The road to Viktatorship
Viktor Orban, it seems, is a guy who never takes a "No" for an answer. No matter if it comes from the EU, from major international organizations or from the Constitutional court of his own country. The Hungarian prime-minister is unshakably convinced that he knows what's best for his people (which, surprise-surprise, is exactly what's best for his own party), and he'd stop at nothing to achieve it. I'm sure the constitutional amendments that he made last week will make his job even easier in this respect. And very soon Hungary will have to be characterized by just one word: Viktatorship.
Within less than a week the PM did so many crazy things: he changed the Constitution for the 4th time (in order to tame the Constitutional court, one of the very few institutions that still dared defy him); he took control of the Central Bank of Hungary by hand-picking his former Minister of the Economy (and close party buddy) to chair it; then he vowed that at least 50% of the banking sector would pass into Hungarian hands, as it was "unhealthy" if most of it was owned by foreign capital (a brave populist move, and yet utterly failing to comply with the reality that there's hardly nearly enough investor potential within Hungary itself to make this happen); he then attacked the court for its "scandalous" decision to repeal the unilateral government decision to suppress the gas prices in defiance of all market principles (another populist move that, however, earned him extra points among the populace); and for the umpteenth time he resorted to using rhetoric that described Hungary as a country besieged by hostile forces. The result of all that was that the markets got so nervous that last week the Hungarian currency sank to a 9-month low. And those guys in Brussels probably abandoned all hope that Orban could swiftly and efficiently steer the country back on course.
Until recently it looked like the "Victatorship" (as Orban's regime was called) could be stopped through some external pressure. When more than a year ago the EU, US and IMF ran the alarm that the center-right Fidesz party (which had a 2/3 majority in parliament) was performing a constitutional coup that would cement it in power for years ahead while destroying such basic principles of democracy like pluralism, that seemed to help, at least initially. After the EU froze some of the funds for Hungary and initiated a number of penal procedures against Orban's government, the storm seemed to have subsided and the country even managed to get more EU funds for the 2014-2020 period. The civil rights institutions at the Council of Europe recently concluded that Budapest was in line with most EU standards. And the US and IMF concerns were also toned down.
The reason was that, at least on the surface, the Hungarian government had backpedalled on some of the most controversial reforms, especially the ones related to media control and the appointment of judges. What's more, despite all concerns that the Constitutional court was still under pressure, it seemed to be doing its job well, and it even managed to torpedo some of the bills that were causing the most concern.
But now Viktor Orban is striking back, and openly challenging the EU. His revenge against those pesky magistrates in the Constitutional court came swiftly, despite all warnings from Brussels, Berlin, Washington and the Council of Europe, and the protests on the streets of Budapest. His revenge took the form of a 15-page document, which is now the 4th amendment to the new Constitution (which only took effect last year, by the way). The former head of the Constitutional cour and reputed legal expert Laszlo Solyom made a very sharp comment about the changes and urged his successor Janos Ader to veto them. But few are expecting the head of state (one of the founders of Fidesz) to defy his long-time party comrade Orban.
In essence, this 4th amendment directly attacks the Constitutional court, which, under the Hungarian one-chamber system is the main instrument of holding the executive power in check. Without it, Hungary would have no further limits for a parliamentary super-majority to do as it pleases, including to change the rules at will in order to harm its opponents. And the risk is for reaching a situation where no further elections could possibly remove the ruling party from power.
The amendment posulates that the court will no longer have any direct influence on the laws that are being voted through a 2/3 majority (which Fidesz does have in parliament), and even change the Constitution at a whim. All it'll be able to do is state an opinion on whether the procedure for the adoption of these laws has been observed, without being able to challenge their contents. What's more, the Constitutional court won't be able to cite general practice and prior precedent, including references to its own decisions in the last 20 years.
