Re: If you can catalog it then it can be cataloged.strawcatJanuary 12 2011, 05:15:07 UTC
..and if you can't see, hear, smell, touch, or taste something, then it can't be studied empirically. It is outside the realm of human knowledge at least as far as empiricism is concerned. Science makes no attempt and cannot attempt to resolve metaphysical problems that cannot be reduced to physical problems, nor problems of value and morality that cannot be reduced to problems of fact. It cannot tell us whether there is such a thing as "intrinsic value" and where it can be found. This is because science purports to be detached, objective and only studies the observable physical world, and everything else is thereby out of its scope. I'm not stating an opinion here, I'm just regurgitating the methodology that makes science what it is. If it purported to do otherwise, it simply wouldn't be science as we know it.
A difference in definitionsvindonnusJanuary 17 2011, 02:13:13 UTC
I wouldn't describe purely conceptual issues (i.e. Those w/o physical consequences) as "problems." Then again we clearly differ on this point. I'm almost with Dr. Szasz here, in fact, if there is no lesion there is no disease. However, this does NOT mean there is no lesion to discover... Just that we don't know what it is yet.
Re: A difference in definitionsstrawcatJanuary 17 2011, 20:59:49 UTC
I would emphasize that a crisis of the psyche/spirit (e.g. existential angst, the 'problem' of evil, issues of guilt, etc.) is a problem for those who experience it, and would precipitate many questions about the universe and our place in it, that are no less substantial as "problems" (and perhaps moreso) as issues of mass and volume. And nor are these the sorts of problems that necessitate the finding of a reducibly physical cause in order to validate them or solve them. To even search around for such as if there could be one (like turning over stones to find intrinsic value) may be wrongheaded. On that note I would also urge that most questions are prompted by perfectly healthy individuals in case certain physicalists start chanting about chemical imbalances in the brain and such
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A few things then...vindonnusJanuary 20 2011, 04:59:40 UTC
What I'm asserting is that there is no spirit outside of our physical selves. This is where I differ from Dr. Szasz. This is probably the most extreme physical-ist stance possible as it implies that most, if not all, "problems" of the psyche can be solved with physical means. This doesn't mean that we have the tools to do this, or that we will ever have the tools to do this, but, rather, that this could be done (physically/empirically) if the tools could be made.
In terms of value questions, well, I believe that any problem, by definition, has some real solution(s). My sense of things in philosophy is, in essence, whatever you select ("whatever floats your boat") is what works (as long as it is internally consistent). However, this doesn't necessarily point to a real solution, because for anything to be real it has to be subject to shared observation. This stance goes hand-in-hand with my personal ethic/rule of thumb that "right makes mighty." Sort of an inversion of the old "might makes right" idea. It can be noted that this
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In terms of value questions, well, I believe that any problem, by definition, has some real solution(s). My sense of things in philosophy is, in essence, whatever you select ("whatever floats your boat") is what works (as long as it is internally consistent). However, this doesn't necessarily point to a real solution, because for anything to be real it has to be subject to shared observation. This stance goes hand-in-hand with my personal ethic/rule of thumb that "right makes mighty." Sort of an inversion of the old "might makes right" idea. It can be noted that this ( ... )
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