Climates of Massacre
The essay below is about the My Lai Massacre. Any academics out there, feedback is welcome. also if you want to proof it that'd be cool. I'm not turning it in untill 9am.
Ron Ridenhour exposed what might have been the worse atrocity of the Viet Nam conflict. His letter sent to top officials in the government, told an eerie tale of the slaughter of civilian men, women, and children, by American soldiers. The true horror of this lies not in the fact that there was an atrocity committed. People of other countries are senseless killers, not Americans. Unfortunately this is not the case, and the slayings of close to 500 Vietnamese people, on March 16 1968, were committed by US troops. A closer look is necessary so that we might learn what circumstances could have lead to such a massacre, because armed with this knowledge it might be possible to keep an act of such inhumanity from readily happening again. My Lai: A Brief History with Documents gives us the look at this event needed by providing a number of primary and secondary sources. From careful consideration of the evidence, we learn that the circumstances of the fighting in Vietnam created an environment where a massacre was inevitable.
When Charlie Company was deployed to the Quang Ngai Province in December of 1967, they where deployed to an area of South Vietnam that was known to be an extremely hostile and volatile area, where most civilians support the enemy. The first document I examined was written in 1970 and presents the findings of the Peers Commission, the official investigation headed by Lt. General William Peers. The document titled, “Military Situation in Quang Ngai Province” explains the enemy situation, gives background on Son My village and the people of the province, and also explains the enemy’s tactics and techniques. In this document, the first traces of a climate that would permit massacre appear. The total strength of the enemy forces in the province of Quang Ngai was thought to be around 10,000-14,000 men. According to the commission’s findings, “Members of the 48th LF Battalion reportedly lived with the local villagers in order to conceal their presence, often working as farmers during the day and fighting as guerrillas at night.” The 48th had suffered heavily during the Tet offensive, and at the time of the massacre it was estimated that there were only 200-250 of them in the area; however there were two other companies in the same area that occasionally helped them making the total number of guerrillas around 700. The government of Vietnam considered the people in the Son My area to be VC or VC supporters. The soldiers of Charlie Company found themselves in an area where anybody could be the enemy. How were the soldiers to fight, if they could not determine who the enemy was? The enemy’s tactics and techniques played heavily on this weakness. Preferring to remain invisible “The VC made extensive use of mines and "…,” which “In addition to the men…children, women, and old men…” placed overnight. It becomes clear now, that enemy was truly indistinguishable. The VC used mines to slow process to their controlled areas. However successful this tactic was, all it did was create hate and frustration at the unknown enemy.
The hate and frustration is directly linked to the trend of US solders to dehumanize the South Vietnamese, in their minds. The second document examined is a Testimony to the Peers Commission in 1970, by Michael Bernhardt. Bernhardt was a rifleman with the 2nd Squad of the 2nd Platoon who did not take place in the killing of the day. In his testimony to the commission Bernhardt, describes the attitudes of the average GI. According to him the root of the problem is rooted in language, because, “…a person loses a certain aspect for being valued as a human being if you cannot understand them…” He goes on to say, “…since the Vietnamese were speaking something that we could not understand, [US soldiers] felt that they weren’t communicating with anyone.” With such attitudes the norm among soldiers, atrocity is to be expected. If you don’t consider someone human, it opens the gates for murder, rape, and brutality towards them, a well observed fact from the African-American experience in America. Such beliefs were no doubt made worse by the officers, Bernhardt tells of a time after failing to communicate with Vietnamese civilians, ”After that time Lieutenant Calley said to me that “the old man” says -which could mean any “old man,” the company commander, the battalion commander - said that if they don’t stope when you say “dung lai,” you shoot them.” Civilians not stopping due to a failure to communicate may not seem like a reason to be cautious until one thinks that the enemy could be anybody. In this environment of fear and hatred with an invisible enemy, a paranoia arose which combined with American dehumanization encouraged by officers, cultivated the climate of massacre.
Lieutenant William L. Calley was commander of Charlie Company’s 1st Platoon. Calley was known to not be able to read maps or carry out basic operations, and was generally considered to be a bad leader. Despite his ineptness Calley was made a platoon leader because of a shortage of officers. Calley is the subject of the third document, “Testimony at Court-Martial” which took place in 1970. This third document shows how the “climate of massacre” leads to the killing of 500 South Vietnamese. Calley believed that “…all orders were to be assumed legal, that it was a soldier’s job to carry out any order given to him…” Calley believed he was following orders given to him by Capitan Medina when he was slaughtering innocents, because in a briefing the previous night Medina said that people in the area were the ones hurting US soldiers and that it was time to start treating them as enemies. According to Calley he was told to “neutralize My Lai (4) completely…,” by Capitan Medina and he interpreted the the instructions as ”…it was our job to go through destroying everyone and everything in there” The company was told that all civilians had left the area and Calley believed that to the T. When he was killing women, children, and old men he thought he was killing the enemy and was thus right in doing so. Calley elaborates in his testimony, “I was ordered to go in there and destroy the enemy…I did not sit down and think in terms of me, women, and children. They were all classified the same, and that was the classification that we dealt with, just as enemy soldiers, sir.”
So why did a massacre occur on the morning of March 16, 1968? One theory is that the military situation (faceless enemy and their tactics), and the dehumanization of the South Vietnamese created an environment in which massacre was inevitable. It is important to parallels between then and now. We are in a military situation now very similar to Vietnam. We are facing a faceless enemy that blends into the local populace, and uses similar guerilla tactics like those used by the VC, in a war that knows no borders. The prison scandle at Abu-Grav, shows that American forces have dehumanized the enemy. If the US Army didn’t learn its lesson in Vietnam, it might get its second chance soon.
