The Boston mooninite Mass-a-cree, part 1
A few days ago, I'd assembled a lengthy essay on what happened, contemporarily, in Boston. Unfortunately it became very lengthy and I never finished the stupid thing; however, you can probably guess the point that I was gearing up to make. I hope that I'll complete it sometime in the near future, but for now, I'd like it to be read while it's topical.
This whole matter isn't over, unfortunately. The Boston city officials and other politicians looking to curry some decent press are continuing to compound their asshattery by remaining indignant and persisting in calling the mooninite signs "hoax devices" though it is patently clear that there was no attempt to "hoax" anyone, and any misinterpretation came from the overactive imaginations of petrified citizens. The citizens, of course, were petrified mainly because of the politicians, mostly Democratic, who use the Republican-created near-hysteria-as-a-way-of-life to control and manipulate the public into doing their bidding.
We can no longer speak about the terrorists "winning" if a certain event happens. It has, and they have.
This whole kerfluffle over the Boston Mooninite thing: as a geek and a politician, I do not expect those in public administration to react with sense when dealing with technology, and this, combined with Boston's historically psychotic methods of city governance (banning, race riots, Big Digs, and so forth), has left me only mildly surprised at not only their initial, hysterical reaction, but their continued histrionic and outwardly laughable attempt to shift the blame and make themselves look not quite so dysfunctional.
The mainstream media may in fact be worse, but again, that is not a surprise, nor is the manufactured consent of those uneducated on the issue that has arisen in its wake. All involved need to have a look here.
It does surprise me, and I'm trying not to let it bother me, that my flist and the LJsphere at large do have a few folks who are adamantly defending the city's actions as if they are justified. The logic goes something like this: they were black boxes sitting on bridges and the like, which had electronic components, and therefore they could be bombs. The only logical response is to treat the devices as if they are bombs until they are proven otherwise. It would be more consise to describe where this mode of thinking does not fall apart rather than where it does, but let me at least point out a few details:
A video of the devices is here. As the accompanying article notes, they consisted of batteries, wires, lights, and a circuit board. Seattle police did not receive any calls about them and characterized them as "obviously not suspicious". Boston police, momentarily forgetting they were not located in an Iraqi province, characterized them as "components consistent with improvised explosive devices." Batteries, wires, lights, a circuit board.
There is, in many technical fields, a process called risk assessment. I've done formal examples myself, for computer systems, but it is one of those processes that cuts across many fields and need not be that involved; indeed, if you are familiar with the writing and advocacy of Bruce Schneier - and if you're not, stop reading what I write immediately and read someone who's smart for a change, beginning with this - you would be convinced that it is a process we should all be applying in our everyday lives. You do risk assessment because you cannot go through life without assuming some risk; the alternative is complete paralysis, an end to your entire lifestyle. (A sermon for another time: the American judicial assumption that all risk has personified causes - in other words, people to blame - is one of the fallacies most injurious to this notion.)
Risk assessment is a way of taking all things into account. That there is a risk of some sort is assumed, but how likely is it? What other explanations are there, and how likely are they? Is there an action which can mitigate this risk? What are the consequences of doing that action...are they better or worse than the risk itself, or its assumption?
Let me give you a personal example. At one point, about two years ago, I was in Union Station in D.C., about to purchase a ticket for the next train to Baltimore, when I discovered I needed more cash. I walked to the ATM near the Metro entrance when I noticed that there was a small paper bag sitting on top of the ATM I was using. It was full, and a tentative poke at it showed that there was something heavy in the bottom of it.
Time for some risk assessment. The most likely scenario was that somebody'd forgotten their lunch, and the object was a can of soda. I couldn't tell for sure, and it seemed heavy, even for that. The risk, of course, was an unattended bag in a train station, which could contain something harmful...however, this wasn't likely: an amount of explosives that small wasn't enough to do much, and chemical or biological agents are very difficult to use properly in an container or fashion, much less a hastily plopped-down paper bag. (And I did make this assessment before the tentative poke, which otherwise may have blown my head off.)
How to mitigate this? I could have grabbed it myself, but if I guessed wrong, I would have been responsible for the problems caused. Also, I'm not a "trained observer" and might not know what to look for in the bag. Further, what would I do with the bag afterwards? If I loudly called the cops or pulled a fire alarm or shouted "UNEXPLODED BAG!!", I may have panicked the whole of the station, likely would have been thrown in jail - and of course I'd have missed my train.
