The Abyss is in the Pyramid V- the problem of personality
There was a Muslim Brotherhood backed assassination attempt on Egyptian President Nasser in 1954. It was a crucial time. Nasser was promoting his program of limited land ownership, and redistribution of the lands which would be confiscated from a few feudal families of landlords. This was something which Hassan al-Banna, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, considered to be heretical to the extreme. It is a point that is interesting to note, that Islamic fundamentalists in both Pakistan and the middle-east agree on, that any limits to wealth and land ownership are seen as “against the Qur’an.” Nasser is possibly the best example, with the possible exception of Ghandi, (who will be treated in some detail in a future post) of an individual capable of raising a powerful and effective cult of personality which disintegrated after his death. The forces that Nasser opposed, without him there to personally confront them, eventually triumphed and it is now isolationist Islamic Nationalism, not practical Arab Nationalism, which sets the political tone of the opposition to colonial power in the middle-east.
The opposition to limits on wealth and ownership make up a large part of the reason that the Brethren were the natural enemies of communism and leftist ideology, and part of the reason that they were natural allies of the west against the Soviets, although that threat was not genuine or significant to any reasonable analysis of global affairs. The assassination attempt came on the heels of a deal struck by al-Banna for support from the Saudi royal family in 1953. Interestingly, the Brethren did not originally promote extreme Wahhabism. They did not start attacking liquor stores and bars or insisting that women be veiled until that deal was struck. The political Islam of the Brethren has always been somewhat vague, and dependent on circumstances. The support of the Saudis influenced their policies a great deal, but that influence was not solidified until the early ‘70s and the rise of OPEC. It seems likely that Nasser’s program would compromise a lot of al-Banna’s supporters within Egypt, as well as threaten feudal landlords in neighbouring countries. Their methods, however, backfired.
The gunman appeared in the front rows and fired eight times at the Egyptian President, wounding some of his bodyguards but missing his target. Nasser immediately stood up, asked for calm, and told the audience: “If Nasser dies here today, then you are all Nasser. I am willing to sacrifice myself for the nation.” The audience reaction was, as one can imagine, hysterical. Nasser raised his hands behind his head and shook his fingers in a Said tribe gesture of triumph.
Nasser orchestrated a multilayered mass media campaign to secure popular support for his rule. There were pop songs recorded about him, plays mocking his political enemies were written and performed, and a series of “fireside chat” style broadcasts, as well as the spread of stories of his ingenuity and bravery in organizing the overthrow of Farouk’s dynasty. This media-awareness did not come out of nowhere. One thing we do about Nasser’s personal life before the military was that he loved movies, and continued to do so throughout his life. He was also interested in photography, and took hundreds of pictures and home movies. He understood the power of the image in the new media before the political leadership of the west.
What Egypt needed was a symbol. There was a vacuum in Egyptian culture waiting to be filled, and What must be understood about the British occupation is that it was, whether intentionally so or the consequence of natural English cultural myopia, humiliating. Anyone who wanted could come and join Farouk’s party. The “Aliens’ Privileges”* law severely restricted Egyptian self governance. Foreigners could not be arrested by Egyptian police or tried by Egyptian courts. The state could only inform the embassy from their country of origin, which would decide whether or not to take action. It is not difficult to imagine the element attracted by these conditions. Cairo had become a favourite dumping ground for eurotrash. There was little talk of independence among Egyptian intellectuals. The closest thing to revolutionary ideas came from those who longed for the days of the French occupation, or those who hoped to see the axis defeat the allies in W.W.II, so that control of Egypt would be transferred to Italy. The idea that “anything would be better than the English” and the lack of strong nationalist feelings gave rise to low expectations. These are part, but not all, of what created the cultural vacuum.
In the introduction to his biography of Nasser, Said K. Aburish makes a statement which figuratively leaps off the page. He observes that the nature of dictatorship is such that it is impossible to build durable political institutions. When a colonial empire crumbles and the imperial forces withdraw, they leave behind dictators to protect their interests. These dictators are sometimes overthrown, but because they have such massive military power due to imperial support, they can generally only be overthrown by a similarly authoritarian, usually also imperially armed, force. These coups are necessary to facilitate the transition from one dictator to another. As Aburish writes:
“...dictatorships leave us with no institutions to examine; the cult of personality created by dictators excludes the development of durable political institutions. ... Even the legendary unifier of the Arabian peninsula, Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, left us with nothing but a family of awesome statistical proportions. The House of Saud fails to qualify as an institution, unless perpetuating despotism is elevated to an accepted form of continuity. So the absence of institutions places the Arab leaders in the unique position of the sole representatives of their time.”
-Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab
Vacuums of this nature exist in our culture today. Individuals must recognize the opportunities that these vacuums present. At the same time, those individuals must also be aware of what they use to fill them. A cult of personality has no continuity beyond the life of the individual. Although many people who know his history consider Aleister Crowley to an egotistical bastard, I think it is significant that he avoided a cult of personality and devoted himself to the establishment of an institution that would carry on his work. People cannot withstand becoming symbols (unless, of course, they comprehend Liber Asarte) without severely warping themselves, but institutions are themselves yetziric manifestations, and can as such more authentically bring the symbol into reality. There is nothing more dangerous in a powerful individual than a hostility to institutions. At best, their power will inevitably be squandered in the long run, and uselessly destructive in the short term.
The biography of Nasser is a lesson in HOW power corrupts. I do not believe that it necessarily MUST corrupt, but future posts will examine this case study in some more detail. The danger of trying to manifest a symbol in reality through a human vehicle which has not been properly prepared. Nasser had no magical link connecting him with the Egypt he was trying to symbolize. His link was to the ideal, not the reality. This created a dyad, "two Nassers." And as Arbuish observes, quoting another journalist on the subject *source, "one of them was a Tyrant."
The A is in the P, pre., The A is in the P I, The A is in the P II, The A is in the P III, The A is in the P IV