Ron Ridenhour exposed what might have been the worse atrocity of the Viet Nam conflict. His letter sent to top officials in the government, told an eerie tale of the slaughter of civilian men, women, and children, by American soldiers. The true horror of this lies not in the fact that there was an atrocity committed. People of other countries are senseless killers, not Americans. Unfortunately this is not the case, and the slayings of close to 500 Vietnamese people, on March 16 1968, were committed by US troops. A closer look is necessary so that we might learn what circumstances could have lead to such a massacre, because armed with this knowledge it might be possible to keep an act of such inhumanity from readily happening again. My Lai: A Brief History with Documents gives us the look at this event needed by providing a number of primary and secondary sources. From careful consideration of the evidence, we learn that the circumstances of the fighting in Vietnam created an environment where a massacre was inevitable.
When Charlie Company was deployed to the Quang Ngai Province in December of 1967, they where deployed to an area of South Vietnam that was known to be an extremely hostile and volatile area, where most civilians support the enemy. The first document I examined was written in 1970 and presents the findings of the Peers Commission, the official investigation headed by Lt. General William Peers. The document titled, “Military Situation in Quang Ngai Province” explains the enemy situation, gives background on Son My village and the people of the province, and also explains the enemy’s tactics and techniques. In this document, the first traces of a climate that would permit massacre appear. The total strength of the enemy forces in the province of Quang Ngai was thought to be around 10,000-14,000 men. According to the commission’s findings, “Members of the 48th LF Battalion reportedly lived with the local villagers in order to conceal their presence, often working as farmers during the day and fighting as guerrillas at night.” The 48th had suffered heavily during the Tet offensive, and at the time of the massacre it was estimated that there were only 200-250 of them in the area; however there were two other companies in the same area that occasionally helped them making the total number of guerrillas around 700. The government of Vietnam considered the people in the Son My area to be VC or VC supporters. The soldiers of Charlie Company found themselves in an area where anybody could be the enemy. How were the soldiers to fight, if they could not determine who the enemy was? The enemy’s tactics and techniques played heavily on this weakness. Preferring to remain invisible “The VC made extensive use of mines and "…,” which “In addition to the men…children, women, and old men…” placed overnight. It becomes clear now, that enemy was truly indistinguishable. The VC used mines to slow process to their controlled areas. However successful this tactic was, all it did was create hate and frustration at the unknown enemy.
The hate and frustration is directly linked to the trend of US solders to dehumanize the South Vietnamese, in their minds. The second document examined is a Testimony to the Peers Commission in 1970, by Michael Bernhardt. Bernhardt was a rifleman with the 2nd Squad of the 2nd Platoon who did not take place in the killing of the day. In his testimony to the commission Bernhardt, describes the attitudes of the average GI. According to him the root of the problem is rooted in language, because, “…a person loses a certain aspect for being valued as a human being if you cannot understand them…” He goes on to say, “…since the Vietnamese were speaking something that we could not understand, [US soldiers] felt that they weren’t communicating with anyone.” With such attitudes the norm among soldiers, atrocity is to be expected. If you don’t consider someone human, it opens the gates for murder, rape, and brutality towards them, a well observed fact from the African-American experience in America. Such beliefs were no doubt made worse by the officers, Bernhardt tells of a time after failing to communicate with Vietnamese civilians, ”After that time Lieutenant Calley said to me that “the old man” says -which could mean any “old man,” the company commander, the battalion commander - said that if they don’t stope when you say “dung lai,” you shoot them.” Civilians not stopping due to a failure to communicate may not seem like a reason to be cautious until one thinks that the enemy could be anybody. In this environment of fear and hatred with an invisible enemy, a paranoia arose which combined with American dehumanization encouraged by officers, cultivated the climate of massacre.
Lieutenant William L. Calley was commander of Charlie Company’s 1st Platoon. Calley was known to not be able to read maps or carry out basic operations, and was generally considered to be a bad leader. Despite his ineptness Calley was made a platoon leader because of a shortage of officers. Calley is the subject of the third document, “Testimony at Court-Martial” which took place in 1970. This third document shows how the “climate of massacre” leads to the killing of 500 South Vietnamese. Calley believed that “…all orders were to be assumed legal, that it was a soldier’s job to carry out any order given to him…” Calley believed he was following orders given to him by Capitan Medina when he was slaughtering innocents, because in a briefing the previous night Medina said that people in the area were the ones hurting US soldiers and that it was time to start treating them as enemies. According to Calley he was told to “neutralize My Lai (4) completely…,” by Capitan Medina and he interpreted the the instructions as ”…it was our job to go through destroying everyone and everything in there” The company was told that all civilians had left the area and Calley believed that to the T. When he was killing women, children, and old men he thought he was killing the enemy and was thus right in doing so. Calley elaborates in his testimony, “I was ordered to go in there and destroy the enemy…I did not sit down and think in terms of me, women, and children. They were all classified the same, and that was the classification that we dealt with, just as enemy soldiers, sir.”
So why did a massacre occur on the morning of March 16, 1968? One theory is that the military situation (faceless enemy and their tactics), and the dehumanization of the South Vietnamese created an environment in which massacre was inevitable. It is important to parallels between then and now. We are in a military situation now very similar to Vietnam. We are facing a faceless enemy that blends into the local populace, and uses similar guerilla tactics like those used by the VC, in a war that knows no borders. The prison scandle at Abu-Grav, shows that American forces have dehumanized the enemy. If the US Army didn’t learn its lesson in Vietnam, it might get its second chance soon.