Being Towards Death
Being Towards Death
By John Franzen
The possibility of the impossible. Being towards the end. Facing the most extreme possibility of DaSein. Finally, the ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed, which is apodictically certain. These phrases describe important aspects of Martin Heidegger's philosophy on the character of DaSein as being-towards-death.
To begin, let's attempt to find direction within Heidegger's philosophy which allow us to understand his position on being-towards-death. DaSein is thrown into a world, it cannot exist without the world, and the world cannot exist without it. DaSein, as being-in-the-world, observes with clarity the being of the world that is nearest it, and judging on the truth of the being it observes, comes to certain conclusions about how, when, and why it will deal with the being it encounters. It is a being of possibilities, it projects itself onto(or into) the world. Thus, it's nature is that it always observes it's ability to act according to it's circumstances. Any possibility which is available to it remains projected into the not-yet.
Certainly, not everything is possible for DaSein. It is clearly not possible for a man to throw an average phone 50 feet high into the air, consistent with the standards of the being of the world in that gravity, a lack of physiological strength, and other inhibiting factors will prevent this from occurring. Situations, and circumstances, dictate the ability of DaSein to act upon it's environment. It revels in the clarity, namely, it is what it is, and it is possible to do whatever it is possible to do.
While it is mostly apparent what DaSein cannot do physically, we are only trying to establish that DaSein cannot do anything that it cannot do, if that tautology shows us the primordial character of DaSein in that it is a Being which does not change over time in that it is only allowed by its circumstances to do what is available. This concept of being-with-the-world, not above it's being or separated from it, allows us to show that possibilities are essential to the character of DaSein. In reference to the character of DaSein in that it is a Being which projects it's possibilities into the world and cannot contradict that which is not yet actualized, we should discuss one's ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed, which is of our greatest concern as the most extreme possibility which is found to to be upon examination the possibility of the possible, a contradiction to our existence which in being-towards it we are staring at our own demise, the possibility our non-existence, our death.
In the nature of DaSein, which is always in the mode of being-towards the world, it projects itself onto working with beings in the world, but at the same time unlike any of these beings it encounters in the environment it has the ability of self reflection and clarification of it's own nature. Our present discussion will encounter the circumstances in which DaSein reveals it's ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed, which is an indefinite certainty. Exercising clarity, or to Heidegger exercising the authentic, will bring to the front of our minds that most extreme possibility of DaSein. The wholeness of DaSein, in it's totality, is attained only when the constitution of all parts and possibilities of DaSein are completely examined. Thus, we must examine not only the aspects within the character of DaSein's life, but the most extreme possibility as death as the no longer being-towards, and the paradox of existence that DaSein faces when it's own existence is contemplated in regards to the nothingness of it's own demise.
This very brief introduction to our subject of DaSein as a being-towards the world, but more explicitly being-towards-death, will suffice for now until we can redress any grievances contained in the misstatement of the concepts contained therein. The important element established is that DaSein is always a Being of possibilities. So, as one of the world's most prominent continental philosophers of his time, Heidegger would naturally draw criticism for his complicated and fantastic views on the nature of existence, wherein for him the question of Being remained more important than those philosophies diffused from such an important question. Naturally, a philosopher with the impact of Heidegger, no matter how controversial to Cartesian grounding of existence his writings were, would attract criticism and also praise.
Particularly of concern in our present discussion will be the criticism of Heidegger originating from Paul Edwards, a Professor of Philosophy who decided to critique Heidegger's concept of death as one's ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed as certain. Hopefully, the aforementioned pointers will guide us in our examination of the critique, which itself will be a potential hermeneutical circle in defending Heidegger from Edwards' attacks. Basically, we can hope to reassert the true representation of DaSein as a Being of possibilities, rather than the misinterpretation of Edwards in regards to what he considers a contradiction of Heidegger's use of the term possibility.
First and foremost in our examination of the text presented against Heidegger's philosophy of being-towards-death, I feel it necessary to note Edwards' seeming preoccupation with deeming any work with which he finds tiresome or unnecessary to be "unoriginal"(1). He uses the phrase several times throughout his critique, in conjunction with several other key phrases which I believe to be necessary in discerning the usefulness of his work on Heidegger much as he has discerned the usefulness of Heidegger's work on death itself.
