Auschwitz
I would like to take some time to comment on Bush's comments that we "should have bombed it." While Bush has a graduate degree, it is from Harvard Business School and should not carry the same distinction as a M.A., M.S. or Ph.D. earned in a real academic discipline like political science, history, the hard sciences, literature to name a few disciplines.
The first question is what is this "it" Bush was speaking of? The rail line connecting the camp to the outside world or rail stations along the route? The camp itself? Did the OSS and MI-5 have acccurate intel regarding the layout of the camp--which was a gigantic facility? After all, I doubt the Germans would mind if we bombed the camp and only succeeded in killing inmates, which would be handing the Reich a major propaganda victory.
Having recon missions shoot some film of Auschwitz is vastly different from attacking its support infrastructure or camp facilities itself. There were no "smart" weapons back during the 1940s (although the Germans were experimenting with remote-controlled bombs and missiles, thereby laying the groundwork for all the weapons we have today). How many miles of rails would be targeted for destruction? At what point would the lines be bombed--within Germany or into western or central Poland? How often would follow-up strikes be made--especially to target German railroad repair units?
This is an important question, since, without adequate fighter cover, Eighth Air Force and RAF bombers would be at the mercy of the [i]Luftwaffe[/i]; they would be shredded to pieces. The P-51 Mustang lacked the range--even with fuel tanks--to provide fighter cover all the way to the target--forget about the second leg of the round trip.
Interestingly, hang-wringing over this has never included the "ally" with the far more mundane logistical hurdles to leap over: the Soviet Union. The Red Air Force would have been in a far superior position to cut all links between Auschwitz and the outside world. They would have had assets far closer to it than the US or Britain.
The quickest way to stop the Holocaust was to defeat the German military in the field.
The first question is what is this "it" Bush was speaking of? The rail line connecting the camp to the outside world or rail stations along the route? The camp itself? Did the OSS and MI-5 have acccurate intel regarding the layout of the camp--which was a gigantic facility? After all, I doubt the Germans would mind if we bombed the camp and only succeeded in killing inmates, which would be handing the Reich a major propaganda victory.
Having recon missions shoot some film of Auschwitz is vastly different from attacking its support infrastructure or camp facilities itself. There were no "smart" weapons back during the 1940s (although the Germans were experimenting with remote-controlled bombs and missiles, thereby laying the groundwork for all the weapons we have today). How many miles of rails would be targeted for destruction? At what point would the lines be bombed--within Germany or into western or central Poland? How often would follow-up strikes be made--especially to target German railroad repair units?
This is an important question, since, without adequate fighter cover, Eighth Air Force and RAF bombers would be at the mercy of the [i]Luftwaffe[/i]; they would be shredded to pieces. The P-51 Mustang lacked the range--even with fuel tanks--to provide fighter cover all the way to the target--forget about the second leg of the round trip.
Interestingly, hang-wringing over this has never included the "ally" with the far more mundane logistical hurdles to leap over: the Soviet Union. The Red Air Force would have been in a far superior position to cut all links between Auschwitz and the outside world. They would have had assets far closer to it than the US or Britain.
The quickest way to stop the Holocaust was to defeat the German military in the field.