Не способны провести историческую аналогию

[shoehanger]

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Бои между большими надводными кораблями основные игроки в мире (кроме России, и, видимо, Китая) считают, в принципе, возможными, но вторичными по сравнению с другими их задачами (обеспечение противолодочной обороны и противовоздушной обороны корабельных соединений).

Кто прав?

На первый взгляд - Запад.

Во-первых, действительно, ничто не может сравниться по разрушительной силе с массированным авиаударом. А современные атомные подлодки представляют собой огромную опасность для надводных кораблей.

Но в то же время против этих доводов говорит история.

Так, за всю историю человечества после 1945 года только две дизель-электрических и одна атомная подлодка уничтожили по одному кораблю на реальной войне.

В 1971 году пакистанская ДЭПЛ «Хангор» потопила индийский фрегат «Кукри». А в 1982 - произошла известная атака атомной подлодкой «Конкэрор» ВМС Великобритании аргентинского крейсера «Генерал Бельграно». В 2010 году предположительно северокорейская подлодка потопила южнокорейский корвет «Чхонан».

Всё.

А вот боёв между надводными кораблями и уничтожения надводных сил надводными силами было куда как больше - в разы. Начиная с уничтожения эсминца ВМС Израиля «Эйлат» ракетными катерами ВМС Египта в 1967-м году. И далее 1971 год - Индо-пакистанская война. 1973 - арабо-израильская. 1974 - бои за Парасельские острова. 80-е - танкерная война в Персидском заливе. И под занавес холодной войны - операция «Богомол», в которой один из иранских кораблей («Джошан») был уничтожен ракетной атакой американских кораблей. Ещё один корабль («Саханд») - совместным ударом ракетного корабля и палубного штурмовика. А также китайская операция на островах Спратли в 1988.

Количество боевых кораблей и катеров (вместе), погибших в этих боях, исчисляется десятками.

https://topwar.ru/181114-morskaja-vojna-dlja-nachinajuschih-morskoj-boj.html

There is a perception throughout much of the Navy and the American public that extensive damage and losses to U.S. naval forces are not possible, nor are they tolerable. There is no basis for this. In fact, history shows that warfare within the constraints of the littoral arena is fast, furious, and deadly. Conflicts such as the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1980-1987 Iran-Iraq War, and the Falklands War of 1982, suggest otherwise.

Historical Perspective

The Israeli Navy provides a superb example of the development and implementation of tactics, doctrine and training aimed to counter the threats which it confronted in Eastern Mediterranean littoral waters before the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Still inferior in ASCM range to the Egyptians, the Israelis were nonetheless engaged in well advanced thought of how to employ these new craft even before they were delivered. Scouting procedures, EM CON conditions, electronic warfare, hardkill and softkill anti-missile procedures, coordinated anti-ship missile attacks, as well as gunnery procedures, were developed and extensively tested both at sea and inport with the use of state-of-the-art tactical trainers in Haifa.

The tests served as a mechanism for identifying weaknesses and shortfalls in their tactics, which were then evaluated, refined, adopted, and mastered. The exercises served to build proficiency and confidence in their ability to fight as a team. The entire naval force developed a common bond and mutual understanding of their procedures and how they were to be executed. Eventually this bond and mutual understanding coalesced into a simple, clear and powerful doctrine which each and every member of the naval force - from the most junior sailor to the highest ranking officer - could relate to, understand, and execute in battle.

It also shows how the anti ship cruise missile advantage of the Syrians lulled them into carelessness, and the absence of well thought out combat doctrine.

The paradigm shift from open ocean operations to operations near land, which we now see in the U.S. Navy, is not an anomaly. The study of maritime history reveals that the most common employment of navies has been the support of operations ashore, the landing of forces, and the protection of shipping at sea.

In fact, a review of the period of confrontation with the Soviet Union, roughly 1950-1990, shows that there is a dichotomy between U.S. Navy strategy and actual force employment. Maritime strategy during this time frame was developed to gain sea control, support a major war in Europe, and attack the Soviet homeland directly - blue water missions. However, the actual employment of American naval forces was conducted near land in many and varied circumstances throughout the world. Air strikes in North Vietnam, cruise missile strikes against Iraq, naval gunfire support in Lebanon, amphibious landings in Korea, blockade operations against Cuba, and maritime interdiction operations in the Adriatic are just a few examples of such operations.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36724868.pdf

The Navy is also not likely to receive a greater portion of a flat or declining DoD budget. Some analysts and former defense officials recommend the Service’s slice of the shrinking budget pie increase because naval forces are important to defense priorities such as the Asia-Pacific rebalance and “small footprint” counterterrorism operations described in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, such a shift would be inconsistent with the history of the past seventy years - it happened only once since World War II.

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185614/A-Plan-To-Reinvigorate-US-Navy-Surface-Warfare.pdf

Is there any evidence to suggest that frigates or corvettes would be much harder to target with ASBMs via the OTH kill chain that the PRC presumably has in place for CBGs?

Zero. Frigates and corvettes aren't about survivability or lethality, they're about affordability with a healthy dose of SWO's and transformationalists pretending the lessons of WWII no longer apply.

I agree. The SWOs current focus on Distributed Lethality seems to ignore the fact that airpower and submarines have been the principal ship-killers since about 1941. That's the key problem when you rely on a TYCOM to build a Navy wide strategy.

The antidote to corvettes and frigates is... air power. Those ships simply don't have the magazine depth or detection range (don't have time to shoot-look-shoot) to survive against sustained air attacks. So if anything it's an argument for proliferation of air power beyond the CVNs.

https://news.usni.org/2020/06/04/navy-lacks-clear-theory-of-victory-needed-to-build-new-fleet-experts-tell-house-panel

То есть ВМУЗы США готовят специалистов по Liveral arts, а те вместо истории и дайверсити в матчасть норовят свалиться?..