(no subject)
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
I. Desire is the actual essence of man.
II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.
III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection. I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of pleasure. The contrary emotion, pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity.
IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts.
VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire. Explanation-Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.
XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.
XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future.
XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.
XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.
XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.
XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.
XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.
XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.
XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.
XXX. Honour is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.
XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.
XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Cor. ii and note.)
XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.
XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.
XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse. Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust.
I. Desire is the actual essence of man.
II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.
III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection. I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of pleasure. The contrary emotion, pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity.
IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts.
VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire. Explanation-Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.
XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.
XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future.
XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.
XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.
XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.
XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.
XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.
XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.
XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.
XXX. Honour is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.
XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.
XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Cor. ii and note.)
XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.
XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.
XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse. Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust.