makes the foreign policy department an instrument of the entire European Commission, not just the VP). Which is why positions like that of new Bulgarian star Kristalina Georgieva will be of particular importance, as they'll be the ones to provide stability and internal cohesion in a structure that'll be looking more like a network of clusters, each of them grouped around the respective commissioner.
Secondly, there's an obvious attempt for gaining more independence form the European Council. The new European Commission will have a large number of former prime ministers and high-ranking politicians from their respective countries: a total of 18 former national government members, which will make it more difficult to manipulate, but also probably more prone to trench wars between the factions. But that's also for a purpose. Juncker and his VPs will have to be the ultimate arbiters in case of conflict. The larger number of political figures also makes this EC more political and less expert-technocrat. It's possible that this would preserve its efficiency and will protect it from the influence and weight of the European Council (essentially the EU parliament, where all member states are represented), which has dominated all other European institutions, especially since the break of the financial crisis.
Thirdly, a possible consequence will be the largely mitigated negative effects from the bigger number of commissioners. If the new cluster structure does work well, it'll see fewer problems stemming from the large number of branches, which were endemic for the Barroso era. In May last year, right after Croatia became the 28th member state, all EU countries unanimously decided not to apply the decisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was planning to decrease the number of commissioners by almost 1/3. Thus, Barroso's EC had to continue functioning with 26 commissioners (plus a President and a High representative), and as many diverse, mostly arbitrarily distributed branches for these top bureaucrats.
There'll also be changes in fundamental policy. The 2nd Barroso EC was completely defined by the financial crisis and the economic consequences for the member states. Juncker's team will of course continue to pursue growth and the creation of more jobs in the EU, but it's also putting two ambitious goals in front of itself: the creation of a European energy union, and restoring the public's trust to the European institutions. Two of Juncker's VPs, Alenka Bratusek of Slovenia and Frans Timmermans of the Netherlands are entrusted with these respective tasks. Along with the commissioner for energy and climate, and probably aided by the co-authors of the idea for a European energy union (France and Poland), Bratusek will have to carry out this critically important next step in Europe's integration.
There's also a clear confirmation of the clinical death of the idea for further EU expansion, at least for the time being. The Austrian commissioner in the EC, Johannes Hahn is getting a branch that'll literally be dealing with the European Neighborhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations. This is a clear sign for something that's been known in Brussels for quite a while: the further EU expansion has been halted, but also the term "expansion", itself, has become non-PC. Outright disdain for expansion among the European citizens has become so strong that even the European institutions whose obligation is to work for expansion, are compelled to put that idea into the closet, at least for a while. And, while Turkey has already gotten over this fact, the countries in the Western Balkans will probably go through some political turmoil, due to the wider gap that's opening between them and their European prospects, and the realization that the doors are being shut right under their noses. This will likely force some countries to re-define their priorities, with unpredictable consequences. So the EU has to send a clear signal to those countries that they're not forgotten. Because desperation is the worst possible advisor.
So what's the place of Central and Eastern Europe in this picture? The term "new members" has become pejorative for quite a while now, especially for established regional powers like Poland, who believe that after 10 years of EU membership, and unprecedented economic and social development, they deserve to be treated as equal members. Well, this is practically a fact in Juncker's European Commission. Three of the six VPs are from the "new" Europe: the above mentioned Georgieva, Bratusek and Valdis Dombrovskis of Latvia, the latter being entrusted huge sectors like the economic and social issues, jobs, financial stability, internal markets, entrepreneurship, and regional policy. Dombrovskis is not just a former prime minister, he was the one who reformed Latvia's finances and brought his country out of the financial crisis that was threatening to develop like the Greek scenario. If we count the new European Council chairman Donald Tusk, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have definitely received a huge chunk of the pie now. Which is of course a very good sign.
What about the "old" members, then? Well, UK, France and Germany will continue to be the most influential countries in the EU, that's for sure. So it was logical to expect that they'd be granted important branches. Surprisingly, at first sight, they were not. Still, if we look more closely, we'll find out that although they don't have VPs in the new EC, their expectations were met, more or less. UK got what the London City wants the most: the financial markets, and control on the European financial policies - so they'll be able to guarantee independent decision-making in the financial sphere for the separate member states. France got the economic policy, thus protecting the French economy from "Germanization". And Germany, Europe's top exporter, instead of taking the expected trade branch (including the main position on the table at the negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic trade agreement), requested the digital econoomy policies instead. The next integration step will be the evolution of the digital market, and that's exactly where Germany is the front-runner. Also, they've got a number of important secondary positions: from the chief of staff to the Council's secretary-general.
So, after all this bargaining and negotiating, we might be finally witnessing the formation of an effective and working EU government. And if he plays his cards well, Juncker could be the new Delors, the politician who facilitated the transformation of the European Commission into the European Union, and turned a patchwork of nation-states (many of them former rivals and enemies) into a functioning confederation, the seeking of consensus being the main trait that defines the way it conducts its politics.