These elaborate legislative tricks will have serious consequences. It's obvious that Orban is trying to centralize all power into his own hands. He had almost managed to achieve this with the Hungarian parliamentary system, but his control could only be total if he neutralizes the Constitutional court. With this amendment, he has done just that. And this comes in addition to all his attempts to take control of the court from within - he recently extended the term of the constitutional magistrates from 5 to 9 years, and now he's actively working towards filling its ranks with people who are loyal to him. So, even at the unlikely scenario that the next Hungarian government does not belong to Fidesz, its job would be immensely complicated because of the Constitutional court, whose members will be loyal to Orban.
Orban's cabinet will be practically able to annull any court decision it doesn't like. But the problem is that no government in Europe can operate legally without a sanction from the respective court. And no government within EU can claim that it's following the framework agreement of the EU if it doesn't accept judicial limits on its power.
And there's still more. The 4th amendment includes laws that the Constitutional court had previously rejected - but now they'll take effect without an obstacle. One of them would force all students who've graduated at state universities to remain to work in Hungary for a certain period. And in case they still decide they want to go to work abroad, they'll have to pay for their entire education. Another part of the bill would force the political parties to run campaign ads only in state-owned media (including on EU parliamentary elections). And the fact is that all state-owned media are currently under Fidesz control. Their news segments abound of blatant propaganda and outright lies, many of them designed to smear Orban's opponents and paint him as the savior of the nation.
Oddly enough, despite all this, Orban's populist style apparently continues to appeal to the majority of his fellow countrymen. The support for Fidesz may or may not be slowly waning, but it's still by far the most popular party in the country. The problem is that most people are not bothered to concern themselves with theoretical constructs like the Constitution, and the long-term implications from these latest amendments. In fact, one could gather a few thousand youngsters on the streets of Budapest, who wear hipster clothes and glasses and who can cite Nietzsche by heart, and encourage them to protest against the changes in the Constitution. But the remaining 10 million Hungarians don't seem to give a cow's poop about all this. They're clearly more fascinated with the way their government has ordered the energy companies to immediately cut the prices by 10%. And everyone is so happy.
Meanwhile, there are mounting reports about suspicious "civic organizations" occasionally staging "peaceful protests" in support of the government, with slogans like "We love you Viktor" and "We'll never be a foreign colony". These meetings are usually much larger than the anti-Orban marches, and for that purpose the numerous Orban fans are encouraged to board the specially designated buses and trains, and march on the Budapest center where they're provided with warm food and clothes throughout the whole day of the "spontaneous protest". If we're to go as far as to compare the new Hungarian Constitution to those of the North Korean type, then perhaps that sort of pro-Orbanite ralllies might call some associations to the Milosevic style in Serbia.
The events in Hungary are as disturbing as they're embarrassing for the EU itself, because they make the EU look helpless in the face of the blatant disregard for all basic European principles and values. I suspect some people in Brussels still don't believe that Orban could be such a big threat, and they rather view him as a nuisance. Another explanation could be that they already know how dangerous he is, but they find it difficult to stop him without making themselves look bad, too. The truth is, the EU lacks the necessary instruments to prevent any one of its members from succumbing to autocracy. It cannot even throw a member out of the club becaue of that.
All the EU has got, apart from the "soft power" of political and dipliomatic pressure and the penal procedures with the EU funds (which, however, are way too complicated and take a lot of time to kick in), is the so called "nuclear option", i.e. Article 7 of the Lisboa Treaty, which allows the European Council to temporarily take away the voting right of a certain member if its transgressions have become too bad. But it has never been used before, and despite all signals coming from Brussels that the option is being considered, it's highly unlikely that it would come to that.
A few days ago the foreign ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark proposed a different approach: a mechanism of deprivation of EU funds in case a country disregards the primacy of law and violates the EU principles. And that make sense. Because ultimately, the financial pressure could turn out far more efficient than the political one, especially in Hungary's case where the EU subsidies it receives annually constitute a relatively high share of its GDP. So the economic threat could force Orban to get back in line, and think twice before spitting on democracy ever again. But the problem is that the budget cuts that would result from this measure would most likely cause much more pain to the Hungarian people than to their government. On the other hand, that could be the trigger that could make them realize how deceived they've been all along, and set things right on their own. One thing is certain: these will be both sad and interesting times for Hungary.
