Another angry ally
In just 24 hours Saudi Arabia managed to do two unprecedented things. First, on October 17 the country was selected to be one of the ten temporary members of the UN Security Council for the first time in its history. Later, on October 18 it became the first country in history to decline that very same position.
And all this, given the fact that bombastic political rhetoric and sharp moves on the diplomatic scene have never been typical for Riyadh at all. As a world leader in oil export, the birthplace of Islam and one of America's major allies in the Arab world, KSA has always pushed its interests and influence gradually, without much ado, and through not-so-official channels. That's why when Riyadh starts speaking loudly about double standards against the Arab and Muslim nations, and accusing the international community of failure in its Middle East policy, and calling for reforms in the largest institution of international diplomacy, that is quite some news. It shows a serious change in the behaviour of the Arab monarchy, and that deserves some attention.
It all started more than a year ago when the Saudis announced they'd be applying for a 2-year term at the UNSC. Although it's one of the UN founder members, so far Saudi Arabia has mostly been subject of criticism on its human rights record, and has never openly shown a desire to occupy any leading positions in the organisation. So when after the Oct 17 vote it became clear that the Arab monarchy had received the 2/3 of the vote it needed, their delegation was naturally jubilant. And their ambassador Abdullah al-Mouallimi almost jumped from his chair with a grin. In his words, that was "a defining moment in the history of the kingdom", and also "a positive change". But only a few hours later, the big surprise came: Riyadh announced they were quitting the position they had just gained.
The official justification for this unprecedented step sounds too hollow and even self-contradictory. The Saudis claim that the UNSC has failed on the Palestinian issue and the Syrian civil war, which is why "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, based on its historical responsibilities towards its people, Arab and Islamic nations as well as towards the peoples aspiring for peace and stability all over the world, announces its apology for not accepting membership of the Security Council until the Council is reformed and enabled, effectively and practically, to carry out its duties and responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security".
On one side, this criticism does sound kind of reasonable - I'm sure few would contend the notion that the UNSC isn't particularly effective, and operates by archaic and outdated principles. It's another question whether it should be exactly Saudi Arabia with its horrible record on human rights or with the fact that it's one of the major arms suppliers for the Syrian conflict, should be in the best position to be preaching about double standards. Some have even gone as far as to call this step "mockery" of the UN. Others go even further and call for UN actions against KSA. At the same time it doesn't become clear exactly what sort of "reform" in the UNSC Riyadh is expecting, and moreover it's doubtful if their behaviour would help them achieve the desired changes (it's more logical to be pushing for those changes from the inside, after all). Still, it's quite telling that countries like Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar (or practically, all US allies in the Arab world and the Middle East) have already supported the Saudi position.
With this surprising and unusually daring behaviour, Saudi Arabia not only possibly hints about its intentions to assert a position of a regional leader, but is also sending a clear message to its closest ally, the US. And it says that from a Saudi standpoint, the US is turning itself into a less reliable partner, who in recent months has done three things around the Middle East that have startled and angered the Saudi royal family: the US quit its intentions for a military strike on Syria, it condemned the military coup in Egypt, and now it's enthusiastically embracing the idea of negotiations with KSA's main regional rival, Iran.
Let's face it, the Saudis are hardly among the biggest fans of the Arab spring. The Saudi monarchy was feeling pretty comfortably in the company of authoritarian Arab regimes in the past, because there were clear rules and predictable relations between them, which today are largely part of the past.
On one side, the wave of democratic protests that engulfed the Arab world in the recent years has scared the Al-Saud dynasty that it could spread into their lands and put an end to their rule, just like it did in Egypt. And Riyadh has invested a lot of time and resources to avoid that threat. On the other hand, the ascent of populist Islamist parties throughout the region is also a threat to the survival of the royal family. The Muslim Brotherhood and the other related movements are openly opposed to the old monarchic dynasties, because in their view the monarchs are "hypocritical, decadent, and traitors to Islam", due to their close relations and even their dependency on the West. So, Riyadh is risking to become isolated in the long term in a region dominated by governments that are ideologically hostile to it, and who even support Islamist organisations within Saudi Arabia itself.