Instead, I walked over to the police kiosk, which I knew was about 150 m inside, and reported the exact location, size, and look of an "unattended bag". The officer thanked me, asked another officer to come with him, and went to check it out. I went off to board my train, and that was that. No alarms, panicking, closing of the station, anything like that.
This whole matter isn't over, unfortunately. The Boston city officials and other politicians looking to curry some decent press are continuing to compound their asshattery by remaining indignant and persisting in calling the mooninite signs "hoax devices" though it is patently clear that there was no attempt to "hoax" anyone, and any misinterpretation came from the overactive imaginations of petrified citizens. The citizens, of course, were petrified mainly because of the politicians, mostly Democratic, who use the Republican-created near-hysteria-as-a-way-of-life to control and manipulate the public into doing their bidding.
We can no longer speak about the terrorists "winning" if a certain event happens. It has, and they have.
This whole kerfluffle over the Boston Mooninite thing: as a geek and a politician, I do not expect those in public administration to react with sense when dealing with technology, and this, combined with Boston's historically psychotic methods of city governance (banning, race riots, Big Digs, and so forth), has left me only mildly surprised at not only their initial, hysterical reaction, but their continued histrionic and outwardly laughable attempt to shift the blame and make themselves look not quite so dysfunctional.
The mainstream media may in fact be worse, but again, that is not a surprise, nor is the manufactured consent of those uneducated on the issue that has arisen in its wake. All involved need to have a look here.
It does surprise me, and I'm trying not to let it bother me, that my flist and the LJsphere at large do have a few folks who are adamantly defending the city's actions as if they are justified. The logic goes something like this: they were black boxes sitting on bridges and the like, which had electronic components, and therefore they could be bombs. The only logical response is to treat the devices as if they are bombs until they are proven otherwise. It would be more consise to describe where this mode of thinking does not fall apart rather than where it does, but let me at least point out a few details:
A video of the devices is here. As the accompanying article notes, they consisted of batteries, wires, lights, and a circuit board. Seattle police did not receive any calls about them and characterized them as "obviously not suspicious". Boston police, momentarily forgetting they were not located in an Iraqi province, characterized them as "components consistent with improvised explosive devices." Batteries, wires, lights, a circuit board.
There is, in many technical fields, a process called risk assessment. I've done formal examples myself, for computer systems, but it is one of those processes that cuts across many fields and need not be that involved; indeed, if you are familiar with the writing and advocacy of Bruce Schneier - and if you're not, stop reading what I write immediately and read someone who's smart for a change, beginning with this - you would be convinced that it is a process we should all be applying in our everyday lives. You do risk assessment because you cannot go through life without assuming some risk; the alternative is complete paralysis, an end to your entire lifestyle. (A sermon for another time: the American judicial assumption that all risk has personified causes - in other words, people to blame - is one of the fallacies most injurious to this notion.)
Risk assessment is a way of taking all things into account. That there is a risk of some sort is assumed, but how likely is it? What other explanations are there, and how likely are they? Is there an action which can mitigate this risk? What are the consequences of doing that action...are they better or worse than the risk itself, or its assumption?
Let me give you a personal example. At one point, about two years ago, I was in Union Station in D.C., about to purchase a ticket for the next train to Baltimore, when I discovered I needed more cash. I walked to the ATM near the Metro entrance when I noticed that there was a small paper bag sitting on top of the ATM I was using. It was full, and a tentative poke at it showed that there was something heavy in the bottom of it.
Time for some risk assessment. The most likely scenario was that somebody'd forgotten their lunch, and the object was a can of soda. I couldn't tell for sure, and it seemed heavy, even for that. The risk, of course, was an unattended bag in a train station, which could contain something harmful...however, this wasn't likely: an amount of explosives that small wasn't enough to do much, and chemical or biological agents are very difficult to use properly in an container or fashion, much less a hastily plopped-down paper bag. (And I did make this assessment before the tentative poke, which otherwise may have blown my head off.)
How to mitigate this? I could have grabbed it myself, but if I guessed wrong, I would have been responsible for the problems caused. Also, I'm not a "trained observer" and might not know what to look for in the bag. Further, what would I do with the bag afterwards? If I loudly called the cops or pulled a fire alarm or shouted "UNEXPLODED BAG!!", I may have panicked the whole of the station, likely would have been thrown in jail - and of course I'd have missed my train.
Instead, I walked over to the police kiosk, which I knew was about 150 m inside, and reported the exact location, size, and look of an "unattended bag". The officer thanked me, asked another officer to come with him, and went to check it out. I went off to board my train, and that was that. No alarms, panicking, closing of the station, anything like that.