Within less than a week the PM did so many crazy things: he changed the Constitution for the 4th time (in order to tame the Constitutional court, one of the very few institutions that still dared defy him); he took control of the Central Bank of Hungary by hand-picking his former Minister of the Economy (and close party buddy) to chair it; then he vowed that at least 50% of the banking sector would pass into Hungarian hands, as it was "unhealthy" if most of it was owned by foreign capital (a brave populist move, and yet utterly failing to comply with the reality that there's hardly nearly enough investor potential within Hungary itself to make this happen); he then attacked the court for its "scandalous" decision to repeal the unilateral government decision to suppress the gas prices in defiance of all market principles (another populist move that, however, earned him extra points among the populace); and for the umpteenth time he resorted to using rhetoric that described Hungary as a country besieged by hostile forces. The result of all that was that the markets got so nervous that last week the Hungarian currency sank to a 9-month low. And those guys in Brussels probably abandoned all hope that Orban could swiftly and efficiently steer the country back on course.
Until recently it looked like the "Victatorship" (as Orban's regime was called) could be stopped through some external pressure. When more than a year ago the EU, US and IMF ran the alarm that the center-right Fidesz party (which had a 2/3 majority in parliament) was performing a constitutional coup that would cement it in power for years ahead while destroying such basic principles of democracy like pluralism, that seemed to help, at least initially. After the EU froze some of the funds for Hungary and initiated a number of penal procedures against Orban's government, the storm seemed to have subsided and the country even managed to get more EU funds for the 2014-2020 period. The civil rights institutions at the Council of Europe recently concluded that Budapest was in line with most EU standards. And the US and IMF concerns were also toned down.
The reason was that, at least on the surface, the Hungarian government had backpedalled on some of the most controversial reforms, especially the ones related to media control and the appointment of judges. What's more, despite all concerns that the Constitutional court was still under pressure, it seemed to be doing its job well, and it even managed to torpedo some of the bills that were causing the most concern.
But now Viktor Orban is striking back, and openly challenging the EU. His revenge against those pesky magistrates in the Constitutional court came swiftly, despite all warnings from Brussels, Berlin, Washington and the Council of Europe, and the protests on the streets of Budapest. His revenge took the form of a 15-page document, which is now the 4th amendment to the new Constitution (which only took effect last year, by the way). The former head of the Constitutional cour and reputed legal expert Laszlo Solyom made a very sharp comment about the changes and urged his successor Janos Ader to veto them. But few are expecting the head of state (one of the founders of Fidesz) to defy his long-time party comrade Orban.
In essence, this 4th amendment directly attacks the Constitutional court, which, under the Hungarian one-chamber system is the main instrument of holding the executive power in check. Without it, Hungary would have no further limits for a parliamentary super-majority to do as it pleases, including to change the rules at will in order to harm its opponents. And the risk is for reaching a situation where no further elections could possibly remove the ruling party from power.
The amendment posulates that the court will no longer have any direct influence on the laws that are being voted through a 2/3 majority (which Fidesz does have in parliament), and even change the Constitution at a whim. All it'll be able to do is state an opinion on whether the procedure for the adoption of these laws has been observed, without being able to challenge their contents. What's more, the Constitutional court won't be able to cite general practice and prior precedent, including references to its own decisions in the last 20 years.
These elaborate legislative tricks will have serious consequences. It's obvious that Orban is trying to centralize all power into his own hands. He had almost managed to achieve this with the Hungarian parliamentary system, but his control could only be total if he neutralizes the Constitutional court. With this amendment, he has done just that. And this comes in addition to all his attempts to take control of the court from within - he recently extended the term of the constitutional magistrates from 5 to 9 years, and now he's actively working towards filling its ranks with people who are loyal to him. So, even at the unlikely scenario that the next Hungarian government does not belong to Fidesz, its job would be immensely complicated because of the Constitutional court, whose members will be loyal to Orban.