Edwards' first concern with Heidegger's work comes in the form of a lack of example, which we will find later on will be a problem for Edwards himself. I quote, "Knowing is of a non-theoretical kind. None of this is terribly clear and, as usual, not a single illustration is provided."(2) Let's put this criticism in context. The premise on which Edwards' critique lies is that Heidegger has used the term possibility in two distinct manners which he has secretly hidden from his readers. The confusion which ensues(according to Edwards) is that in the matter of death as one's ownmost nonrelational possibility, Heidegger considers the matter as a possibility of DaSein. Edwards claims that in actuality what Heidegger refers to is actuality rather than possibility, and accuses him of using wordplay in an unnecessary fashion.
But it is here that Edwards misunderstands the nature of DaSein. DaSein is by it's nature a being of possibilities, never of actuality. It is always looking forward, or "running at"(3) possibilities. According to the critique, however, these misunderstandings(relayed as revelations) are not only his, but of all readers of Heidegger. The concept of unecessary wordplay is that Heidegger says in many words what he himself has stated, that death is a nothingness in which we cease to exist. I think what is important here is that Edwards fails to grasp the nature of DaSein, once again, in that it is always running to something, and that at it's death it simply ceases to be; this does not change the fact that it never stopped running, and it's nature was always that of projecting possibilities until it ceased to be, at which point there was no actuality to DaSein itself. The moment is ceased to be, it ceased to be for all time, in the present and into the future and thus does not need such intangible terms as the ones presented to us by Edwards, for example deadness, the moment of death, the cause of death, and all things unrelated to the nature of DaSein as a living thing which ceases to exist. Heidegger states that death is an individual undertaking, that we cannot actualize death until it occurs, as which points we have not actualized it at all because we have ceased to be.
At times the attack reverts first to an acknowledgment of the true meaning of Heidegger's sentiment, while soon-thereafter an expounding upon the misunderstanding of Edwards' interpretations of what he has just stated(4). In fact, there is a thread of bitterness which should be enough to turn anyone off from his philosophy at least in regards to our present discussion. Take for example his analysis of the inauthentic life, and the inability of an inauthentic being to grasp the truthful acknowledgment of the nature of his being(DaSein). Two characteristics pertaining to DaSein looking at death are seen as inauthentic: Brooding, and expecting. In both of these, for Heidegger, a man fails to be authentic in moving towards his death.(5) Edwards claims that a man with these two approaches to death may have just as clear thoughts of the inevitable certainty of death, that the inauthentic life may also acknowledge the primordial truth of the nature of death in that it is a dive into nothingness. Once again until Edwards understands DaSein he will not understand the particular point of view presented by DaSein's death. He repeatedly objectifies death, and he does it in such a way that to Heidegger he goes no further in his examination than the "they".
Namely now, Edwards fails to see the nature of DaSein as that of possibilities only, that it must look past itself at all times, it cannot imagine it's own demise because by truly actualizing the thought of demise DaSein would bring a demise upon itself. If I could try to paraphrase the role of DaSein in regards to death: DaSein is an infinite being in nature in that it truly cannot imagine it's own demise. It's demise is the possibility of impossibility, a contradiction, an absurdity. Thus, there is no knowing death, only knowing the possibility of it. This is the nature of DaSein, which Edwards repeatedly neglects. Vicariously we see death in others, but once again death is our own and highly individualized.
On numerous occasions Edwards claims that Heidegger and his follows have done thus and thus, but as usual fails to provide an example for Heidegger's role in the misunderstanding. The only real criticism found in the cutting is that not only is Heidegger right with as many words as he is, but it is "perverse" to accomplish such a wordplay on the nature of death(6). Basically, he is angry at Heidegger for not coming right out and saying that in death there is nothingness; everything DaSein knows, ends at death. For all of time, however, Edwards has missed the true character of DaSein as a being of possibilities. It is faced with the possibility of it's in-existence in death, and thus to DaSein death is much more complicated than nothingness. Of course when DaSein actually passes away, it no longer existing, is drawn into nothingness no longer existing.
So Edwards is right that death is ultimately the end of DaSein. But what he considers perverse and unnecessary in Heidegger's philosophy on death is in reality a very important aspect of the being-towards-death that DaSein experiences in life. To ignore the being-towards-the-end of DaSein would be missing not the crown moment, which Heidegger himself could be any moment in life when you are being authentic and at your peak, but missing one of the most important aspects of DaSein. Faced with it's own existence meeting demise, DaSein sees the possibility of impossibility in it's possible in-existence.
Endnotes
1. Edwards, Death as Possibility, 558.
2. Edwards, Death as Possibility, 550.
3. 557.
4. 557.
5. 561.
6. 549.
Bibliography
Guignon, Charles. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1995.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Division Two, Part I, Sections 46-53.
Paul Edwards. Heidegger and Death as ‘Possibility’. Mind LXXXIV: 548-566.
