I consider you less of a friend and more of a societal casualty
There are two “paths” from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude: the ontological way and the Cartesian way. The ontological way to reduction arises from the desire to have a unified and comprehensive understanding of the subjective correlates of our knowledge in the natural attitude. Practitioners within the empirical sciences themselves develop a body of knowledge about things out in the world, but there is no comprehensive understanding of the particular intentionalities correlated with those observations and judgments. This is where phenomenology steps in to rationally reconstruct the particular intentionalities that disclose the objects of the sciences. This is done by means of phenomenological reduction or the “freezing’ in place we saw earlier. But once one begins to philosophically examine the intentionalities inherent in solid state physics or history, for example, the whole of intentionality becomes an object of investigation, along with the world, the broadest context within which all intentionality takes place.
The second, far more frightening path to phenomenology is the Cartesian way to reduction. Descartes famously pursued the method of systematically doubting everything he thought he knew in the interest of arriving at a certain foundation upon which to construct knowledge. The problem here is that Descartes moves from one set of natural modalities -- belief - to yet another natural modality - doubtfulness. He never elevates himself to the level from which he can explicitly and philosophically reflect upon the natural attitude itself.
The phenomenologist attempts to improve upon the Cartesian method by asking us, not to doubt everything we think we know, but rather to attempt to doubt what we know. The shift here is subtle but crucial. In order to doubt something, we have to have a reason to doubt it. It’s impossible to gaze out on to the world and to doubt that what we see is really there. If I see a cat walk through an open door, there’s almost no way I can doubt whether this is real. Some things we can’t doubt, even if they don’t seem fully grounded. Granted, if the lighting is poor, I may make a mistake about what I see, but then there’s a reason to doubt.
Systematically attempting to doubt is analogous to the suspension of the intentionalities of the natural attitude that takes place in the phenomenological reduction. We distance ourselves not only from the objects of our intentionalities but from the intentionalities themselves, thereby allowing us to examine whether we are capable of adopting a stance of doubt toward them. When we sight our intentionalities for the possibility of doubt, we isolate and “freeze” them in place; we adopt a reflective, objective stance toward them. In this way we bring into theoretical view not just this intentionality or that, but rather all of the intentionalities along with the ultimate context in which they all occur: the world itself.
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these methods. The ontological method proceeds slowly and carefully, although sometimes it is difficult to see the radicality in it. The Cartesian method happens “all at once,” and so it brings to the foreground how different the phenomenological attitude is from the natural attitude. But because it is so radical, there’s the tendency to confuse it with skepticism and solipsism. (Indeed, many critics have unfairly leveled this accusation against Husserl as a result of their misunderstanding of the meaning of this path.) Probably the best way to proceed is to employ one method or the other where it seems most appropriate.
The second, far more frightening path to phenomenology is the Cartesian way to reduction. Descartes famously pursued the method of systematically doubting everything he thought he knew in the interest of arriving at a certain foundation upon which to construct knowledge. The problem here is that Descartes moves from one set of natural modalities -- belief - to yet another natural modality - doubtfulness. He never elevates himself to the level from which he can explicitly and philosophically reflect upon the natural attitude itself.
The phenomenologist attempts to improve upon the Cartesian method by asking us, not to doubt everything we think we know, but rather to attempt to doubt what we know. The shift here is subtle but crucial. In order to doubt something, we have to have a reason to doubt it. It’s impossible to gaze out on to the world and to doubt that what we see is really there. If I see a cat walk through an open door, there’s almost no way I can doubt whether this is real. Some things we can’t doubt, even if they don’t seem fully grounded. Granted, if the lighting is poor, I may make a mistake about what I see, but then there’s a reason to doubt.
Systematically attempting to doubt is analogous to the suspension of the intentionalities of the natural attitude that takes place in the phenomenological reduction. We distance ourselves not only from the objects of our intentionalities but from the intentionalities themselves, thereby allowing us to examine whether we are capable of adopting a stance of doubt toward them. When we sight our intentionalities for the possibility of doubt, we isolate and “freeze” them in place; we adopt a reflective, objective stance toward them. In this way we bring into theoretical view not just this intentionality or that, but rather all of the intentionalities along with the ultimate context in which they all occur: the world itself.
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these methods. The ontological method proceeds slowly and carefully, although sometimes it is difficult to see the radicality in it. The Cartesian method happens “all at once,” and so it brings to the foreground how different the phenomenological attitude is from the natural attitude. But because it is so radical, there’s the tendency to confuse it with skepticism and solipsism. (Indeed, many critics have unfairly leveled this accusation against Husserl as a result of their misunderstanding of the meaning of this path.) Probably the best way to proceed is to employ one method or the other where it seems most appropriate.