Orban's cabinet will be practically able to annull any court decision it doesn't like. But the problem is that no government in Europe can operate legally without a sanction from the respective court. And no government within EU can claim that it's following the framework agreement of the EU if it doesn't accept judicial limits on its power.
And there's still more. The 4th amendment includes laws that the Constitutional court had previously rejected - but now they'll take effect without an obstacle. One of them would force all students who've graduated at state universities to remain to work in Hungary for a certain period. And in case they still decide they want to go to work abroad, they'll have to pay for their entire education. Another part of the bill would force the political parties to run campaign ads only in state-owned media (including on EU parliamentary elections). And the fact is that all state-owned media are currently under Fidesz control. Their news segments abound of blatant propaganda and outright lies, many of them designed to smear Orban's opponents and paint him as the savior of the nation.
Oddly enough, despite all this, Orban's populist style apparently continues to appeal to the majority of his fellow countrymen. The support for Fidesz may or may not be slowly waning, but it's still by far the most popular party in the country. The problem is that most people are not bothered to concern themselves with theoretical constructs like the Constitution, and the long-term implications from these latest amendments. In fact, one could gather a few thousand youngsters on the streets of Budapest, who wear hipster clothes and glasses and who can cite Nietzsche by heart, and encourage them to protest against the changes in the Constitution. But the remaining 10 million Hungarians don't seem to give a cow's poop about all this. They're clearly more fascinated with the way their government has ordered the energy companies to immediately cut the prices by 10%. And everyone is so happy.
Meanwhile, there are mounting reports about suspicious "civic organizations" occasionally staging "peaceful protests" in support of the government, with slogans like "We love you Viktor" and "We'll never be a foreign colony". These meetings are usually much larger than the anti-Orban marches, and for that purpose the numerous Orban fans are encouraged to board the specially designated buses and trains, and march on the Budapest center where they're provided with warm food and clothes throughout the whole day of the "spontaneous protest". If we're to go as far as to compare the new Hungarian Constitution to those of the North Korean type, then perhaps that sort of pro-Orbanite ralllies might call some associations to the Milosevic style in Serbia.
The events in Hungary are as disturbing as they're embarrassing for the EU itself, because they make the EU look helpless in the face of the blatant disregard for all basic European principles and values. I suspect some people in Brussels still don't believe that Orban could be such a big threat, and they rather view him as a nuisance. Another explanation could be that they already know how dangerous he is, but they find it difficult to stop him without making themselves look bad, too. The truth is, the EU lacks the necessary instruments to prevent any one of its members from succumbing to autocracy. It cannot even throw a member out of the club becaue of that.
All the EU has got, apart from the "soft power" of political and dipliomatic pressure and the penal procedures with the EU funds (which, however, are way too complicated and take a lot of time to kick in), is the so called "nuclear option", i.e. Article 7 of the Lisboa Treaty, which allows the European Council to temporarily take away the voting right of a certain member if its transgressions have become too bad. But it has never been used before, and despite all signals coming from Brussels that the option is being considered, it's highly unlikely that it would come to that.
A few days ago the foreign ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark proposed a different approach: a mechanism of deprivation of EU funds in case a country disregards the primacy of law and violates the EU principles. And that make sense. Because ultimately, the financial pressure could turn out far more efficient than the political one, especially in Hungary's case where the EU subsidies it receives annually constitute a relatively high share of its GDP. So the economic threat could force Orban to get back in line, and think twice before spitting on democracy ever again. But the problem is that the budget cuts that would result from this measure would most likely cause much more pain to the Hungarian people than to their government. On the other hand, that could be the trigger that could make them realize how deceived they've been all along, and set things right on their own. One thing is certain: these will be both sad and interesting times for Hungary.