By John Franzen
The possibility of the impossible. Being towards the end. Facing the most extreme possibility of DaSein. Finally, the ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed, which is apodictically certain. These phrases describe important aspects of Martin Heidegger's philosophy on the character of DaSein as being-towards-death.
To begin, let's attempt to find direction within Heidegger's philosophy which allow us to understand his position on being-towards-death. DaSein is thrown into a world, it cannot exist without the world, and the world cannot exist without it. DaSein, as being-in-the-world, observes with clarity the being of the world that is nearest it, and judging on the truth of the being it observes, comes to certain conclusions about how, when, and why it will deal with the being it encounters. It is a being of possibilities, it projects itself onto(or into) the world. Thus, it's nature is that it always observes it's ability to act according to it's circumstances. Any possibility which is available to it remains projected into the not-yet.
Certainly, not everything is possible for DaSein. It is clearly not possible for a man to throw an average phone 50 feet high into the air, consistent with the standards of the being of the world in that gravity, a lack of physiological strength, and other inhibiting factors will prevent this from occurring. Situations, and circumstances, dictate the ability of DaSein to act upon it's environment. It revels in the clarity, namely, it is what it is, and it is possible to do whatever it is possible to do.
While it is mostly apparent what DaSein cannot do physically, we are only trying to establish that DaSein cannot do anything that it cannot do, if that tautology shows us the primordial character of DaSein in that it is a Being which does not change over time in that it is only allowed by its circumstances to do what is available. This concept of being-with-the-world, not above it's being or separated from it, allows us to show that possibilities are essential to the character of DaSein. In reference to the character of DaSein in that it is a Being which projects it's possibilities into the world and cannot contradict that which is not yet actualized, we should discuss one's ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed, which is of our greatest concern as the most extreme possibility which is found to to be upon examination the possibility of the possible, a contradiction to our existence which in being-towards it we are staring at our own demise, the possibility our non-existence, our death.
In the nature of DaSein, which is always in the mode of being-towards the world, it projects itself onto working with beings in the world, but at the same time unlike any of these beings it encounters in the environment it has the ability of self reflection and clarification of it's own nature. Our present discussion will encounter the circumstances in which DaSein reveals it's ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed, which is an indefinite certainty. Exercising clarity, or to Heidegger exercising the authentic, will bring to the front of our minds that most extreme possibility of DaSein. The wholeness of DaSein, in it's totality, is attained only when the constitution of all parts and possibilities of DaSein are completely examined. Thus, we must examine not only the aspects within the character of DaSein's life, but the most extreme possibility as death as the no longer being-towards, and the paradox of existence that DaSein faces when it's own existence is contemplated in regards to the nothingness of it's own demise.
This very brief introduction to our subject of DaSein as a being-towards the world, but more explicitly being-towards-death, will suffice for now until we can redress any grievances contained in the misstatement of the concepts contained therein. The important element established is that DaSein is always a Being of possibilities. So, as one of the world's most prominent continental philosophers of his time, Heidegger would naturally draw criticism for his complicated and fantastic views on the nature of existence, wherein for him the question of Being remained more important than those philosophies diffused from such an important question. Naturally, a philosopher with the impact of Heidegger, no matter how controversial to Cartesian grounding of existence his writings were, would attract criticism and also praise.
Particularly of concern in our present discussion will be the criticism of Heidegger originating from Paul Edwards, a Professor of Philosophy who decided to critique Heidegger's concept of death as one's ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed as certain. Hopefully, the aforementioned pointers will guide us in our examination of the critique, which itself will be a potential hermeneutical circle in defending Heidegger from Edwards' attacks. Basically, we can hope to reassert the true representation of DaSein as a Being of possibilities, rather than the misinterpretation of Edwards in regards to what he considers a contradiction of Heidegger's use of the term possibility.
First and foremost in our examination of the text presented against Heidegger's philosophy of being-towards-death, I feel it necessary to note Edwards' seeming preoccupation with deeming any work with which he finds tiresome or unnecessary to be "unoriginal"(1). He uses the phrase several times throughout his critique, in conjunction with several other key phrases which I believe to be necessary in discerning the usefulness of his work on Heidegger much as he has discerned the usefulness of Heidegger's work on death itself.
