Don't read philosophy on an empty stomach
[What lessons should we learn from what Parfit calls the non-reversibility objection?]
The non-reversibility objection draws attention to the limitations of Kant’s (first) formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Though seemingly unlimited in the way in which it is universally binding, ruling out maxims that cannot be universally accepted rather than telling us which to adopt, Parfit suggests that it fails to take into account the unequal positions from which humans must make these judgements.
The prime example Parfit uses for the non-reversibility objection is that of gender inequality. A man, argues Parfit, can treat women unfairly and still rationally wish it to be a universal law, since he is (obviously) not a woman and so the unfair treatment would not affect him. It is, in other words, the classic defiant response to the statement ‘treat others as you would yourself be treated’: ‘that’s fine, because I don’t care.’ The problem that Parfit singles out here is that people have differing moral values and live under differing circumstances. Think, for example, of a slave-owner’s attitude to slavery or (to some extent) a masochist’s view on torture. A slave-owner would not object to a world in which those of a certain race, class, birth or even due to pure misfortune are bought and sold, and a masochist would probably object less than most to being hurt (though I suppose this is a slightly more complex argument since there are more issues of consent and preference on all sides...), but for some reason we do not assume that an ideal world would be one in which people hurt each other or in which people are bought and sold. Of course, not everyone feels like the masochist or the slave-owner and though the masochist may be able to go about his business without affecting others (we hope), the slaves have little option but to be enslaved. Does this make us inconsistent or irrational in our moral judgements, or is, as Parfit suggests, Kant’s Categorical Imperative really fatally flawed?
Perhaps part of the problem is that Kant fails to make his formula entirely impersonal. Rather than say ‘treat others as you would yourself be treated’, he universalises the formula by saying “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” But this does not remove the issue of personal ‘will’. Take the idea ‘all women should be made to stay at home and do housework’, a man (or woman, I suppose) can easily will this to be a universal law without it affecting his career prospects (or in the case of a woman who wills this, she presumably doesn’t mind the housework). In fact, the simpler formula: ‘treat others as you would yourself be treated’ may work better here, as it could be interpreted to assume some level of equality amongst all people (as long as ‘others’ is taken as ‘all others’ rather than ‘others of the same social/gender/cultural group as yourself’). As it is, Kant’s wording does not allow us to put ourselves in other’s shoes (as was Nagel’s argument - p.271), since he emphasises ‘our will’ in forming our own maxims.
Rawls (p.27) suggests that Kant in fact meant us to make our moral decisions under a ‘veil of ignorance’, through which we discount our own situation (gender, race, class…), but this is also not mentioned in Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Should we take from this that we shouldn’t make assumptions about the words of the cannons of philosophy, even if they seem obvious? Nonetheless, I find it very hard to believe that Kant could have meant anything other than Rawls or Nagel’s suggestions. Parfit seems to be arguing over semantics here, rather than Kant’s actual theories on morality.
Another point to consider is that Kant actually revises his formula in a second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” This new formula leans towards a more uniform idea of equality, bringing on board (to some extent) the consent principle and going back to more of a rule-based ‘what should be done’ (i.e.: people should be treated as an end, not just a means) approach to moral philosophy. Here, the non-reversibility principle can’t apply, since the focus has been taken away our own will - or indeed anyone else’s - to be replaced by the idea of means and ends which, if explored, reveals itself to be more-or-less unrelated in terms of focus to the first formulation. That Parfit chooses, therefore, to focus his objection on Kant’s first formula is somewhat puzzling.
So what can we learn from Parfit’s non-reversibility objection? Well, perhaps most obviously it is not to take the philosophical cannon’s words too much at face value: simple phrasing and claims at universality may not apply in all cases. Also that moral philosophy is prickly largely because there are so many and varying views on morality, depending on who you are, where you come from and what your situation is. In the end though, I am rather inclined to feel that when dealing with moral issues, we shouldn’t get too tied up by semantics. I shall conclude with the sound advice of one of my flatmates: “don’t read philosophy on an empty stomach”.
Sonya Hallett
March 2007
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Bibliography
- Cottingham, John (ed.) - Anthology of Western Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996.
- Kant, Immanuel - Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Thomas K. Abbot trans.), Project Gutenberg, 2004, http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682
- Parfit,?? - Climbing the Mountain (as yet unpublished), latest edition available on http://??
With thanks for advice from my flatmate Aimee Lockwood.