The Arab Spring is only adding more fuel to an old fire that's been smouldering under the Saudi asses for quite some time. Ever since the Islamic revolution in Tehran, the Saudis have been viewing Iran as their main rival. The ayatollahs share the Muslim Brotherhood's hatred for monarchies of any kind. Meanwhile, Shia Iran has always been enemy number one of Saudi Arabia, one which the Saudis would hardly be able to deal with without help from outside.
After Iraq War v.2.0 and the fall of Saddam, Iran's main counterweight in the region was removed. Eventually Iraq fell under Iranian influence, and this allowed the ayatollahs to strengthen their positions in the entire region, and look more boldly to the geopolitical map. So in recent years Riyadh has found itself in a difficult and insecure position, where it has to simultaneously counter Iran's growing influence in Iraq and Syria (the support of Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood being one of the main tools), while being compelled to take a gamble and side with the military junta in Egypt in order to counter the Brotherhood there as well.
It was exactly in this context that Riyadh's idea for UNSC candidacy was born, and for a time it did look logical and natural. Sure, Saudi Arabia has always preferred to conduct its diplomacy behind the scenes, without attracting too much attention. But the developments in the region have put them in the spotlight on the international political scene, whether they liked it or not. Besides, their actions would hardly remain secret for too long, since they were now being looked under a magnifier by the whole world. And a UNSC membership would've at least granted them some extra international prestige and leverage, and it could've provided them with an opportunity to directly participate in the discussions on the future of the region - the Syrian issue and the Iranian nuclear program being of topmost priority.
But at some point the Saudis must have realised that participation in the debates for participation's sake wouldn't significantly help them, given Russia's firm stance coupled with the Russian right of veto. In the meantime, especially in recent months, it became clear that in many respects the Saudi positions and those of the US (a key ally and guarantor for KSA's national security) were diverting pretty seriously. In Egypt, the Saudis supported the military coup while the Americans condemned it and decided to cut some aid to Cairo. Later, when the use of chemical weapons in Syria was verified by the UN inspections, Riyadh insisted on a "resolute action" against Assad, while Obama preferred to play by the Russian proposal for dismantling Assad's chemical arsenal.
The Saudis keep repeating that Assad had crossed all the red lines that Obama had drawn, but this has eventually led to no consequences. Today there are official voices within the US itself, praising Assad for his helpfulness to the WMD experts and his compliance with the program for destroying his chemical weapons, as if his continuous murder of thousands of his own people is happening in some parallel reality. Today the US is preparing to sit on the table with the Iranians, and the Saudis (much like many other Arab countries in the Gulf region), are concerned that Tehran would be eventually recognised as a legitimate regime, and the sanctions would be dropped, without sufficiently guaranteeing the security of the remaining countries in the region. This fear has reached a point where even Israel could side with some of its former enemies to counter Iran's threat. Meanwhile, the Saudis are starting to view America as "too soft" and too weak a partner, one which they can't fully rely upon any more. And this is exactly the message they were trying to send by withdrawing from the UN Security Council. Yes, the message was not aimed at the UN, but rather the US.
It's another question what benefit this theatrical gesture would bring to the Saudis. The royal family are not stupid people, they must know that they'd hardly be able to withstand the Iranian pressure on their own, and they'll still have to rely on America's help and cooperation. I'm thinking that with this move they've left the door ajar for such an opportunity. If they had entered the UNSC, the open tensions between them and the US would've been exposed, they'd become an almost daily routine. The problems between them could be aggravated, and KSA would start to feel increasingly isolated, without allies at the UN. So, with their actions they could've skillfully avoided such a danger, while still reminding of themselves, and they may've made a point without necessarily worsening their relations with their allies too much.
And let's not forget that Riyadh has managed to rally a number of Arab countries to its cause - mainly countries who share the same fears. So we could expect Saudi Arabia to start conducting a bolder, more unilateral and US-independent policy in the region from now on. This of course doesn't mean that the "special relations" between the two countries would be scrapped. It's just that all the main prerequisites for them are still in place: the Saudis are capable of strongly influencing the world's oil supply, while the Americans are practically the only ones who could guarantee security in the Gulf region. Within or outside the UN, the two sides would hardly drift too far apart from each other anyway.