Edwards' first concern with Heidegger's work comes in the form of a lack of example, which we will find later on will be a problem for Edwards himself. I quote, "Knowing is of a non-theoretical kind. None of this is terribly clear and, as usual, not a single illustration is provided."(2) Let's put this criticism in context. The premise on which Edwards' critique lies is that Heidegger has used the term possibility in two distinct manners which he has secretly hidden from his readers. The confusion which ensues(according to Edwards) is that in the matter of death as one's ownmost nonrelational possibility, Heidegger considers the matter as a possibility of DaSein. Edwards claims that in actuality what Heidegger refers to is actuality rather than possibility, and accuses him of using wordplay in an unnecessary fashion.
But it is here that Edwards misunderstands the nature of DaSein. DaSein is by it's nature a being of possibilities, never of actuality. It is always looking forward, or "running at"(3) possibilities. According to the critique, however, these misunderstandings(relayed as revelations) are not only his, but of all readers of Heidegger. The concept of unecessary wordplay is that Heidegger says in many words what he himself has stated, that death is a nothingness in which we cease to exist. I think what is important here is that Edwards fails to grasp the nature of DaSein, once again, in that it is always running to something, and that at it's death it simply ceases to be; this does not change the fact that it never stopped running, and it's nature was always that of projecting possibilities until it ceased to be, at which point there was no actuality to DaSein itself. The moment is ceased to be, it ceased to be for all time, in the present and into the future and thus does not need such intangible terms as the ones presented to us by Edwards, for example deadness, the moment of death, the cause of death, and all things unrelated to the nature of DaSein as a living thing which ceases to exist. Heidegger states that death is an individual undertaking, that we cannot actualize death until it occurs, as which points we have not actualized it at all because we have ceased to be.
At times the attack reverts first to an acknowledgment of the true meaning of Heidegger's sentiment, while soon-thereafter an expounding upon the misunderstanding of Edwards' interpretations of what he has just stated(4). In fact, there is a thread of bitterness which should be enough to turn anyone off from his philosophy at least in regards to our present discussion. Take for example his analysis of the inauthentic life, and the inability of an inauthentic being to grasp the truthful acknowledgment of the nature of his being(DaSein). Two characteristics pertaining to DaSein looking at death are seen as inauthentic: Brooding, and expecting. In both of these, for Heidegger, a man fails to be authentic in moving towards his death.(5) Edwards claims that a man with these two approaches to death may have just as clear thoughts of the inevitable certainty of death, that the inauthentic life may also acknowledge the primordial truth of the nature of death in that it is a dive into nothingness. Once again until Edwards understands DaSein he will not understand the particular point of view presented by DaSein's death. He repeatedly objectifies death, and he does it in such a way that to Heidegger he goes no further in his examination than the "they".
Namely now, Edwards fails to see the nature of DaSein as that of possibilities only, that it must look past itself at all times, it cannot imagine it's own demise because by truly actualizing the thought of demise DaSein would bring a demise upon itself. If I could try to paraphrase the role of DaSein in regards to death: DaSein is an infinite being in nature in that it truly cannot imagine it's own demise. It's demise is the possibility of impossibility, a contradiction, an absurdity. Thus, there is no knowing death, only knowing the possibility of it. This is the nature of DaSein, which Edwards repeatedly neglects. Vicariously we see death in others, but once again death is our own and highly individualized.
On numerous occasions Edwards claims that Heidegger and his follows have done thus and thus, but as usual fails to provide an example for Heidegger's role in the misunderstanding. The only real criticism found in the cutting is that not only is Heidegger right with as many words as he is, but it is "perverse" to accomplish such a wordplay on the nature of death(6). Basically, he is angry at Heidegger for not coming right out and saying that in death there is nothingness; everything DaSein knows, ends at death. For all of time, however, Edwards has missed the true character of DaSein as a being of possibilities. It is faced with the possibility of it's in-existence in death, and thus to DaSein death is much more complicated than nothingness. Of course when DaSein actually passes away, it no longer existing, is drawn into nothingness no longer existing.
So Edwards is right that death is ultimately the end of DaSein. But what he considers perverse and unnecessary in Heidegger's philosophy on death is in reality a very important aspect of the being-towards-death that DaSein experiences in life. To ignore the being-towards-the-end of DaSein would be missing not the crown moment, which Heidegger himself could be any moment in life when you are being authentic and at your peak, but missing one of the most important aspects of DaSein. Faced with it's own existence meeting demise, DaSein sees the possibility of impossibility in it's possible in-existence.
Endnotes
1. Edwards, Death as Possibility, 558.
2. Edwards, Death as Possibility, 550.
3. 557.
4. 557.
5. 561.
6. 549.
Bibliography
Guignon, Charles. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1995.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Division Two, Part I, Sections 46-53.
Paul Edwards. Heidegger and Death as ‘Possibility’. Mind LXXXIV: 548-566.