Down a Rabbit Hole of Theory?
There are points at which theoretical physics starts looking more like philosophy than an actual hard science. Quantum mechanics is the most obvious, with its arguments about the Copenhagen Interpretation vs. the Many Worlds Interpretation, a question that cannot be empirically tested. But some other areas of physics seem to be going down unproductive philosophical dead ends as well, especially when dealing with Grand Unified Theories of Everything that try to explain all the forces and particle families in the universe.
It's a bit amusing to me to come across this article right as I'm reading Neal Stephenson's Anathem, which deals with a world in which philosophers and theoretical physicists have been enclosed in cloistered establishments known as maths, which are a sort of secular, co-ed monastery system. Some of them get into some truly deep philosophical discussions about the fundamentals of physics and the nature of knowledge that have that feeling of going down a rabbit hole of thought. Which suggests that there might be something about this sort of inquiry that appeals to a certain kind of mind, to the point of excluding all else.
It's a bit amusing to me to come across this article right as I'm reading Neal Stephenson's Anathem, which deals with a world in which philosophers and theoretical physicists have been enclosed in cloistered establishments known as maths, which are a sort of secular, co-ed monastery system. Some of them get into some truly deep philosophical discussions about the fundamentals of physics and the nature of knowledge that have that feeling of going down a rabbit hole of thought. Which suggests that there might be something about this sort of inquiry that appeals to a certain kind of mind, to the point of excluding all else.